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Abstract
China's banking sector has undergone remarkable changes during the last two
decades, and banks in China today face more competitive pressure than ever
before. The objective of this thesis is to investigate the efficiency and competition
of the major Chinese banks over the period 1985-2002.
After reviewing the evolution of the banking sector over the past half-century, the
thesis addresses an important aspect of competition: X-efficiency and its potential
correlates. X-efficiency is found to be as low as 40%-50% on average, suggesting
that it is an important issue which should receive more attention from researchers,
bank regulators and managers. State-owned banks are found to be less X-efficient
than joint-stock banks, confirming the need for a shift in favour of shareholder
owned banks. X-efficiency is also found to be more pronounced in the first stage
of banking reform, implying that further interest rate liberalisation is necessary to
help bank managers to be better able to control their costs. Tests for the presence
of economies of scale and scope follow. The evidence is mixed but suggests that
banks' cost structures may improve if the law prohibiting universal banking is
relaxed. Finally, both the market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses are
examined using a random effects panel data model. Some evidence is found to
support the relevant market-power hypothesis and the X-efficiency version of the
efficient-structure hypothesis for banks in the first and second reform stages,
respectively, suggesting that the government's gradual approach to reform has
improved the competitive structure of the banking sector. However, policy should
be directed at enabling the more efficient banks to gain larger market shares. For
example, the expansion of the joint-stock banks should be encouraged. There is
little evidence of a 'quiet life' for the big four (state-owned) banks. However,
while interest rate liberalisation should improve bank efficiency, policy makers
must be aware of possible negative effects such as excessive market power, 'quiet
life' effects, and other anti-competitive behaviour.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
"Bank professionals require a thorough grounding in the micro foundations of banking, f they are
to make important managerial decisions, or implement banking policies."
Heffernan (Modern Banking in Theory and Practice, 1996, p.1)
1.1 Introduction
Both policymakers and bank managers are concerned with the issue of how
efficiently banks transform their various inputs into multiple financial products
and services, as well as how competitive the market is to enable banks with
greater efficiency to attain higher profitability and a larger market share
accordingly. Inspired by Heffernan (1996) and others, this thesis is devoted to the
important micro issues of China's banking sector: efficiency and competition.
In the literature, two types of efficiency are discussed in the context of cost
minimization. X-efficiency refers to the ability to select the optimal scale and/or
mix of inputs, given the output bundle and input prices. Scale and scope
efficiency, usually measured by economies of scale and scope, is the ability to
choose the optimal scale and mix of outputs, assuming that all banks are
approximately equally X-efficient (Berger, 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1994).
As argued by Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Kumbhakar (1991, 1996), X-
efficiency and economies of scale and scope should be taken as complementary,
rather than as substitutes for each other.
Efficiency is a critical issue for bank regulators. Improved banking efficiency
should result in better resource allocation, which will benefit society by
intermediating greater amounts of funds, providing more products with better
prices and service quality for clients, improving bank profitability, and achieving
greater safety and soundness in the banking sector if efficiency savings are
applied towards improving capital buffers that absorb risk. Of course, the
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converse applies if structural changes lead to less efficient intermediaries, with the
additional danger of taxpayer-financed bailouts if substantial losses are sustained
(Berger, Hunter, and Timme, 1993). For these reasons, over the last two decades a
large number of developed and developing countries have undertaken extensive
banking reforms aimed at raising the efficiency of the banking sector.
Efficiency is also an important issue for bank managers because deregulation-
induced changes, technological progress and market integration release new
competitive pressures and accelerate the capacity and need for change. In
response to this new environment, banks have followed many different strategies,
which include rationalization, restructuring, consolidation etc., to improve their
efficiency (Molyneux, Altunbas, and Gardener, 1996).
Therefore, the study of efficiency could help banking regulators to design policies
by assessing the effects of banking reform, mergers or market structure on
efficiency. Bank managers could improve managerial performance by identifying
"best and worst practices" associated with high and low X-efficiency respectively
and encouraging the former practices while discouraging the latter. Bank
managers could also design growth and risk strategies by identifying the optimal
scale and mix of bank outputs.
The structure—performance relationship has been extensively investigated in the
literature to address the question of how competitive the banking market is and/or
whether anti-trust policy is an effective force. Usually two types of hypothesis
have been tested: the market-power and the efficient-structure hypotheses. Under
the market-power hypothesis, firms in a concentrated market or with a large
market share and well-differentiated products may exercise market power in
pricing and earn supernormal profits. Under the efficient-structure hypothesis, the
low costs of production of relatively efficient firms enable them to compete more
aggressively, capture a bigger market share and earn high profits.
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These two hypotheses have directly opposing implications for anti-trust policy. If
high profits are created by market power, then anti-trust enforcement may be
socially beneficial, moving prices toward competitive levels and allocating
resources more effectively. By contrast, if greater efficiency is the explanation for
high profits, then breaking up efficient firms or forbidding efficient firms to
acquire other firms may raise costs and lead to less favourable prices for
consumers (Berger and Hannan, 1997).
1.2 Objectives of this Thesis
Over the past two decades, China's economy has achieved an average annual
growth rate of 9.5 percent and accomplished a remarkable improvement in the
standard of living of its population of 1.2 billion. China's GDP constituted almost
one-fifth of the total GDP of all developing countries by 2002 (World Bank,
2004). Considering its enormous size, China's economic development and its
transition to a market economy is of global significance.
At the centre of the economic reforms, China's banking sector has undergone
significant changes over the last two decades. The reforms were gradual and in
two stages, combining structural and conduct deregulation with new regulation.
Technological progress has also enhanced competition by eliminating
geographical barriers and facilitating product innovation. Therefore, banks in
China today face more competitive pressure than ever before.
In response to these changes, banks have attempted to adopt strategies aimed at
improving efficiency to enhance their competitive viability. The streamlining of
the state-owned banks, the expansion of the joint-stock banks, the diversification
of portfolios, the innovation in the off-balance-sheet activities, and, more recently,
the joint-stock reform of the state banks can be interpreted as responses of this
kind. A major motivation has been the drive to realize potential scale and scope
economies, and also to eliminate X-inefficiencies.
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In the light of these developments, and noting that China's WTO accession may
lead to an increasingly integrated banking market, it is important to investigate X-
efficiency and cost economies as well as the structure-performance relationship
issues in China's banking sector. An empirical investigation may yield insights
that will be of interest to academics, bankers and policymakers. However, to date,
no published econometric analysis has appeared which investigates these critical
issues. The purpose of this thesis is to fill this void.
The main objective of this thesis is to address the following questions:
. How X-efficient is China's banking sector?
• Has the gradual banking reform improved the X-efficiency of the banking
system?
• Is there empirical evidence to support the view that significant efficiency
improvements will result from the ongoing joint-stock reform of the state
banks?
• Are there any economies or diseconomies of scale and scope in China's
banking sector?
• Do economies or diseconomies of scale and scope differ across ownership
types?
• Has the gradual banking reform improved the cost structure of the banking
sector?
• How competitive is China's banking market? Does it follow the "market-
power hypotheses" or the "efficient-structure hypotheses"?
• Do the big four state banks enjoy a "quiet life"?
This research contributes to the banking literature in the following ways. The
thesis:
• collects and translates (into English) micro-banking data for China;
• provides a comprehensive overview of China's banking sector over the
period 1949-2003;
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• undertakes a preliminary exploration of bank performance using a random
effects panel data model;
• for the first time, conducts an econometric analysis of X-efficiency in
China's banking sector;
• for the first time, tests the presence of economies of scale and scope in
China's banking sector;
• for the first time, tests a variety of hypotheses related to the structure-
performance relationship, using Chinese data;
• uses the results of the econometric tests to discuss the effectiveness of
China's banking reform, and provide policy suggestions for future reform.
This thesis is organized as follows:' Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of the
banking sector during the period 1949-2003, providing a background for the more
detailed econometric analyses of the key micro issues presented in subsequent
chapters. After briefly describing the socialist banking model, the two-stage
banking reform that occurred after 1979 is discussed in detail. Evidence is
presented to show the impact of the most important developments on the
institutional structure and market shares, trends in the non-performing loans and
the composition of banking business, and trends in costs, profitability and
efficiency. Finally, a random effects panel data model is estimated for a
preliminary exploration of bank performance.
Chapter 3 estimates X-efficiency within the banking sector from 1985 to 2002. A
stochastic cost frontier model is employed to measure X-efficiency, with three
different assumptions (i.e., half-normal, exponential, and truncated-normal) being
applied to the disturbance distribution. A two-stage regression model is then
estimated to identify the potential correlates of X-efficiency. In light of the
findings on X-efficiency, the question of how the gradual banking reforms
influenced the respective X-efficiency is discussed. It is also possible to address
The standard literature review does not appear immediately after this chapter, because separate
literature exists for each of the main topics in this thesis. Literature reviews appear at the
beginning of the chapters on X-efficiency, scale and scope economies and the structure-
performance relationship.
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the issue of whether X-efficiency was affected by differences in the type of bank
ownership.
Chapter 4 tests for the presence of the economies of scale and scope in the
banking sector over the last two decades using the stochastic frontier approach
and the expansion path measures. For completeness, the traditional non-frontier
approach and the standard measures are also applied. Economies of scale and
scope between banks with different forms of ownership and/or in different reform
stages are also compared.
Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between market structure and performance
in the banking system over the same period. The random effects panel data model,
which incorporates the measures of concentration, market share, X-efficiency, and
scale efficiency directly in the regression, is employed to test both market-power
and efficient-structure hypotheses. In addition, the issue of whether or not the big
four banks enjoy a "quiet life" is tested. The standard pooled data regression
model is also estimated to check for robustness. The findings are used to assess
whether the reforms affected the competitive structure.
Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the major findings, identifying the
limitations of the study, and making suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2: China's Banking Sector: An Overview
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews China's banking sector pre- and post-1979, providing a
background for the detailed empirical analyses of the efficiency and competition
issues presented in subsequent chapters. Section 2.2 explains the monopolistic
banking sector before 1979. Section 2.3 describes the first stage of banking reform
between 1979 and 1992, which created a two-tier system. Section 2.4 discusses
the second stage of banking reform after 1993, the aim of which was to create an
efficient, competitive, and sound banking sector. Section 2.5 provides stylized
facts on major Chinese banks from 1985 to 2002. A number of figures and
tabulations of banking sector data are presented, which highlight the impact of the
most important developments on the institutional structure and market shares, the
composition of banking outputs, and trends in costs, profitability and efficiency.
Section 2.6 undertakes a preliminary exploration of the issue of bank performance
using a random effects panel data model. Section 2.7 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Pre 1979: A Banking Monopoly
Before 1979, China had a monopolistic system modelled after that of the Soviet
Union. The People's Bank of China (PBC) acted as the centre of cash, credit and
settlement, simultaneously engaged in both central and commercial banking
operations. The main objective was to channel funds in accordance with the state
plan. The PBC's functions included currency issue, transaction clearing, setting
interest rates, and managing the foreign exchange reserves. Monetary and credit
policy consisted of direct control of the credit aggregate and currency in
circulation.
The major policy instrument used to control the credit aggregate was called "tong
cun tong dai". The PBC centralized all deposits collected by its over 15,000
branches and sub-branches. Credits were allocated to production agents via its
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branches according to the state physical production plan (Yu, Xin, and Qu, 2000).
Interest rates were uniform. There were only two different interest rates for
deposits: one for current savings accounts and the other for fixed savings
accounts. Interest rates for loans were the same for all credit to industrial and
commercial enterprises, regardless of the duration of the loans, the uses for which
the loan were granted, and whether the loans were overdue. Thus, they had no
appropriate impact on the mobilization and allocation of funds (Zhou, 1992).
The PBC also had a monopoly over commercial banking, such as deposit
collection and short-term lending. At the end of 1978, the total deposits and total
loans of the PBC amounted to RM1B 113.45 bn (or USD70.94 bn) and RMB 185 bn
(or USD117.3 bn)2, respectively3.
On the eve of reform, China had three other banks and a network of rural credit
cooperatives. They were nominal banks: none operated as independent economic
entities. The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was established in 1951. Between
1951 and 1978, it underwent several stages of merger and restoration, but was,
effectively, a department of the PBC. The Bank of China (BOC) was initially
founded in 1912. From the 1950's to the 1970's, it was a subsidiary of the PBC
specializing in foreign exchange related banking business. The China
Construction Bank (CCB) 4 was first created in 1954. Prior to 1979, the CCB acted
as a fiscal agent for processing annual budgetary allocations for capital
construction from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and disbursed and administered
the funds designated in accordance with the state's plans for key construction
projects.
The rural credit cooperatives (RCC5) were first established at bases of the Red
Army before the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded. At that time,
2 The exchange rate at the end of each year is applied throughout this chapter. For details of
exchange rates for each year, please see Appendix 2.1.
of China's Finance and Banking (1989).
China Construction Bank was known as the People's Construction Bank of China before March
1996.
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they were called peasant's own banks. After the founding of the PRC, RCCs were
gradually transformed into units of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) (Zhou,
1992). The RCCs were the grass roots of the ABC, and mobilized deposits from
the rural population. They engaged in relatively little lending.
There were two reasons for the formation of the monopolistic banking system.
First, household savings, the major source of bank deposits in developing market
economies, were extraordinarily small, due to the low wage incomes policy that
had been operated since 1957. In 1978, the entire cumulative stock of household
savings was only RMB21.06 bn (or USD13.35 bn), about 5.8% of GDP 5 . Second,
investments for firms' fixed assets were financed predominantly from interest-free
budgetary grants. The state budget was even the source of much of the working
capital of state-owned enterprises. Banks focused on short-term rather than long-
term loans to state-owned enterprises. Under these circumstances, the major role
of the banking sector was quite circumscribed.
2.3 The Two-tier Banking Sector (1979-1992)
The economic reforms in China started after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Party Congress in 1978. One of the major goals of this economic reform was to
improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the domestic economy. The policy
changed to a focus on decentralization in the distribution of national income and
the allocation of financial resources. As a result, government revenues as a
proportion of the GDP have declined significantly since 1979. By the mid-1980s,
Chinese households had emerged as the principal source of savings in the
economy. In 1979 the government also declared that investment funds for
enterprises' fixed assets would no longer be granted exclusively from the cost-free
state budget. It also declared that bank loans, which were subject to interest
charges, would gradually replace budgetary grants.
of China's Finance and Banking (2001).
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Being central to the major goals, China's banking sector was reformed at the same
time. The objective was for the banking sector to serve as an intermediary
between savers and borrowers and to facilitate payments between economic units.
This reform strategy was consistent with that of the overall economic reform in
China, which, unlike many transitional economies in Eastern Europe, adopted a
gradual approach. It is characterized by partial experimentation and a trial-and-
error approach. The successes and failures of these experiments influenced the
decisions on the future direction of reform policy (Jin, 1994).
There was a debate on the optimal pace and sequence of banking reforms. Some
argued that China's gradual approach to banking reform would have a minimizing
impact on the existing market order, preserved a high savings rate for economic
development, and contributed to superior economic performance (e.g. Murrell,
1995; Walder, 1996). Although not denying the success of China's strategy,
others argued that its initial conditions were unique and that the Chinese approach
was not suitable for other transition economies (e.g. Woo, 1994; Sachs and Woo,
1994). More importantly, the economic cost of the gradual reform strategy in
China was quite high, for example, the large and rising amount of non-performing
loans (e.g. Lardy, 1998; Lo, 2001). The details of the debate are not covered here
because the objective of this thesis is to focus on efficiency and competitive issues
within the Chinese banking sector.
2.3.1 Reform of the PBC
To strengthen the central bank's capacity for macroeconomic management, the
State Council decided, in September 1983, that the PBC should function as a
central bank. After four state-owned specialized banks were rebuilt or established
to take over part of its commercial business, on January 1, 1984 the PBC was left
to deal mainly with central banking functions, while its institutional structure was
left unchanged.
The main responsibilities of the PBC were stipulated in the "Interim Regulations
10
/
on Bank Management" in January 1986, according to which the PBC was
responsible for issuing currency, the maintenance of price stability, setting interest
rates on deposits and loans, devising state credit plans, exercising centralized
control over credit funds, exercising uniform control over the working capital of
state enterprises, and supervising China's foreign exchange business. The PBC
was also responsible for the supervision of all other financial institutions.
The objectives of monetary and credit policy were defined as 'promoting
economic development and stabilizing price' in 19866. As indicated by Wu
(1998), in practice, development took precedence over price stability until 1995.
The major instruments of monetary and credit policy included the credit-quota
plan and the PBC "zai dai kuan" (PBC lending) .
Within the framework of expected output and price developments, the PBC
combined the fund sources of all banks to set up a credit-quota plan, which
included an overall credit ceiling on both state-owned specialized banks and
medium and small-sized commercial banks. To ensure that all banks remained
within their credit limits, the banks were directed in their lending by the PBC
(Zhou, 1992).
The PBC lending (zai dai kuan) allowed banks to supplement their loanable funds
by borrowing from the PBC. The maturity of the PBC lending varied, including
overnight lending (10-20 days), seasonal lending (2-4 months), discount loans
(within 6 months) and annual loans (1-2 years). By the end of 1992, the total
lending from the PBC to banks reached RMB678.02 bn (or USD117.88 bn),
accounting for 25.6% of the total lending made by banks8.
Interim Regulations on Bank Management (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1987, IX-
2).
In fact, the credit-quota plan was implemented from 1985. Before this, there was another
transitional credit plan named "cha e kong zhi" (credit-gap control) introduced from 1981.
"Credit-gap control" featured a national credit plan to control the credit gap between fund
availability and fund usage for all local banks (Lu and Yu, 1998).
8 Here, banks include only the state-owned specialized banks and the medium and small-sized
commercial banks.
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On the other hand, the PBC still set all interest rates on deposits and loans9.
However, interest rates were diversified according to the various durations and
depositors or purposes of loans 10. Moreover, banks could add a 20% to 50%
surcharge on the interest for overdue loans, for loans to be used to cover working
capital that was judged excessive, and for loans caused by overruns in capital
construction. The general term was that interest rates should be used as an
instrument of monetary control so as to direct funds to the more important
enterprises, and to mobilize more financial savings from the public to curb
inflation (Zhou, 1992).
2.3.2 Restoring and Establishing of State-owned Specialized Banks
Between 1979 and 1984, four state-owned specialized banks were rebuilt or
established, and operated in well-defined, but different types of business. In 1979,
the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was restored and specialized in lending to
support agricultural production as well as rural industrial and commercial
enterprises. The Bank of China (BOC) was separated from the PBC and
specialized in foreign exchange related banking business. The China Construction
Bank (CCB) was separated from the Ministry of Finance and specialized in the
fixed-asset investment of state enterprises. In January 1984, the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) took over the deposit taking and lending
functions of the PBC, specializing in lending to support the state-owned
commercial and industrial enterprises.
Between 1985 and 1992, the segmentation of these four state-owned specialized
banks gradually diminished. For example, in 1985, in addition to the BOC, the
other three specialized banks were permitted to conduct foreign exchange
business at some of their branches. Subsequently, more were allowed to enter the
foreign exchange business (Lardy, 1998). In 1986, the BOC was permitted to
conduct RMIB deposit business (Dai, 1998). The CCB and ABC were allowed to
The inter-bank money market rate was determined by market supply and demand.
10 See Appendix 2.2 for a detailed example.
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enter into a variety of commercial banking services, including accepting corporate
and household deposits, offering fixed assets and working capital loans.
Furthermore, the state-owned specialized banks engaged in universal banking by
establishing their own trust, securities, or insurance companies (Wu, 1998). Like
the PBC, the four state-owned specialized banks established branches throughout
the country.
2.3.3 Creation of Medium and Small-sized Commercial Banks
Between 1985 and 1992, a number of medium and small-sized commercial banks
were established through merger, restructuring or incorporation. These banks
included the Bank of Communication (BOCOM), CITIC Industrial Bank (CITIC
IB) 11 , China Merchants Bank (CMB), Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB),
Industrial Bank (IB) 12 , Guangdong Development Bank (GDB), China Everbright
Bank (CEB), and Hua Xia Bank (HXB)13.
A new force in China's banking sector, these banks had four distinguishing
features by end-1992. Unlike the four specialized banks wholly owned by the
state, some commercial banks were joint-stock-structured, including BOCOM,
CMB, SDB, FIB, and GDB, meaning that they could raise funds from various
channels besides the state. Among them, SDB was the first bank to list its shares
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in April 1991, and remained the only one until
CITIC stands for China International Trust and Investment Corporation.
12 Industrial Bank was known as Fujian Industrial Bank before 2003.
13 During this stage, three other banks were founded, namely, China Investment Bank (CIB),
Yantai Housing Savings Bank (YHSB) and Bengbu Housing Savings Bank (BHSB). CIB had been
a state-owned bank specializing in raising funds abroad and responsible for the disbursement of
loans from international financial organizations between 1981 and July 1994. After nearly 5 years
of commercial operation, total assets reached RMB75.5 bn (or USD9.12 bn) at end-1998. It was
then acquired by CEB in March 1999. Both housing savings banks were established in 1991. They
were established as experiments to help facilitate the transfer of ownership of housing from
enterprises to occupants. They do not take deposits from the public but rather depend on funds
deposited by manufacturing and commercial firms. By year-end 1999, the total assets of YI-ISB
were only RMB8.36 bn (or USD1.01 bn) and those of BHSB were only RMBO.84 bn (or USD0.1
bn). Given that these banks were engaged in specialized operations and were tiny (measured by
assets), they are not discussed in this thesis (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1999
p.432; 2000 p.454, 455).
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November 1999. Most of these new commercial banks were allowed to engage in
universal banking.
Nor did they rely on the PBC for funds: these commercial banks were required to
ensure total loans did not exceed total deposits and had sole responsibility for
their profits and losses. While the specialized banks were required to open
branches in all provinces, cities, and counties, these national commercial banks set
up branches anywhere, to best serve their commercial interest.
It should be emphasized that all the medium and small-sized commercial banks
were largely state-owned. They were either fully affiliated to state-owned
enterprises (such as CITIC lB. CEB, HXB, and CMB) or largely owned by the
central or local governments (such as BOCOM, SDB, 0DB, and FIB). Even the
publicly listed bank, SDB, had a majority of its shares held by local government,
solely state-owned enterprises, and other "legal persons" (about 60-70% of the
total), and shares owned by the state and legal persons cannot be traded publicly
on stock exchanges'4.
2.3.4 Founding of Credit Cooperatives
The rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) and urban credit cooperatives (UCCs) could
also undertake deposit and lending business with the public. RCCs were
collectively-owned financial institutions operating in rural areas in China. They
engaged in deposit and lending business with rural households, collective
enterprises, and township and village enterprises (TVEs).
RCCs were the most active deposit collectors in rural areas because the flexible
structure of the credit stations made it possible for them to reach a high number of
depositors (Xu, 1998). During the first stage of banking reform, RCCs were put
under the direct control of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and were
required to place a certain percentage of their deposits with it. ABC supervised
' For details, please see Appendix 2.3.
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their banking activities and provided them with clearing services. They therefore
had little autonomy in management.
The first UCC was established on an experimental basis in Henan Province in
1979, but most appeared after 1987. UCCs raised equity capital only from
collective and private enterprises, as well as individual households. They focused
on providing banking services to individuals, collectives, and private enterprises
in a given city. UCCs were supervised by the PBC. Both the rural and urban credit
cooperatives were controlled by the local government.
2.3.5 Treatment of Foreign Banks
As an important part of its economic reform, China has also opened its banking
sector to foreign competition. To encourage more foreign capital and the expertise
of foreign banks and institutions, the Chinese government has, since 1979,
gradually eliminated the market entry and business restrictions on foreign
financial institutions. Table 2.1 summarizes the major steps of the opening of
China's banking industry during the first stage of reform. The table indicates that,
in 1992, foreign banks in China could only provide foreign exchange business to
foreign firms and citizens in 13 cities. These initiatives were formally legitimized
by a number of rules.
In summary, compared to the monopolistic banking system, four key changes
occurred during the first stage of banking reform. First, the institutional structure
was changed from one of monopoly to a two-tier banking sector with a central
bank, state-owned specialized banks, medium and small-sized commercial banks,
credit cooperatives, and foreign banks. Second, the credit-quota plan and PBC
lending became major policy instruments to manage aggregate credit. Third, a
range of deposit and loan rates were offered according to their use but were
controlled by the central bank. Fourth, the scope of banking activities was
expanded by allowing universal banking business.
15
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Table 2.1 Opening of China's Banking Sector (1979-1992)
Year	 Events
1979	 The Export and Import Bank of Japan set up the first foreign bank representative office
_________ in Beijing in China.
1982	 The first foreign bank subsidiary in China, Nanyang Commercial Bank (Hong Kong)
Shenzhen Branch, opened. It was restricted to engage in foreign exchange business
with foreign firms and citizens inside the Special Economic Zones (namely, Shenzhen,
_________ Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, and Hainan).
1983	 Introduction of the Management Measures on Representative Offices of Overseas-
_________ invested and Foreign-invested Financial Institutions in China
1985	 Introduction of the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Banks and Sino-
_________ Foreign Joint-Venture Banks in the Special Economic Zones
1990	 Pudong, Shanghai is opened up to operational foreign financial institutions (FFIs).
1992	 The list of the cities where operational foreign financial institutions (FFIs) could
operate were expanded to cover Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Nanjing, Ningbo, Fuzhou
_________ and Guangzhou.
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-1993)
2.4 The Modern Banking Sector (1993-present)
To extend and accelerate banking reform, the State Council announced the
blueprint for the second stage of banking reform in 1993. The Decision on
Financial System Reform stipulated three objectives. The first was to transform
the PBC into a modern central bank to implement monetary policy under the
leadership of the State Council. The second was to transform the state-owned
banks into genuine commercial banks by separating policy lending from
commercial lending, and to create a commercial banking sector in which the state
banks and other forms of banking institutions could coexist and compete under
regulations set by the central bank. The third was to ensure a sound financial
sector (Wu, 1998).
2.4.1 Independence of the Central Bank
During the first stage of banking reform, the PBC lacked independence, and even
though as the central bank, it still made commercial loans. According to the
Interim Regulations on Bank Management of January 1986, the PBC was required
to continue to issue policy loans for special priority government projects. It also
had to continue to finance a large part of the government budget deficit. These
arrangements led to episodes of macroeconomic instability during this period. In
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order to achieve its key objective of price stability efficiently, the PBC needed to
maintain independence in the conduct of monetary policy.
From 1984 to 1998, however, the organizational structure of the PBC mirrored the
administrative structure of the government. The PBC had an administrative rank
lower than a ministry; for example, the director of a local bank branch was ranked
lower than the local government treasurer (Jin, 1994). This situation meant that
the PBC branches would succumb to pressure from local government for credit
expansion. A reorganization of the PBC's branches was necessary if the central
bank was to overcome localism.
The Law of the People's Bank of China of the People's Republic of China (Central
Bank Law) was promulgated in March 1995 and gave the PBC a high level of
independence from all other levels of government, stipulating that the objective of
monetary policy is to maintain price stability and thereby promote economic
growth. As provided by this law, the main functions of the PBC are to implement
monetary policy and supervise the financial system under the leadership of the
State Council 15 . Specifically, the PBC is entrusted to issue and administer the
circulation of RMB; formulate and implement monetary policy; manage the state
foreign exchange and gold reserves; license and supervise financial institutions;
regulate financial markets; act as fiscal agent; maintain the payments and
settlements system; collect and analyze financial statistical data; participate in
international financial cooperation on behalf of the state.
As a consultative body for monetary policy formulation, the Monetary Policy
Committee of the People's Bank of China was established in July 1997. The
responsibility of the Committee is to advise on the formulation and adjustment of
monetary policy and policy targets for a certain period, the application of
monetary policy instruments, the major monetary policy measures, and the
coordination between monetary policy and other macroeconomic policies. The
committee meets quarterly and plays its advisory role on the basis of
15	 of China's Finance and Banking, 1996.
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comprehensive research on macroeconomic situations and the macro targets set by
the government16.
In 1998, the PBC underwent substantial restructuring, which aimed at improving
the conduct of monetary policy, and ensuring the soundness of the financial
system by strengthening financial supervision. During the first phase of
restructuring (between May and August, 1993), the PBC relinquished
responsibility for the supervision of securities and insurance business, which
resulted in the segregation of financial supervisory responsibilities 17 . At the same
time, the PBC also reorganized the functional departments at its head office based
on the idea of the consolidation of the functions of supervision of each type of
financial institution.
The second phase of restructuring took place in September 1998, and resulted in
the closure and merging of 148 duplicate city branch offices. The functions of the
county-level sub-branches were also refocused on the supervision of rural credit
cooperatives. During the third phase (between November and December, 1998),
the PBC replaced the 31 provincial branches with nine regional branches 18 . After
the restructuring, senior managers of the branches are appointed by the PBC,
rather than the local governments. This change would probably prevent local
governments from encouraging banks to finance their favoured projects, many of
which are not profitable (Mo, 1999). In 2003, the PBC's monetary and
16 According to the Rule of the Monetary Policy Committee of the PRC, the Committee consists of
the Governor and two Deputy Governors of the PBC, a Vice Minster of the State Development and
Planning Commission, a Vice Minister of the State Economic and Trade Commission, a Vice
Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the Chairman
of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (since 2000), the Commissioner of the National
Statistics Bureau (since 2001), the Chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (since
2003), the Presidents of two state-owned commercial banks, and a financial expert (People's Bank
of China, 2003b).
17 In 1998, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission was established. Meanwhile, the
responsibility of the supervision of securities firms was transferred from the PBC to the China
Securities Regulatory Commission, which was established in October 1992.
18 People's Bank of China, 1999.
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supervisory functions were split, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission
was established to supervise banking institutions in China19.
2.4.2 Commercialization of State-owned Specialized Banks
According to the 1986 Interim Regulations on Bank Management, the state-owned
specialized banks were not enterprises but independent economic accounting
entities in the socialist planned economy. In 1992, the State Council announced
the decision of establishing the socialist market economy in China in the l4
Conference of China Communist Party Report. To establish a banking sector in
harmony with the development of the socialist market economy, the State Council
further announced the transformation of the state-owned specialized banks into
state-owned commercial banks in 1993 (Wu, 1998).
From 1993 onward, measures were introduced to change both the internal and
external conditions of the state-owned commercial banks. The main objectives
were to give the state-owned banks more autonomy in credit decision-making,
operational profits and losses, and to encourage self-reliance and self-discipline. A
series of measures were introduced: (1) creation of policy banks; (2) re-
capitalization; (3) establishment of asset management companies (AMCs); (4)
reorganization; (5) joint-stock reform.
Creation of Policy Banks
To accelerate the transformation of state-owned specialized banks into fully-
fledged commercial banks and to increase the flexibility and capacity of the
central bank for macro-economic management, three policy banks were
' To further improve the financial supervisory regime, the State Council decided to establish the
China Banking Regulatory Commission to exclusively supervise banking institutions, including
banks, asset management companies and trust and investment companies on December 27, 2003.
After the above-mentioned financial supervision function being removed, the PBC is mainly
responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy, keeping on improving rules on the
operation of financial institutions, so as to better fulfill its duty as a central bank in macroeconomic
management and financial risk prevention and mitigation. Accordingly, the Central Bank Law was
amended at the same time.
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established in China in 1994. They are the China Development Bank (CDB), the
Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM), and the Agricultural Development Bank of
China (ADBC). They are wholly owned by the state and directly under the
leadership of the State Council.
The CDB was established in March 1994, with its head office in Beijing. Its
primary function is to provide financial support to the industries and key projects
that have significant bearing on the national economy.
The EXJM was founded in July 1994. Its major task is to implement industrial and
trade policies by providing policy-oriented financial support and services to boost
the export of mechanical and electronic products, complete sets of equipment, and
new high tech products, as well as to promote Sino-foreign economic and
technological cooperation and exchange through providing export credit and
related loans.
The ADBC was created in November 1994. Its main responsibility is to
programme and provide funds for agricultural development, including the
procurement of agricultural products and the priority agricultural development
projects in line with the state agricultural development policy and credit policy.
Re-capitalization of the State-owned Commercial Banks
In March 1998, a special Treasury bond (amounting to RMB27O bn, or USD32.61
bn) was issued to strengthen the capital bases of the state-owned commercial
banks and to raise their capital adequacy ratio to 8%. The bonds were purchased
by these four banks with funds freed up by a lowering of the required reserve ratio
from 13% to 8% (Xie, 1999).
The re-capitalization plan raised the capital of the state-owned banks to RMB478
bn (or USD57.74 bn) from RMIB2O8 bn (or USD25.12 bn) without changing the
size of their aggregate balance sheets. The re-capitalization could also improve the
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income streams of these banks, through the yields arising from investment in the
bonds, and from reducing their interest costs caused by the decrease in central
bank credits (Mo, 1999).
Establishment of Asset Management Corporations
In the 1990's, the bulk of the state banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) increased
rapidly, the average NPL ratio peaking at 40%20. To quickly reduce the non-
performing assets and maintain the reputation and international competitiveness of
these banks, the government decided to establish asset management companies
(AMCs), which purchased the NPLs of the state-owned commercial banks, and
took over the management and handling of the non-performing assets. In April
1999, Cinda AMC was established. Three other AMCs, Oriental, Great Wall, and
Huarong, were founded in October 1999. Their aim is to dispose of the bad assets,
which existed before 1995, of the relevant state banks.
The purchase of NPLs was completed by the end of August 2000. The four AMCs
had purchased NPLs and interests worth RMB1.39 trillion (or USD0.18 trillion)
from the state-owned commercial banks and the China Development Bank. The
asset purchases reduced the average NPL ratio of the four state banks by about
10% (Jiang, 2001). The AMCs managed and handled the purchased assets through
asset restructuring, sale, auction, contracting, collection of principal and interest,
and leasing.
In 2002, the four AMCs handled debt of RIvIIB 132.73 bn (or USD16.04 bn) using
various methods; the average recovery ratio was 35.73%. In total, the four AMCs
recovered cash to the amount of RMB31.75 bn (or USD3.84 bn) - the cash
recovery ratio averaged 23.92%21. By the end of 2002, 587 enterprises had signed
debt-equity swap agreements with the AMCs, involving RMB334.78 bn (or
USD40.45 bn). Another 578 enterprises had obtained the approval of the State
20 A1,nanac of China's Finance and Banking, 2000.
21 Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 2003.
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Council for debt-equity swaps of RMB3 19.24 bn (or USD38.57)22.
Organizational Changes
From 1996, in order to improve efficiency, the state banks began their
organizational restructuring by combining provincial branches with municipal
branches in provincial capitals, and closing down those county sub-branches or
deposit taking outlets that either made losses or did not fit into the overall
strategy. From 1998, all of these banks except the Agricultural Bank of China
adjusted their organizational structure to facilitate a gradual shift in the priority of
their services towards large and medium-sized enterprises based in large and
medium-sized cities. Between 1998 and 2002, these banks reduced the branches
by 55,324, either through closure or merger, and cut staff by 362,90023.
Joint-stock Reform
A three-stage reform plan for the state-owned commercial banks has been in
operation since 2002. According to this plan, the comprehensive reform would
proceed in steps in accordance with the principles of good corporate governance.
At the first stage, the state-owned commercial banks would be supervised as state-
owned financial intermediaries and participants in the money market to improve
their institutional setup as state-owned companies. At the second stage, they
would be transformed into state-controlled joint-stock commercial banks by joint-
stock restructuring. Finally, they would be listed on the stock exchange at an
appropriate time.
The objective for the joint-stock reform of the four state-owned commercial banks
is to transform the banks into internationally competitive joint-stock commercial
22 The debt-equity swap programme makes the AMCs the owners of the borrowing enterprises
instead of their creditor. In practice, the AIvICs receive loans from the central bank and purchase
the creditor's rights to enterprises at face value from respective commercial banks, then swap them
into equity of enterprises. Finally, all the AMCs shall exit from the enterprises and repay the PBC
lending by selling equity and through other means.
23 www.pbc.gov.cn/english/speeches  and Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2003, p. 66).
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banks with adequate capital, strict internal controls, safe and sound business
operations, quality products and services as well as desirable profitability, within
the transitional period provided by China's WTO agreement. To this end, this
reform shall focus on improving the banks' management systems and corporate
governance, transforming their operating mechanisms and hence boosting their
profitability. This reform will be carried out in a manner that each bank
formulates and implements its own reform policies and strategies (Tang, 2004).
The joint-stock reform of the state-owned commercial banks was initiated in late
2003 with a massive capital injection of USD45 bn (or RMB372.47 bn) into the
two pilot banks, the Bank of China and China Construction Bank. In order to
secure the success of the pilot reform, The Guidelines on Corporate Governance
Reforms and Supervision of Bank of China and China Construction Bank was
formulated and implemented in March 2004. According to the Guidelines, the two
banks should meet a number of specific targets set out by the China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) before 2007. Ten guidelines for building up
sound corporate governance and a number of benchmarks to assess the
performance of the two banks in terms of their profitability, asset quality and
prudent operations were stipulated in the Guidelines in particular24.
2.4.3 Transformation of Medium and Small-sized Commercial Banks
During the first stage of the banking reform (1979-1993), most of the medium and
small-sized commercial banks were regional banks. In addition, some of them
only had one owner. To encourage greater competition, these banks became
national joint-stock commercial banks in 1993. For instance, when established in
1992, the Hua Xia Bank (HXB) was fully owned by the Capital Iron and Steel
Company, which capitalized the bank with equity of RMB1 bn (or USD0.17 bn).
In March 1995, HXB changed to a national joint-stock commercial bank held by
thirty-three owners with an expansion of registered capital to RMB2.5 bn (or
USD0.3 bn).
24 For details of the Guidelines, please see Appendix 2.4.
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The China Everbnght Bank (CEB) completed its joint-stock-restructuring
programme in 1996. Through restructuring, the CEB has transformed itself from a
commercial bank wholly owned by China Everbright Group Limited (CEGL) into
a joint-stock commercial bank, 51 percent owned by CEGL, 49 percent owned by
130 domestic enterprises and institutions as well as the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). With capital restructuring, CEB added RMIB2.4 bn (or USD0.29 bn) to its
capital base, raising its total capital to RM1B4.4 bn (or USD0.53 bn).
In January 1993, a new joint-stock commercial bank, the Shanghai Pudong
Development Bank (SPDB) was created, followed by the China Minsheng
Banking Corporation (CMBC) in January 1996, becoming China's first national
joint-stock commercial bank with participation mainly from non-state enterprises.
By the end of 2002, some shares of four national joint-stock commercial banks
were listed on the stock exchange, including SDB, SPDB, CMBC, and CMB. The
total capital equity of the ten national joint-stock commercial banks increased
from RMB48.49 bn (or USD5.84 bn) in 1996 to RMB1O4.23 bn (or USD12.59
bn) in 200225.
Although most of the medium and small-sized commercial banks are joint-stock,
they are still largely owned by the government via local governments and state-
owned enterprises. The state holds more than 50% of the shares in all joint-stock
banks, with one exception, the CMBC (Xie and Jiao, 2002)26. The Chinese joint-
stock ownership scheme differs from privatization in other developing countries.
Privatization implicitly assumes capitalistic private ownership, but, under the
joint-stock ownership scheme, the state is still a majority shareholder of the firm,
thus preserving communism's public ownership principle (Sun, Tong, and Tong,
2002). However, this raises the issue of how much the state controls these banks
and whether their behaviour differs from the state banks.
25 A1,izanac of China's Finance and Banking (2003).
26 For the definition of various shares issued in the stock exchange markets in China, please see
Appendix 2.3.
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As indicated by Tang (2004), the four state banks have made remarkable
contributions to China's economic development. These banks provided the needed
funding and support for numerous development and infrastructure projects,
regional development, and general investment policies. China has lacked the
private capital to fund such projects because of 50 years of communism, where
the state assumed responsibility and provided the capital. It is only just recently
that the State Council accepted the principal of private ownership (at the Third
Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
in October 2003). The country's private equity markets are still in an embryonic
stage and can play only a modest role when it comes to raising finance. Second,
these banks were central to economic and social restructuring campaigns and
assumed part of the associated cost. For example, they assisted state-owned
enterprises with mergers or bankruptcy liquidation. Finally, the four banks have
subsidized student education, and programs for finding unemployed workers new
jobs, and other social undertakings as part of the policy of "employment and
education to all". Given their particular role in the banking system, the state banks
were subject to the "soft" budget constraints27.
Therefore, although the joint-stock banks are effectively owned by the state, the
issues of social welfare objectives and "soft" budget constraints are more
applicable to the state banks than the joint-stock banks. The joint-stock banks
were also expected to assist with the implementation of state policy - especially in
the early days - but it was far less pronounced.
2.4.4 Rectification of Credit Cooperatives
The urban and rural credit cooperatives (UCCs, RCCs, respectively) played an
important role in supporting the development of small and medium businesses.
However, due to a lack of risk management skills, and even defiance of relevant
laws and regulations, many UCCs and RCCs incurred severe losses and some of
them ended up becoming insolvent. For example, by the end of 1996, the net loss
27 The budget constraint of a firm means that the firm cannot spend more than its wealth.
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of all UCCs reached RM1BO.73 bn (or USD0.09 bn). There were 26,000 RCCs
running in the red, with reported losses of more than RMB14 bn (or USD1.68 bn)
in the same year (Lardy, 1999). The ratio of non-performing loans over total loans
of all RCCs stood at 38%28.
To solve these problems, the credit cooperatives (CCs) were reorganised in 1995.
One major way was to merge and transform the UCCs into city commercial
banks. City commercial banks were established in 1995 through the merger of
urban credit cooperatives with shares held by urban enterprises, residents and
local government. These are local shareholding commercial banks, but their
business is limited to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the cities
where they are located. Between 1995 and 2002, more than 2,000 urban credit
cooperatives were reorganized into 111 city commercial banks, which had 4,961
outlets and 107,913 employees29.
Reform of the rural credit cooperatives is important for agricultural development
in China. Therefore, in 1996, the PBC took over supervision of RCCs from the
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). Three rural commercial banks were
established by merging the RCCs in 2001, on a trial-basis. All are located in
Jiangsu Province, a relatively developed agricultural province. They are owned by
local non-state owned enterprises and the staff of the merged RCCs, making them
the first group of truly "private" banks (Liu, 2002).
Insolvent credit cooperatives were also closed. In 1997 and 1998, the PBC closed
23 insolvent UCCs and 18 insolvent RCCs (Liu, 1999). At the end of 2002, there
were only 758 UCCs, a fall of 81% since 1992. The number of RCCs fell but less
dramatically, leaving 35,544 at the end of 2002, a fall of 33% since 1992°. The
RCCs have become the key providers of financial services in the rural areas and
play an increasingly important role in supporting rural economic development,
Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1997.
Almanac of china's Finance and Banking, 2003.
3	
of China's Finance and Banking, 2003.
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and hence improving the living standards of the rural population31.
2.4.5 Treatment of Foreign Banks
Rapid Development of Foreign Banks before China's WTO Accession
Between 1993 and 2001, the PBC introduced a series of measures to accelerate
the development of foreign banks in China. Table 2.2 illustrates the major changes
during this stage: it indicates that controls over foreign banks were eased
gradually in terms of location, scope of business, and clients. The major
achievement at this stage was allowing foreign banks to engage in RMB business.
The geographic scope of the operation of foreign banks was also enlarged.
Table 2.2 Opening of China's Banking Sector (1993-2001)
Time	 Events
Feb. 1994	 Introduction of the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Administration
____________ of Foreign-funded Financial institutions
Apr. 1996
	
Introduction of the Implementation Rules for the Regulations of the People's
Republic of China on Administration of Foreign-funded Financial institutions, and
the Rules on Administration of Representative Offices in China Established by
____________ Foreign-funded Financial Institutions.
Dec. 1996	 From December 1996 to December 2001, the PBC approved 31 foreign banks in
___________ Shanghai Pudong and Shenzhen to conduct RMB business with foreign firms.
Apr. 1998
	
The PBC allowed eight foreign banks handling RMB business in Shanghai Pudong
___________ to enter the inter-bank lending market of China.
Jan. 1999	 Foreign banks were allowed to operate branches and representative offices in any
___________ major cities in China, subject to the approval of the PBC.
Jul. 1999	 Foreign banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen were allowed to do business in adjacent
___________ provinces or autonomous regions.
1999	 1. Foreign banks were allowed to participate in RMB loan syndication for
Chinese businesses.
2. The ratio of total RMB debt to foreign exchange debt for foreign banks was
raised from 35% to 50%.
3. Foreign banks could borrow long-term RMB funds from domestic banks in
domestic inter-bank lending market.
4. Foreign banks were permitted to raise funds through the issue of transferable
____________	 deposit certificates at an appropriate time.
Sources: Almanac of China's i-'inance and tanking (1994-2UL12)
31 www.pbc.gov.cn/english/speeches/
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China WTO Commitments and the Banking Sector
On 11 December 2001, China joined the WTO after 16 years of negotiations.
According to China's WTO commitments, China will phase out restrictions on
foreign banks. Table 2.3 illustrates the major commitments made by the Chinese
government on opening the banking sector. All the non-prudential restrictions on
ownership, and operational and organizational setup, including restrictions on
number of branches and licenses, will be removed by 2006. Foreign banks will
enjoy "equal treatment" in China, meaning that they will be treated no differently
from the domestic banks32.
Table 2.3 WTO Commitments on the Banking Sector
Activities subject 1. Deposits & lending
to restriction	 2. Financial leasing
3. Settlements & remittances
4. Guarantees and commitments
Licensing	 2001-1.Total assets more than $10 billion to establish subsidiary or joint
restrictions	 venture.
2. Total assets more than $20 billion to establish a branch.
3. Further licensing requirements to engage in RMB business are 3
years business operations in China, being profit making for 2
consecutive years prior to the applications.
__________________ 2006— All licensing restrictions removed.
Other restrictions	 Geographic restrictions 	 Customer restrictions
RMB business	 2001 Shenzhen, Shanghai, Dalian, 2001 Foreign enterprises &
Tianjin.	 Overseas citizens
2002 As in 2001 plus Guangzhou, 2002
Zhuhai,	 Qindao,	 Nanjing,
Wuhan.
2003 As in 2002 plus Jinan, Fuzhou, 2003 All firms.
Chengdu, Chongqing.
2004 As in 2003 plus Kunmin, Beijing, 2004
Xiamen
2005 As in 2004 plus Shantou, Ningbo, 2005
Shenyang, Xian.
_________________ 2006 No geographic restrictions.	 2006 No customer restrictions.
Foreign exchange No restrictions since 11/12/2001. (Foreign banks can conduct foreign
business	 exchange business with all the customers in the country.)
Sources: Bonin and Huang (2002, p.1079) and Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2002,
p.384)
To comply with China's commitments to the WTO, the PI3C adopted numerous
measures to open up China's banking sector. First, the PBC formulated the legal
32	
of China's Finance and Banking, 2002.
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foundations for the operation of foreign banks. Restrictions on the operations of
foreign banks in China are gradually being lifted. Since December 2001, foreign
banks can offer foreign exchange services to all customers, including Chinese
enterprises and individuals. By 2002, about 70 foreign banks in China had started
to increase and provide foreign exchange services.
In addition, since December 2001, the foreign banks in Shanghai, Shenzhen,
Tianjin and Dalian have been allowed to engage in RMB banking business. The
same privileges were extended to the foreign banks in Guangzhou, Zhuhai,
Qingdao, Nanjing and Wuhan from December 2002. This brought the total
number of cities where foreign banks could conduct RMB business to nine, which
is consistent with the WTO commitments. Meanwhile, the PBC further
standardised and simplified the market entry and exit procedures for foreign
banks.
2.4.6 Other Comprehensive Banking Reform Measures
In addition to those discussed in previous sections, additional reform measures
were undertaken in the banking sector. They included: (1) separation of
commercial and investment banking business; (2) promulgation of the
Commercial Bank Law; (3) the introduction of asset-liability management; (4)
improvement of external supervision; (5) development of an inter-bank market;
(6) interest rate deregulation.
Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking Business
Until 1993, most Chinese banks engaged in universal banking by setting up
affiliated securities, trust, and/or insurance companies. Universal banking was
believed to be a source of financial instability (Wu, 1998), though there is little
hard evidence to support this. At the beginning of 1993, the authorities separated
the activities of commercial banks, securities, and insurance firms, citing a
number of reasons.
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First, the financial market in China has not matured enough - bank financing still
represented over 85% of all financing activities nationwide. Second, the internal
risk management level was weak, and, until there were better systems in place,
universal banking was considered inappropriate in China. Third, the central bank
lacked experience in financial regulation33.
It was argued that the separation could prevent contagion from spreading across
different industries such as banking, securities and insurance. Moreover, it could
prevent large volumes of funds from being used for speculation on the capital
market via the banking system. Finally, it could prevent non-bank financial
institutions from gaining unfair competitive advantages by affiliating with banks.
Accordingly, the supervision of these industries is also segregated34.
Promulgation of the Commercial Bank Law
In May 1995, the Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China (the
Commercial Bank Law) was enacted35 . The new law further strengthened the legal
status of the commercial banks, and stipulated that commercial banks shall
operate independently, bear risks on their own, and take responsibility for their
own profits and losses.
The Introduction of Asset-liability Management
In 1996, the commercial banks began to introduce asset-liability management to
ensure sound operations in line with the state industrial and regional development
policies as well as state credit guidelines. However, credit allocation in China was
still mainly based on a mandatory credit-quota system under which the PBC set
the credit ceilings on new annual loans and allocated them to specific sectors. This
system meant that banks could not lend according to commercial considerations.
One reason for the recent division of regulation and central banking is to improve regulatory
standards.
Since 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission has taken over the function of bank
supervision from the PBC.
35 Alrnanac of China's Finance and Banking (1996).
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In January 1998, the credit ceilings on commercial banks were completely
replaced by asset-liability management techniques together with an indicative,
non-binding target, which serves only as a reference for commercial banks to plan
their business.
Improvement of External Oversight
External inspections have been strengthened and the self-discipline system has
been improved. Since 2000, the system of state dispatched supervisory boards36
has been in place and the supervision of state banks has been strengthened. The
China Association of Banks (CAB) was established to encourage discipline within
the banking sector. The CAB had 27 member banks by the end of 2001, of which
4 are wholly state-owned commercial banks, 3 are policy banks, 10 are
shareholding commercial banks, and 10 are city commercial banks. External
auditing has been introduced by permitting outside intermediary agencies to
supervise bank statements.
Development of Inter-bank Market
China has an inter-bank money market. It emerged in the mid-1980s, consisting of
small markets located in different provinces. In January 1996, a centralized inter-
bank money market was created and the China Inter-bank Offered Rate
(CHILBOR) was initiated. Since then, the inter-bank money market has developed
very quickly, and has mainly consisted of the inter-bank lending market, the
repurchase agreements market, and the commercial paper market. By the end of
2000, the transaction value of this market reached RMB2,315 bn (or USD19,164
bn), an increase of 216 percent compared to 1999 (Shi, 2001). The inter-bank
money market has become the major trading place for banks to manage their
liquidity positions.
36 The state dispatched supervisory boards are composed of representatives from the PBC,
Ministry of Finance, State Economic and Trade Commission, State Auditing Commission and also
economists and legal experts. The supervisory boards exercise supervision of state-owned banks
on behalf of the state. They comprehensively evaluate financial conditions, risk control
mechanisms and the performance of the management of the banks (People's Bank of China, 1999).
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In addition, China established an inter-bank bond market in June 1997. Banks are
allowed to conduct repo and spot transactions of government securities and
financial bonds issued by policy banks. The inter-bank bond market has grown
very fast and has become the important platform for the open market operation of
the central bank.
Interest Rate Deregulation
In accordance with the government policy of gradually introducing a market
determined interest rate system based on the central bank rate, the PBC has taken
important steps to liberalize interest rates 37 . In 1995, the PBC Programme of
Deepening Interest Rate Reform during the Ninth Five-year Plan Period marked
the beginning of interest rate liberalisation. The general approach to interest rate
liberalisation is to liberalise the foreign currency interest rate before that for
domestic currency, the lending rate before the deposit rate, and the large and long
term funds before the small and short term funds38.
• From June 1, 1996, the inter-bank money market rate was freely determined
by market supply and demand.
• In June 1997, the rates for both repurchase and outright security transactions
in the inter-bank bond market were liberalised.
• In March 1998, the pricing mechanism for the rediscount rate and the discount
rate was reformed and liberalised.
In September 1998, policy financial bonds were floated on the market and the
yield was determined by the market.
In September 1999, state bonds were issued through public tendering on the
inter-bank bond market.
• In October 1999, the interest rate for large fixed-term deposits by insurance
companies became negotiable, i.e., the interest rate on insurance company
In 1993, the Decision on Certain Issues Pertaining to the Development of Socialist Market
Economic System and the State Council Decision on Financial System Reform drew the original
blueprint for interest rate liberalisation.
38 People's Bank of China, 2003b.
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deposits that exceeded RMB 30 million with a maturity of more than 5 years
could be negotiated between the insurance companies and the commercial
banks.
The lending rate band was widened and interest rate categories simplified. In
1998, lending rates to small enterprises were allowed to widen from 10 to 20
percent of the central rate. Rural credit cooperatives were allowed a lending
rate band of 50 percent of the central rate, up from 40 percent. From 1999,
financial institutions below the county level were allowed to raise the lending
rate by 30 percent. The original 30 percent band for small enterprises now
applied to medium-sized enterprises as well. Interest rate categories continued
to be simplified and most of the interest subsidy was eliminated. The
mortgage rate system was improved.
Foreign exchange interest rate administration was reformed on September 21,
2000. The foreign exchange lending rate was liberalised. Interest rates for
deposit of over USD3 million could be negotiated between the financial
institution and the depositor. After March 2003, small foreign exchange
deposits by Chinese residents with foreign banks should be the same as those
with domestic banks so that domestic and foreign financial institutions enjoy
fair treatment with regard to the interest rate policy of foreign exchange
deposits.
• In 2002, interest rate reforms for rural credit cooperatives were expanded. The
interest rate administration for foreign exchange was the same for domestic
and foreign financial institutions.
2.4.7 Non-performing Loans
The Loan Classification Systems
In China, there was little effort to classify bank loans by quality in the 1980s. In
1993 and 1994, each of the major banks used its own system and standards for
classifying non-performing loans (NPLs). However, these procedures were largely
futile because the central bank set ceilings on the portion of loans that could be
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classified, regardless of the actual quality of a bank's loan portfolio 39. In 1995, the
central bank set forth the loan classification system formally, and classified NPLs
into three types, based on payment status. These included past due loans, doubtful
loans, and bad debt. "Past due loans" refers to loans not repaid when due or not
repaid after the due date has been extended. "Doubtful loans" includes loans that
have been past due two years or more or loans that have been extended to a
borrower who has suspended production or whose project is no longer being
developed. "Bad debt" refers to the value of a loan that has not been repaid after
the borrower has been declared bankrupt and gone through liquidation40.
However, as indicated by Lardy (1998), this scheme was far more lenient than
those prevailing in the modern banking systems for three reasons. First, these
banks were allowed to delay classifying loans as non-performing. The amount of
time during which delay of repayment was allowed was longer and the
classification of loans was usually tied to failure to repay principal instead of
interest. Second, these banks considered each loan separately. They would not
simultaneously classify the entire sum of all loans outstanding to that particular
borrower when they classified any loan as past due. Lastly, the banks had little
authority to write off loans they had extended to enterprises that were liquidated41.
Thus, they had to delay the complete write-off of loans not repaid from the
proceeds of the liquidation of a borrower.
A risk—based five-category loan classification system was introduced for the
commercial banks in 1998, and was implemented in all banks in China from the
beginning of 2002. This system uses international standards, dividing banking
loans into five categories: normal, special mention, substandard, doubtful and
The central bank dictated that the specialized banks could classify no more than 2% of all their
loans as "bad debt", that is, the volume of loans not recoverable from the proceeds form
bankruptcy and liquidation; no more than 5% as "problem loans" referring to loans on which
interest is still being paid but for which principal repayments are more than three years past due;
and a maximum of 8% as "of concern" referring to borrowers who were more than one year
behind on principal repayments (Lardy, 1998, p.115-116).
° People's Bank of China, 1995.
41 Since 1992, the banks could write off loans of less than a half billion yuan. However, larger
amounts required specific approval from the State Council (Lardy, 1998).
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lost42 . Moreover, the banks have been given more discretion to write off losses
since the Guidance on Provisioning for Bank Loan Losses was implemented in
2002. These changes are clearly an advance in credit risk management.
Non-peiforining Loans
The substantial and growing amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) has become
the most serious problem in China's banking sector since the middle of the 1990s.
Just before he became governor of the central bank in June 1995, Dai Xianglong
revealed that the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NFL ratio) of the
four state banks had been rising by 2 percentage points per annum from 1993 to
1995. This assessment was confirmed by the deputy director of the Planning and
Information Department of the ICBC in early 1996. According to his statement,
the NFL ratio of the big four banks at the end of 1994 was estimated to be 20.4%,
increasing by 2% in 1995.
Table 2.4 shows the official reported NPLs based on the old (payment-based) loan
classification system for the two types of commercial banks over the period 1993-
2002. The pre-1998 data for the joint-stock banks are not available. NPLs of the
state banks increased four-fold between 1993 and 1999. Their NFL ratio also
doubled during that period, but fell between 1999 and 2002. The large, 10%
decline from 1999 to 2000 was due to the establishment of the asset management
companies (AMCs). The NFL ratio of joint-stock commercial banks also declined
over the same period, although their NPLs still increased by 44%.
These figures are significant underestimates because of the leniency of China's
old loan classification system compared with standard international practice. Also,
these banks usually excluded inter-bank and trust lending, as well as credit that
was concealed in their balance sheets as "other items". Independent analysts'
estimates of the NFL ratio of the state banks are as high as 50% to 60% (Whalley,
42 For details, please see Appendix 2.5.
www.pbc. gov.cn/civanwenj iansuo/detail.asp?col=cinwen&ID=3 87&kevword
The PBC acknowledged the bias in 2001 (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 2002).
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2003).
Table 2.4 Non-performing Loans: State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks
Unit: billion RMB
Years	 State-owned Commercial Banks 	 Joint-stock Commercial Banks
_______________ NPLs	 NPL ratio	 NPLs	 NFL ratio
1993	 534	 18%	 NA	 NA
1994	 674	 20.4%	 NA	 NA
1995	 864	 22%	 NA	 NA
1996	 1095	 23%	 NA	 NA
1997	 1280	 24%	 NA	 NA
1998	 1808	 29%	 NA	 NA
1999	 2541	 38.88%	 149	 20.77%
2000	 1866	 29.18%	 153	 16.36%
2001	 1772	 25.37%	 164	 12.94%
2002	 1706	 21.41%	 215	 12.39%
Sources: Jiang (2001, p.O9, 1.54); Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1994-200.5)
Note: NFL ratio: the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.
Lardy (1998) claimed that most of the NPLs were not inherited from the pre-
reform period, 1949-1978, but that the problem arose in the 1990s as a by-product
of the gradual strategy. Under this strategy, the state banks were required to make
policy loans to prop up the loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in order
to avoid a decline in output and an increase in unemployment. The profits of state-
owned industrial enterprises fell from around 7% of GDP in 1987 to only 2% by
1994. In the first quarter of 1996, the SOEs as a whole reported losses for the first
time ever. The absolute level of enterprise losses reached a record high of almost
RMB8O bn (or USD9.64 bn).
As indicated by Lardy (1998) and others, the explanations for declining financial
performance of the SOEs include:
(1) The erosion of monopoly power and abnormal profits due to the rapid
expansion of non-state enterprises.
(2) Accounting reforms. The introduction of the modern accounting rules in 1993
required the adoption of accrual accounting instead of cash-based accounting.
This led to more accurate accounting of interest expenditures, which meant
that the profits of the SOEs in earlier years were overstated.
(3) Excessive wage payments. With insider control, SOE managers might ignore
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the interests of the state and pay workers too much. The growth of total
compensation (wages plus various subsidies and benefits) outstripped the
growth of labour productivity, contributing to a decline in profitability.
(4) Excess employees. SUEs were required to employ redundant workers to help
the government to maintain full employment in urban areas.
(5) Excessive social expenditures. SUEs not only provided subsidized housing
for most of their workers, but also shouldered substantial costs for education
and health.
(6) Asset stripping. That is, the illegal transformation of state assets to non-state
enterprises via "false bankruptcies" by SUE managers.
Tang (2004) indicated that the accumulation of NPLs by the state banks was only
partly explained by these banks' rigid mechanisms, weak internal management
and external regulation. Other factors were also important. First, the enterprises
were heavily dependent on bank loans because other forms of financing in China
were non-existent or underdeveloped. Second, the four state banks were expected
to engage in "directed lending", i.e., making loans to support government
industrial policies, system transition and the restructuring of the state-owned
enterprises. Third, the banks were faced with debt evasions by borrowing firms.
Finally, there were deficiencies in accounting practice that allowed false profit
reporting. Thus, the losses of these four banks represent the cost incurred by
China in the transition towards a market-oriented economic system.
Wu (1999) argued that directed lending to the loss-making SUEs can only explain
the NPLs accumulated in the 1980s. Most of the NPLs initiated in the 1990s were
in the form of failed investments in real estate and the financial market. This
suggests that, in addition to the loss-making SUEs, bad lending decisions by the
banks themselves also contributed to the substantial NPLs.
In summary, compared to the first stage of banking reform, reform during the
second stage was a mixture of deregulation and new regulations. Competition
among banks has been increased by gradually introducing more banks to the
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sector. In addition, China's WTO accession means that there should be a greater
involvement of foreign banks than ever before, which will lead to intensified
competition in the sector. On the other hand, banks have been given more
autonomy and chances to improve their performance by commercialising the
state-owned specialized banks, removing the credit ceiling, developing the inter-
bank market and liberalizing interest rates marginally.
In addition to this structural and conduct deregulation, new regulations, such as
the segmentation of commercial and investment banking business, have also been
introduced to the banking sector during this stage. This has limited the services
and products that the banks could offer, which has reduced their opportunities to
improve their performance. In response to these changes, banks have attempted to
adopt strategies aimed at improving efficiency, and hence competitive capability.
The strategies include the streamlining of the state-owned banks, the expansion of
the joint-stock banks, the diversification of portfolios, innovation in off-balance-
sheet activities, and, more recently, the joint-stock reform of the state banks.
The second stage reform was profound, but the high proportion of non-performing
loans poses a substantial challenge to the sector during the second stage of reform.
Therefore, most of the reform measures of this stage also aimed at resolving this
critical problem. These measures included the separation of the commercial and
investment banking business, the re-capitalization of the state banks, the abolition
of the credit ceilings, the introduction of the risk-based loan classification system,
and the establishment of the asset management companies. Although the Chinese
banks have made a degree of progress in improving the quality of their loans, their
average ratio of non-performing loans is still very high, suggesting that improving
asset quality remains the major task for these banks.
While the state banks are wholly owned by the state, the joint-stock banks are also
effectively owned by the state via local governments and state-owned enterprises.
They are not private banks typical of the west. However, the issues of social
welfare objectives and "soft" budget constraints are more applicable to the state
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banks, given that they are the mainstream of China's banking sector, and directly
controlled by the government.
2.5 China's Banking Sector: Descriptive Statistics
2.5.1 Institutional Structure of China's Banking Sector: 1992 vs. 2002
Table 2.5 shows changes in the institutional structure of the banking industry
during the second stage of reform. First, the types of banks increased from 6 to 9.
Three new types of banks were created, including city commercial banks, rural
commercial banks, and policy banks. Second, the number of commercial banks
increased from 74 to 308. Third, the ownership structure was diversified.
Foreign ownership was introduced to the joint-stock commercial banks, and the
truly private banks emerged. Fourth, universal banking was forbidden, and banks
could only conduct commercial banking operations.
Despite the gradually increasing number of entrants, the banking sector is
segmented. Generally, this sector can be divided into "four tiers" according to the
differences in service areas among these banks (Xie and Jiao, 2002):
• State-owned commercial banks: operating domestically and internationally 46;
• Joint-stock commercial banks: operating nationwide, mainly in the large and
medium-sized cities;
City commercial banks: operating in local cities;
• Urban and rural credit cooperatives and rural commercial banks: operating in
local counties and rural areas47.
' Commercial banks only include state-owned, joint-stock, city, rural, and foreign banks.
46 By the end of 2002, domestic (Chinese) banks had set up 674 overseas operational banking
institutions, including 610 or 90.5% set up by these big four banks. Total assets of all the overseas
operational banking institutions reached USD 166.21 billion, out of which USD 147.42 billion or
88.7% was from these banks (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 2003).
The service areas of foreign banks were between city commercial banks and the joint-stock
commercial banks: some could only operate locally, while some could operate in the adjacent
provinces.
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Therefore, although the increasing number and types of banks could enhance
competition generally, the segmentation of the banking sector might lead to a
distorted picture. That is, intensified competition exists in the large cities in which
the state-owned banks, joint-stock banks, city commercial bank, and foreign banks
all have branches, whereas there is little competition or even a monopoly in the
poor rural areas (Xie, 200 1)48.
2.5.2 Market Structure of China's Banking Sector: 1992 vs. 2002
Table 2.6 summarizes the market structure of China's banking sector. At the end
of 2002, total assets of the banking sector amounted to RMB6,785.14 bn (or
USD819.74 bn), an increase of 128% over the figure of 1992. Total deposits and
total loans reached RMB5,097.29 bn (or USD615.82 bn) and RMB4,091.93 bn (or
USD494.36 bn), an increase of 238% and 169%, respectively. In terms of total
assets, the market share of the state-owned banks fell from 84% in 1992 to 61% in
2002, whereas it had doubled for non-state-owned commercial banks since
1992.
In particular, the market share of joint-stock commercial banks increased by over
9 percentage points, which is consistent with the rapid expansion strategy adopted
by these banks during this stage. The market share of the rural credit cooperatives
hardly changed. The decrease of the market share of the urban credit cooperatives
could be fully explained by the increase of the market share of the city
commercial banks. Foreign banks had slight improvements in their market share.
The figures on the market share in terms of deposits and loans also show the same
trend as the asset figure.
48 However, the data for bank branches in each city is unavailable, so detailed research on this
issue is impossible at this moment.
u The non-state-owned commercial banks refer to joint-stock, city, and foreign banks. Rural
commercial banks are not included in this table because the data is unavailable.
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Taken together, China's banking sector is characterized by a decline in the market
share of state-owned banks. In addition, increasing foreign bank presence, rapid
expansion of the joint-stock banks, as well as transforming urban credit
cooperatives to city commercial banks, indicate that market concentration is
decreasing, and hence point to heightened competition among these commercial
banks during the second reform stage.
2.5.3 State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks: 1985-2002
Given that the state-owned commercial banks and the joint-stock commercial
banks are the two major types of banks in China50, and that their data are available
for research, the study below concentrates on these two types of banks.
Composition of Banking Business: State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks
Figure 2.1 (a) indicates that, starting in the mid-1990s, traditional banking
activities (e.g., lending) have decreased in importance with investment (investing
in treasury bills and other finance bonds), and off-balance-sheet activities (agent
services51 , letters of credit) have grown. The average ratio of total investment to
total loans, for instance, increased from 12% in 1993 to 36% in 2002.
This ratio for state banks has grown faster than that of joint-stock banks since
1997, which means that the state banks took an active part in diversifying their
portfolio by making more investments. On the other hand, this ratio has increased
continuously for both types of banks, especially after 1997, reflecting the
influence of the creation of a centralised inter-bank market in 1996, which
provides an appropriate platform for these banks to diversify their assets.
50 At the end of 2002, their market share of the entire banking sector (in terms of total assets) was
75%, and 93% if only the commercial banks are taken into account. The name list of the state-
owned commercial banks and the joint-stock commercial banks are presented in Appendix 2.6.
51 Agent services mainly refer to activities such as collecting and paying fees on a customer's
behalf, acting as an agent for securities and insurance firms. For example, banks have affiliated
with securities firms and opened telephone banking businesses that allow the clients to buy or sell
stock using their deposits accounts. Also, banks can provide bank/security transferable accounts
(Shi, 2001).
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Figure 2.1 Composition of Banking Business: State-owned vs. Joint-stock
Banks
(a) Ratio of Investment to Loans
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Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1994-2003)
Notes: 1. All the figures are based on the mean value of the relative year.
Similarly, the average non-interest income to total income ratio, which captures
the effects of fees and commission based services for banks, increased by about
247% in 2002 compared to the figure for 1993 (Figure 2.1 (b)). For joint-stock
banks, this ratio is constantly higher than the state-owned banks, which means that
the joint-stock banks took greater advantage of the off-balance-sheet activities
than did the state banks.
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Re-organisation: State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks
Figure 2.2 (a) indicates that the fixed assets of the big four banks kept on
increasing over the period 1985-2000, and dropped a little in 2001-2002. This
reflects the influence of the closure of some non-profitable county-level sub-
branches (offices) during this period.
Figure 2.2 (b) shows that, from 1996 to 2002, the average number of employees
of these banks declined by nearly 19%. Both results show that the state
commercial banks began to streamline their branches and staff as well as adjust
their fixed assets structure during the second stage of banking reform.
Figure 2.3 presents the development of fixed assets and the number of employees
for the joint-stock commercial banks during the period 1987-2002. In contrast to
the covered U shape of the graphs for the state banks, both measures for the joint-
stock banks show an upward trend: their average numbers of employees increased
by more than 94%, and the increasing rate of their average fixed assets was about
411% over the period 1993-2002. This result is consistent with the active
expansion strategy adopted by the joint-stock banks during the second stage.
Operational Efficiency: State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks
The cost to income ratio is a raw measure of operational efficiency, and the lower
the ratio the higher the efficiency. Figure 2.4 shows that the trend in the cost to
income ratios for both types of banks has been varied during the last two decades.
Specifically, between 1985 and 1992, the state banks witnessed continuous
efficiency losses, but, for the joint-stock banks, the trend was random. During the
second stage, there were obvious efficiency improvements for the state banks,
whereas the efficiency of the joint-stock banks hardly changed. Overall, the joint-
stock banks have been more efficient than the state banks from 1985 to 2002.
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Figure 2.2 Fixed Assets and Number of Employees of State-owned Banks
(a) Fixed Assets
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Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-2003)
Note: 1. Values of fixed assets are deflated by the CPI, with 1985 as the base year.
2. All the figures are based on the mean value of the relative year.
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Figure 2.3 Fixed Assets and Numbers of Employees of Joint-stock Banks
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Note: 1. Values of fixed assets are deflated by the CPI, with 1985 as the base year.
2. All the figures are based on the mean value of the relative year.
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Figure 2.4 Cost to Income Ratios: State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks
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ROA and ROE: State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks
Figure 2.5 (a) shows that the ROA of the state banks has fallen slowly but
continuously since 1987, and reached the lowest point in 1998. The ROA of the
joint-stock banks increased considerably before 1990, but again shows a declining
trend afterwards. The ROA of the joint-stock banks has been higher than that of
the state banks since 1988.
Figure 2.5 (b) shows that the ROE of both types of banks hardly changed during
the entire period. However, the trend for state banks was basically downwards,
whereas, for the joint-stock banks, the trend was roughly a reverse U-shape. The
big drop after 1996 was probably due to a change of the taxation policy for
financial enterprises, i.e., the rate of tax on turnover was raised from 5% to 8%
(Xie and Jiao, 2002). The ROE of the joint-stock banks has been higher than that
of the state banks since 1989.
48
(b) ROE
35
30
25
4-
U
e 150.
10
5
0
Figure 2.5 ROA and ROE: State-owned vs. Joint-stock Banks
(a) ROA
2.5
2
4-
c 1.5
a)
C.)
I-
a)
0.
0.5
0
Oj	 c	 o	 ç'
year
—.---ROA-state —.----ROA-joint stock
(5
year
—.--ROE-state —u—ROE-joint stocJ
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-2003)
Note: 1. Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of earnings to total assets. Return on equity (ROE) is
the ratio of earnings to total equity. 2. In this study, pre-tax net income was used to calculate ROA
and ROE instead of after-tax net income because of missing corporate tax figures. 3. Total equity
(net worth) of the four state-owned banks refers to the paid-in capital, which corresponds closely
to Tier 1 capital in the Basel Accord, plus retained profits and other surpluses to paid-in capital.
Thus, it is roughly comparable to the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (Lardy, 1999). 4. All the
figures are based on the mean value of the relative year.
Overall, given that the ROA and ROE of both types of banks showed a downward
trend during the second stage of banking reform, and the number and type of
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banks increased, this might suggest that competition increased during this stage.
In addition, technological progress is assumed to enhance competition by
eliminating geographical barriers and facilitating product innovations. With
heightened competition, banks tried to improve their efficiency by restructuring
their product composition and by re-organization. However, the large amount of
non-performing loans might also change the economies of China's banking
business, since more problem loans may incur higher labor expenses for extra
monitoring and negotiating, and, in addition, may necessitate the payment of
higher rates for funds.
2.5.4 Development of Foreign Banks
Figure 2.6 illustrates the development of foreign banks during the period 199 1-
2002. It shows that foreign banks were largely dependent on external sources of
finance. The total deposits of foreign banks was quite low over the period, while
the change in total loans is highly consistent with changes in the funds of other
branches, suggesting that the lending business of foreign banks in China was
mainly supported by funds borrowed from other branches abroad.
Figure 2.6 Development of Foreign Banks (1991-2002)
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Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1992-2003)
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In addition, there was new growth following China's WTO membership. In 2002,
the total deposits and total equity of foreign banks increased compared to the
previous year. At the same time, funds from the branches overseas decreased from
USD26.1 bn in 2001 to USD18.7 bn in 2002, which resulted in a drop in the total
assets of foreign banks. This change suggests that, with China's entry to the
WTO, the foreign banks appear to be using the domestic markets more for funds,
relying less on overseas funds.
Table 2.7 provides the distribution of the home countries of foreign banks at the
end of 2002. It shows that nearly all of the foreign banks come from Asia, Europe
and North America. Among them, Asia is the largest investor. The value of total
assets of foreign banks from Asia was RMB2,401 bn (or USD290 bn) by the end
of 2002, accounting for 61% of the total assets of all the foreign banks. Europe
and North America are in second and third place, accounting for 21% and 17% of
whole total assets, respectively. In terms of the number of foreign bank branches
and sub-branches, Hong Kong (Special Administration Zone), Japan, France,
USA and Singapore are the top five home countries, accounting for 66% of the
total number of foreign bank branches by the end of 2002.
Table 2.7 Home Countries of Foreign Banks (2002)
Continents	 Total Assets % of total	 Home	 Number of % of total
(RMB bn)	 Countries	 Foreign Bank
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ 
Branches	 __________
Asia	 2401.2	 61%	 Hong Kong	 36	 25%
Europe	 806.9	 21%	 Japan	 20	 14%
North	 649.9	 17%	 France	 16	 11%
America_______________ _______________ _______________ 	 ___________
_________ _________ _________ USA	 13	 9%
____________ ____________ ____________ Singapore 	 11	 8%
Total3915.4	 _____________ Total	 146	 _________
CR399.3%	 __________ CR5	 65.75%	 _______
Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 2003
Table 2.8 provides the geographical distribution of foreign bank branches (FBBs)
in China at the end of 2002. Foreign bank branches were highly concentrated in
selected geographical regions. The top-three-city concentration ratio, in terms of
total assets, was as high as 76%. In terms of number of foreign bank branches, the
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top-five-city concentration ratio was as high as 73%52• Shanghai was the main
location for foreign bank branches. By the end of 2002, Shanghai hosted 52% of
total foreign bank assets, with 40 foreign bank branches. It also had the largest
foreign bank size by assets. Shenzhen and Beijing came next to Shanghai, each
with 19 foreign bank branches. Shenzhen had more foreign banks' assets. The
other two main cities for foreign banks were Guanghzou and Tianjin.
Table 2.8 Distribution of Foreign Bank Branches (2002)
Cities	 Total	 % of total	 Cities	 Number of % of total	 Assets
Assets	 FBBs	 per
(RMB bn)
	
	
FBBs
(RMB
___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ bn)
Shanghai	 2026.4	 52%	 Shanghai	 40	 27%	 54
Shenzhen	 547.9	 14%	 Beijing	 19	 13%	 21
Beijing	 406.8	 10%	 Shenzhen	 19	 13%	 29
__________ ___________ ___________ Guangzhou 15
	 10%	 24
___________ ___________ ___________ Tianjin
	 14	 10%	 27
Others	 934.3	 24%	 Others	 39	 27%	 ________
Total 3915.4	 ___________ Total 	 146	 ___________ _______
CR376%	 ________ CR5	 73%	 ________ _____
5ource: Almanac oJ China's Itnance and lianking, 2UO3
Note: FBBs refers to foreign bank branches.
2.6 Econometric Analysis
This section attempts to use the qualitative findings in the previous sections to
conduct a simple econometric analysis of bank performance in China. This is a
preliminary exploration to round off this chapter, and the thesis explores more
complex models in Chapter 553W Following Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and
others, a simple linear equation is employed and specified below:
ROA,, = a + /31 NPL,, + f32 EL + 133 N11A11 + f34 CI 1 + /35L1	 (2 1)
+ /36 OWN + fl7 17' + /38 LGTD11 + J39 CONC + /310 AlP1 + e1
where
ROA, 1 = return on assets, a proxy for the profitability, of bank i at time t;
52 rn-city concentration ratio is defined as the ratio of foreign bank assets (or number of foreign
banks) of the m largest cities to total foreign bank assets (or total number of foreign banks) of all
the cities in a given year.
Given that this chapter is an "overview", and not the central part of this thesis, there is no
attempt to review the relevant literature.
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NPL1 = the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, an indicator of the
asset quality, of bank i at time t;
EL1 = the ratio of total equity to total loans, a crude measure of capital
adequacy, of bank i at time t;
NHA1J = the ratio of net interest income to total assets, a measure of the
interest rate margin, of bank i at time t;
CI,, = cost to income ratio, a proxy for operational efficiency, of bank i at
time t;
LR1 , = the ratio of cash and bank deposits to total assets, an indicator of the
asset liquidity, of bank i at time t;
OWN S = an ownership dummy, 0 for state-owned and 1 for joint-stock banks;
17 = time trend variable, equal to 0 to 17 for years 1985 to 2002, respectively;
LGTD1 , = the natural logarithm of total deposits, a proxy for size, of bank i at
time t;
CONC, = the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HERF) , a measure of market
concentration, at time t;
AlP, = average (annual) income per person, a proxy for the supply of deposits
to banks, at time t;
The random effects panel data approach is used to estimate the equation (2.1). As
indicated by Greene (2000), the advantage of a panel data set over a cross section
and/or a time-series is that it gives the researcher greater flexibility in modelling
differences in behaviour across individuals and/or time periods. The random
effects model is preferred over the fixed effects model because the fixed effects
estimator requires within-group variation in all variables for at least some groups.
However, there are time-invariant regressors, such as the ownership dummy, in
this study. Thus, the fixed effects estimator cannot be computed. Moreover, a
fixed effects model would lead to a substantial loss of degrees of freedom
(Baltagi, 1995). A brief introduction to the random effects panel data approach
appears in Appendix 2.7.
Data were collected on the four state-owned commercial banks and the ten joint-
stock commercial banks. The full sample covers the period from 1985 through
HERF is defined as the sum of squared market shares of deposits of the sample of banks in a
given year. HERF is slightly greater than 0 for a perfectly competitive market and 100 for a
monopoly (Waldman and Jensen, 2001).
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2002 with 187 observations. In addition, the data were split to obtain the first
stage reform sub-sample (1985-1992), and the second stage reform sub-sample
(1993-2002). Table 2.9 presents the summary statistics for the variables used to
estimate this equation.
Table 2.9 Variables Used in the Preliminary Model
Variable	 Description	 All	 ________ l stage ________ 2 stage _________
_________ ________________ Mean 	 S.D.	 Mean	 S.D.	 Mean S.D.
ROA	 Return on assets	 0.0 10	 0.008	 0.011	 0.008	 0.009	 0.008
NPL	 Non-performing	 0.140	 0.077	 0.055	 0.028	 0.175	 0.063
___________ loans/total loans	 ________ ________ ________ _________ ________ __________
EL	 Total	 equity/total 0.129	 0.116	 0.175	 0.177	 0.110	 0.072
__________ loans
	 ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ _________
NIJA	 Net	 interest 0.057	 0.035	 0.029	 0.03 1	 0.056	 0.037
___________ income/total assets ________ ________ ________ _________ ________ __________
CI	 Cost/income	 0.711	 0.144	 0.659	 0.196	 0.732	 0.110
LR	 Cash and bank 0.239	 0.086	 0.184	 0.074	 0.261	 0.081
___________ deposits/total assets ________ ________ ________ _________ ________ __________
LGTD	 Natural logarithm 10.649 	 1.921	 10.298	 2.264	 10.791 1.752
__________ of total deposits 	 ________ ________ ________ ________ _______ __________
CONG	 Herfindahl-	 0.236	 0.034	 0.284	 0.018	 0.217	 0.013
Hirschman Index
AlP	 Average income per 0.855	 0.266	 0.546	 0.043	 0.98 1	 0.2 10
__________ person
	 ________ ________ ________ ________ _______ _________
Number of observations	 187	 54	 133
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-2003); Lardy (1998, 1999).
Notes: 1. All refers to all banks in the sample; stage refers to banks existed in the first stage of
banking reform (1985-1992); 2" stage refers to banks existed in the second stage of banking
reform (1993-2002). 2. Official data for non-performing loans (NPLs) are quite limited to outside
observers. The NPL data are only available for the state banks over the period 1993-2002, and for
the joint-stock banks over the period 1999-2002. Since the majority of the NPLs were created in
the 1990s, in this chapter, the NFL ratio of the state banks is defined as 5% for the period 1985-
1989, and 10% for 1990-1992. For the joint-stock banks, it is defined as 1% for 1987-1989, and
5% for 1990-1992. From 1993 to 1998, its growth rate was 2%, similar to that of the state banks.
3. Both deposits and average income per person are deflated by the CPI, with 1985 as the base
year.
Compared to the banks in the first stage, Table 2.9 shows that banks in the second
stage operated in a more competitive market, given that the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index decreased by 23%. Average income per person increased by 80%, which
means that there was an enhanced potential for greater supply of household bank
deposits. They had lower asset quality (NPL ratio increased by 220%) and
reduced capital adequacy - the ratio of total equity to total loans fell by 37%. The
cost to income ratio increased suggesting reduced efficiency. The banks were
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more liquid, as the liquidity ratio increased by 42%. On average, the return on
assets fell by 17%, and the banks were larger in size in the second stage.
Table 2.10 provides the results of the empirical test. Before analysing the results,
Chow's Breakpoint test was conducted to test the poolability of the data. The
result shows that there was a structural change in 1993 (F statistic is 5.24, and p-
value is zero). Thus, the empirical analysis focuses on the two sub-samples. The
LM statistics are 16.19 and 7.08 with low p-values (i.e. 0.000 and 0.008,
respectively) for the first and second stage sub-samples, respectively. The results
show that the random effects panel data model is more appropriate than the
standard regression model for both sub-samples.
The coefficient of the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is not
significantly different from zero for the first stage sub-sample and significantly
positive for the second sub-sample. This wrong-signed coefficient might be
explained by two factors. One is that total assets were substantially overstated
because large quantities of non-performing loans (NPLs) were carried on bank
balance sheets as assets. Also, the practice of accruing interest on NPLs overstated
the interest income of banks. Banks added the unpaid interest to the principal of
the loan without officially extending a new loan. Since the accrued interest was
treated as income, as if it had actually been paid by the borrower, it overstated
income (Lardy, 1998). Thus, the high NPLs of the Chinese banks overstate both
the numerator and denominator of the ROA, which may explain why the
coefficient is wrong signed.
The ratio of total equity to total loans is insignificant for both sub-samples, and
wrong signed but significant for the sample as a whole. This finding is consistent
with the fact that bank equity rarely acted as a cushion against poorly performing
assets during the sample period (Lardy, 1998, 1999). Thus, it may not be a good
measure of capital adequacy.
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Table 2.10 Empirical Results of the Simple Model of Bank Performance
Variable	 Description	 All	 ________	 stage ________ 2' stage _______
Coef.	 S.E.	 Coef.	 S.E.	 Coef.	 S.E.
(p	 (p	 (p
___________ ____________________	 value	 ________ value)	 _________ value
C	 Constant	 0.068	 0.014	 -0.074	 0.028	 0.132	 0.019
_________ _________________ _______ (0.000) _______ (0.008) ________ (0.000)
NPL	 Non-performing	 0.002	 0.009	 -0.013	 0.038	 0.030	 0.011
__________ loans/total loans 	 ________ (0.793) ________ (0.733) _________ (0.008)
EL	 Total	 equity/total -0.008	 0.004	 -0.002	 0.005	 0.004	 0.006
__________ loans	 ________ (0.075) ________ (0.686) _________ (0.436)
NIIA	 Net	 interest 0.026
	
0.013	 0.007	 0.024	 0.031	 0.011
__________ income/total assets ________ (0.038) ________ (0.775) _________ (0.007)
CI	 Costlincome	 -0.031	 0.003	 -0.002	 0.004	 -0.042	 0.004
_________ _________________ _______ (0.000) _______ (0.591) ________ (0.000)
LR	 Cash and bank -0.004	 0.006	 -0.008	 0.010	 -0.009	 0.005
deposits	 /total	 (0.507)	 (0.441)	 (0.093)
______________ assets 	 ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ____________ __________
OWN	 Ownership dummy 0.008	 0.003	 0.027	 0.007	 0.007	 0.003
_________ _________________ _______ (0.007) _______ (0.000) ________ (0.009)
IT	 Time trend	 0.001	 0.001	 -0.001	 0.001	 -0.002	 0.001
_________ _________________ _______ (0.186) _______ (0.211) ________ (0.096)
LGTD	 Natural logarithm 0.0004 0.001 	 0.004	 0.001	 -0.001	 0.001
_________ of total deposits 	 _______ (0.516) _______ (0.000) ________ (0.383)
CONC	 Herfindahl-	 -0.098	 0.036	 0.089	 0.050	 -0.287	 0.065
__________ Hirschman Index	 ________ (0.006) _______ (0.072) ________ (0.000)
AlP	 Averageincomeper -0.034	 0.006	 0.019	 0.029	 -0.011	 0.014
_________ person
	 _______ (0.000) _______ (0.507) ________ (0.423)
LM	 13.06	 (0.000) 16.19	 (0.000)	 7.08	 (0.008)
statistics________________________ __________ ___________ __________ ___________ ___________ __________
Number of observations 	 187	 54	 133
IAll	 .11 L_l_ :_ L.	 _...l.. 1St -, --------------------.L..	 _C L_l_.._
reform (i985-1992); 2 stage= banks e;isted in the second stage of banking reform (1992OO2
2. Coef. stands for coefficients, and S.E. for standard errors. 3. White Heteroscedasticy consistent
standard errors are applied. To provide correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the
presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form, White (1980) derived a heteroskedasticity
consistent covariance matrix estimator. 4. Coefficients significant at 10% level are in bold type. 5.
LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the
random effects model based on the OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as
chi-squared with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model
with a single constant term is appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is
appropriate.
The coefficient on net interest income to total assets has significantly positive
effects on ROA only for the whole sample period and the second stage sub-
sample. The absence of a significantly positive coefficient for the first stage sub-
sample may be because these banks tended to focus on the real estate and stock
markets via their own trust and/or securities companies (Wu, 1998). However,
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they concentrated on investing in government and finance bonds 55 after 1993,
because of the separation of commercial and investment banking business and the
development of an inter-bank market during the second stage.
The cost to income ratio is insignificant for the first stage, and significantly
negative for the second stage. It indicates that the lower the cost efficiency, the
lower the profitability for banks in the second stage of reform. The coefficient for
liquidity is insignificant for the first stage sub-sample. but significantly negative
for the second stage sub-sample. This indicates that the higher the asset liquidity,
the lower the bank profitability, which is consistent with the expectation, since
assets with greater liquidity usually have lower returns.
The significantly positive value of the ownership dummy suggests that the joint-
stock banks earned higher profits than the state banks during the whole reform
period. The time trend variable is insignificant for the first stage sub-sample, but
significantly negative for the second sub-samples. This indicates that bank
profitability has been deteriorating significantly since 1993.
The significantly positive sign on the coefficient for the log value of total deposits
shows that for banks in the first reform stage, the larger the size, the better the
performance. In the second stage, it was not found to be significant. The
concentration coefficient is significantly positive for the first stage sub-sample,
and negative for the second stage sub-sample. This suggests that banks in the first
stage earned higher profits because of greater market power. However, by the
second stage, the reduced concentration in the market negatively affected bank
profits.
The coefficient of the average income per person is insignificant for both sub-
samples. Deposits rose steadily throughout the period (28.75% between 1979 and
bonds is one issued by the financial institutions.
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2002) and to the extent that rising income proxies these rising deposits, it appears
that the banks were unable to profit from them56.
Overall, these findings suggest that efficiency and competition have influenced
banks' performance in China over the last two decades, and further research might
focus on them. The decision to allow joint-stock banks appears to have improved
performance, even though the reduced market concentration had a negative effect.
The peculiar treatment of bad loans by banks during the period makes it difficult
to comment on the effect of asset quality. Given the distorted figures on assets,
equity/loans was used as a proxy for capital adequacy, but any comment on the
effects of capital adequacy should be reserved until a more accurate measure is
available. Indeed, the fact that bad loans ended up inflating the asset figures may
have undermined the entire estimating equation, because the dependent variable
was also affected. Finally, looking at bank performance in aggregate has its
limitations, even if the difference in ownership type is allowed for.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the evolution of China's banking sector from 1949 to
2002. Before 1979, the banking sector was monopolistic, with the People's Bank
of China (PBC) simultaneously engaged in both central and commercial banking
operations. Thus, the major role of the banking system was quite circumscribed
during the period 1949-1979. To strengthen the role of the banking sector in the
mobilization and allocation of financial resources, reforms in banking have been
introduced since 1979. Consistent with the strategy of overall economic reform in
China, a gradual approach has been used.
The first stage of banking reform (1979-1992) transformed the monopoly into
two-tier banking, consisting of the central bank, state-owned specialized banks,
medium and small-sized commercial banks, rural and urban credit cooperatives,
56 Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2000-2003). Appendix 2.8 provides a figure of the
growth rates of household deposits.
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and foreign banks. The credit-quota plan and central bank lending became the
major policy instruments to manage aggregate credit. Interest rates on deposits
and loans were under the control of the central bank. In 1986, the scope of
banking activities was expanded by allowing universal banking business. Despite
the emergence of the medium and small-sized commercial banks and foreign
banks, the system was dominated by the state-owned specialized banks. In
addition, the activities of the banking sector were largely directed by the
government as a means to implement its development strategy. Both prudential
regulation and corporate governance of the banking sector were quite weak.
The second stage of banking reform (1993-2002) was initiated with the objective
of developing a sound banking system, i.e., an effective, competitive, and safe
banking sector. To achieve this aim, a reform strategy consisting of deregulation
and new regulations was adopted. Structural deregulation, such as lowering the
entry barriers, brought more players to the market. Technological progress also
enhanced competition by eliminating geographical barriers and facilitating
product innovations.
Some conduct deregulation, such as removing the credit ceilings, commercializing
the state-owned banks, allowing an inter-bank market, and some marginal interest
rate liberalization, also took place. These measures gave banks more chances to
adjust their product and cost structure, and improve their performance
accordingly. However, new regulation, such as the segmentation of commercial
and investment banking business, was also introduced. This measure limited the
services and products that the banks could offer, and probably reduced their
opportunity to enhance their performance.
In response to these changes, banks attempted to adopt strategies aimed at
improving efficiency to expand output and increase the range of services offered.
The streamlining of the state-owned banks, the expansion of the joint-stock banks,
the diversification of the portfolio, innovation in the off-balance-sheet activities,
and, more recently, the joint-stock reform of the state banks can be interpreted as
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responses of this kind. A major motivation has been to realize potential scale and
scope economies, and to eliminate inefficiencies. Given the above factors and new
pressures under China's membership of the WTO, it is of interest to investigate
the progress of China's banking system with respect to efficiency and
competition.
The second stage reform was profound, but the high proportion of non-performing
loans poses a substantial challenge to the sector during the second stage of reform.
Although the Chinese banks have made certain progress in improving the quality
of their loans, their average ratio of non-performing loans is still very high,
suggesting improving asset quality should still be the major task for these banks.
While the state banks are wholly owned by the state, the joint-stock banks are also
effectively owned by the state via local governments and state-owned enterprises.
They are not private banks typical of the west. However, the issues of social
welfare objectives and "soft" budget constraints are more applicable to the state
banks, given that they are the mainstream of China's banking sector, and directly
controlled by the government.
Furthermore, a random effects panel data model was employed for the preliminary
exploration of the issue of bank performance over the last two decades. The
results suggest that efficiency and competition have influenced bank performance
in China over the last two decades. Therefore, the next two chapters explore a
different perspective by looking at X-efficiency and scale/scope economies,
before returning to the more complex models of structure-performance and
relative efficiency.
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Appendix 2.1
Table of Exchange Rate for the Period 1978-2002
Unit: RMB yuan
Year	 Exchange	 Annual	 Year	 Exchange	 Annual
rate at the average	 rate at the average
end of the exchange	 end of the exchange
year	 rate	 year	 rate
(USD 100)	 (USD 100)	 (USD 100)	 (USD 100)
1978	 157.71	 168.36	 1991	 543.42	 532.22
1979	 149.62	 155.49	 1992	 575.18	 551.46
1980	 153.03	 149.84	 1993	 580.00	 576.20
1981	 174.55	 170.50	 1994	 844.62	 861.87
1982	 192.27	 189.25	 1995	 831.74	 835.09
1983	 198.09	 197.57	 1996	 829.82	 829.90
1984	 279.57	 232.70	 1997	 827.96	 828.98
1985	 320.12	 293.67	 1998	 827.91	 827.91
1986	 372.21	 345.28	 1999	 827.93	 827.83
1987	 372.21	 372.21	 2000	 827.72	 827.84
1988	 372.21	 372.21	 2001	 827.68	 827.70
1989	 472.21	 376.51	 2002	 827.72	 827.70
1990	 522.21	 478.32
Sources: China's Financial Statistics 1952-1996 (1997); Almanac of China's Finance and
Banking (1998-2003)
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Appendix 2.2
Deposit and Lending Rates (March 15, 1989)
Unit: % (annual rate)
Type of Deposits Maturity 	 Type of Loans Maturity	 %
Residential	 Current	 2.88	 Working	 Loans to industrial 11.34
Saving Deposits	 account	 Capital Loan	 and	 commercial
enterprise
1 year	 11.34	 Loans to procure 9.00
cereals, cotton, and
edible oil
3 years	 13.14	 Fixed-asset	 Less than 1 year	 11.34
8 years	 17.64	 Loan	 1-3 years	 12.78
Government	 Current	 2.88	 3-5 years	 14.40
Agency Deposits account
Time	 Same as
	
5-10 years	 19.20
deposits	 residential
time
deposits
Source: Zhou (1992)
Note: Interest rates mentioned in this table are only a small part of the interest structure of the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
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Appendix 2.3
Definition of Shares in China's Stock Exchange Markets
A company in China may issue five different types of shares on either the
Shanghai or Shenzhen Securities Exchanges: state shares, legal person shares,
employee shares, A shares and B shares. In addition, they may issue shares in
Hong Kong and on overseas exchanges. There is no cross-listing between the two
Chinese exchanges.
State shares designate holdings in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by the
central government, local governments, or solely SOEs. To preserve the
economy's socialist structure, most of the companies permitted to go public have
to issue shares to the government, in addition to various categories of shares
representing claims from different entities. Legal person shares are shares owned
by domestic institutions which are themselves partially owned by the central or
local government.
Legal persons are typically business agencies or enterprises of local governments
that helped in starting up the public company either by giving permission to
operate or by allowing public resources to be used for the star up. Therefore, the
legal persons would behave very similarly as state shareholders. Both state shares
and legal person shares are not tradable on the stock market, but transferable to
domestic institutions upon approval of the China's Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC).
A-shares are similar to ordinary equity shares, except that they are exclusively
available to Chinese citizens and domestic institutions. They are mostly held and
traded by individuals. It is required that A-shares should account for no less than
25% of total outstanding shares when a company makes its initial public offering.
For most listed companies, the top 10 shareholders are normally the state and
legal persons.
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B-shares are issued to attract foreign portfolio investors. Since the Chinese
currency is not convertible on the capital account, B-shares are quoted and traded
in either US dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Hong Kong dollars on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Prior to February 2001, only non-PRC (the People's
Republic of China) residents were allowed to trade B-shares. Employee shares are
offered to workers and managers of a listed company, usually at a substantial
discount. After a holding period of 6 to 12 months, the company may file with the
CSRC to allow its employees to sell their shares on the open market. Once sold on
the market, they become A-shares. H shares are shares of mainland Chinese
enterprises listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Source: Sun et al. (2002)
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Appendix 2.4
Guidelines on Corporate Governance Reforms and Supervision of Bank of
China and Construction Bank of China
(China Banking Regulatory Commission)
Chapter 1	 General Provisions
Article 1: Given the significance of the joint-stock reforms of State-owned
commercial banks as a brand new experience of financial sector reforms, the
Guidelines on Corporate Governance Reforms And Supervision of Bank of China
and Construction Bank of China (hereinafter is referred to as the Guidelines) is
formulated for the purpose of securing the success of the pilot joint-stock reforms
of the Bank of China and China Construction Bank (hereinafter referred to as
"two pilot banks").
Article 2: The objective of the joint-stock reforms of the two pilot banks is to
build, within three years, the two pilot banks into modern and internationally
competitive joint-stock commercial banks with adequate capital, strict internal
controls, safe and sound business operations, quality services and desirable
profitability. To this end, the reforms shall be centered on innovating the banks'
management regime and systems, improving their corporate governance,
innovating their operating mechanisms and thereby boosting their profit-earning
capacity.
Article 3:	 The two pilot banks shall, through reforms, meet and keep at the
average level of the world top 100 banks in terms of both corporate governance
and financial conditions measured by internationally accepted criteria.
Chapter II	 Corporate Governance
65
Article 4:	 The two pilot banks shall have in place a standard corporate
governance structure comprising the general shareholders meeting, a board of
directors, a board of supervisors and an executive management.
Each pilot bank shall, with reference to the corporate governance required for a
modern corporate entity, segregate the functions and powers of the general
shareholders meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the
executive management, adopt an organizational structure required for a joint-stock
commercial bank and in compliance with the Company Law of the People's
Republic of China, and establish sound and efficient mechanisms for policy
making, enforcement and oversight so as to ensure independent operations of each
organ and necessary checks and balances among different organs.
Article 5:
	
The two pilot banks shall be encouraged to introduce domestic and
foreign strategic investors to diversify their equity structure, and shall select the
investors in a fair and impartial manner.
By introducing strategic investors, in particular the foreign strategic investors,
each pilot bank shall aim at building up its financial strength, optimizing its equity
structure, bringing its management systems and operating concepts in line with
those of the world advanced banks by learning from the international advanced
management expertise, technology and methodology.
Article 6:
	
The two pilot banks shall have in place clear-cut development
strategies with an aim at maximum profitability.
Each pilot bank shall identify its core and market competitive advantages in light
of its own profile and market situations, and on this basis, adopt a comprehensive
package of development strategies consistent with its development goals. The
implementation of the strategies shall be rolled out and assessed on an annual
basis.
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Article 7:
	
The two pilot banks shall have in place sound mechanisms for
decision-making, internal controls and risk management.
Each pilot bank shall adopt a system of risk management, which covers the credit
risk, market risk and operational risk, and is effective in identifying, measuring,
monitoring and controlling risks.
Article 8: The two pilot banks shall optimize their organizational set-up,
improve the allocation of resources and conduct their business in an efficient and
cost-effective manner by way of reducing the layers of hierarchy, adopting a line
management structure and streamlining their business and management
procedures.
Article 9:
	
The two pilot banks shall, with reference to the human resources
management schemes required for a modem financial corporate entity, deepen the
reforms of personnel management, adopt market-oriented mechanisms for human
resources management and for providing incentives and imposing disciplines.
Article 10: The two pilot banks shall, with reference to the requirements for a
modem financial corporation and a listed commercial bank, have in place policies
and procedures for both prudent accounting practices and stringent information
disclosure, and shall enforce these policies and procedures to improve their
financial management and information disclosure activities.
Article 11:	 The two pilot banks shall build up their information technology
system to secure quality management and services.
Article 12: The two pilot banks shall have in place strategies for building up a
quality staff through proper training and recruitment of qualified personnel for key
positions, and at the same time pay due attention to effective allocation of human
resources, and give full play to the initiative and creativity of the existing human
resource.
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Article 13:	 The two pilot banks shall give a full play to the professional
advantages of intermediary institutions and proceed with the joint-stock
restructuring in a prudent manner.
Chapter III Performance Assessment Indicators
Article 14:	 The joint-stock reforms of the two pilot banks shall be assessed by
using such indicators as the ROA (Return on Assets), the ROE (Return on
Equity), cost/income ratio, non-performing asset ratio, capital adequacy ratio,
largest exposure concentration and the NPL provisioning coverage ratio.
Article 15: The net ROA ratio of the two pilot banks shall reach 0.6 per cent by
2005, and shall be further increased to the level required for an internationally
competitive bank by 2007.
Article 16: To reinforce the effectiveness and ensure the return of the capital
injection, the net ROE ratio of the two pilot banks shall reach 11 per cent by 2005,
and shall be further increased to 13 per cent or above by 2007.
Article 17: Starting from 2005, the cost/income ratio of the two pilot banks shall
be controlled within the range of 35 to 45 per cent each year.
Article 18: Starting from 2004, the two pilot banks shall apply the five-category
classification system to the classification of their non-credit assets and assessment
of the quality of their entire asset portfolio, while controlling the non-performing
asset ratio within the range of 3 to 5 per cent.
Article 19: Starting from 2004, the two pilot banks shall manage their capital
strictly in accordance with the Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of
Commercial Banks, and their capital adequacy ratio shall be maintained at the
level above 8 per cent at any point of time.
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Article 20: The two pilot banks shall take effective measures to strictly control
their exposure to a single customer. Starting from 2005, each pilot bank's lending
to a single client shall be no more than 10 per cent of its total capital.
Article 21: By the end of 2005, the NPL provisioning coverage ratio shall reach
60 per cent for the Bank of China and 80 per cent for China Construction Bank,
which shall be further increased by the end of 2007.
Chapter IV Examination and Reporting System
Article 22: The two pilot banks shall take immediate measures to dispose of their
non-performing assets.
While resolving the historically accumulated non-performing assets, the two pilot
banks shall probe into their illegal or rule-breaking business activities and take
strict disciplinary actions against the entities and personnel that are found in
violation of rules and regulations, so as to prevent the debt evasions by their
corporate customers and guard against moral hazards during the process of
reforms, and thereby safeguarding the value of their assets. For this purpose, the
two pilot banks shall submit an initial appraisal report by the end of 2004.
Article 23: The two pilot banks shall establish and enforce a clearly defined
responsibility system under which the responsibility and accountability shall be
assigned in line with the tasks and objectives set out by the State Council on the
State-owned commercial bank reforms. The chairman of the board of directors of
each pilot bank shall be the person who takes the primary responsibility.
The two pilot banks shall adopt a target-driven management system, conduct
periodical performance evaluation and submit the evaluation report, on a quarterly
basis, to the Taskforce for Pilot Joint-stock Reforms of State-owned Banks under
the State Council. In addition, each pilot bank shall conduct comprehensive
69
examinations on an annual basis, and shall disclose their progress of reforms to
the public in a proper manner so as to subject their performance to market
oversight.
Article 24: The China Banking Regulatory Commission shall examine the
performance of both corporate governance reforms and financial indicators of the
two pilot banks by way of an overall inspection, annual examinations and
quarterly surveillance reports. The findings of both examinations and surveillance
shall be reported to the Taskiorce for Pilot Joint-stock Reforms of State-owned
Banks under the State Council respectively on an annual and quarterly basis.
Chapter V	 Supplementary Provisions
Article 25: The China Banking Regulatory Commission shall have the power of
the interpretation of the Guidelines.
Article 26: The Guidelines shall enter into effect on the date of promulgation.
Source: www. cbrc.gov. cn/englisWfalvfaguildetail.asp ?id=24
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Appendix 2.5
The Five-category Loan Classification in China
To reflect the quality of loans in an authentic, comprehensive and dynamic
manner, control, prevent and mitigate risks and enhance banks' credit
management skills, the PBC initiated the risk-adjusted loan classification
approach in 1998, initially in Guangdong Province on a trial basis and eventually
nationwide. In 1999, the PBC modified the Guiding Principles on Risk based
Loan Classification (Provisional) and required the commercial banks to classify
their loans accordingly. In December 2001, the PBC issued the Notice on the
Implementation of Five-category Loan Classification, together with the Guiding
Principles on Risk-based Loan Classification. This five-category classification
approach was implemented in all banks in China from the beginning of 2002. By
the end of 2002, the 4 state-owned and 10 joint-stock commercial banks had
established the five-category classification management system. Hence, the results
of the classification are reported to the PBC on a quarterly basis as required.
Depending on the degree of risk, the Guiding Principles on Risk-based Loan
Classification classify bank loans into five categories, i.e., normal, special
mention, substandard, doubtful and lost. Their definitions are as following: (1)
normal: the debtor is able to perform the loan contract and the bank does not have
sufficient reason to doubt the full servicing of the loan in time. (2) Special
mention: the debtor is able to service the loan at present, however, there are
factors that can adversely affect the repayment of the loan. (3) Substandard: there
are clear weaknesses in the debtor's repayment capability. The loan cannot be
fully serviced with the debtor's normal business income. Some losses will occur
even if the guarantees are executed. (4) Doubtful: the debtor is unable to service
the loan in full and significant losses will occur even if the collateral is executed.
(5) Lost: the principal and interest cannot be recovered or can be recovered in a
small part after legal actions are taken.
Source: PBC Annual Report, 2002, p.49.
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Appendix 2.6
List of Major Commercial Banks in China
Bank Type Number Bank Name
	State-owned 1
	
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
	
Commercial 2
	 Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)
Banks	 3	 Bank of China (BOC)
	
4	 China Construction Bank (CCB)
Joint-stock	 I	 Bank of Communication (BOCOM)
	
Commercial 2
	 CITIC Industrial Bank (CITICIB)
Banks	 3	 China Merchants Bank (CMB)
	
4	 Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB)
	
5	 Guangdong Development Bank (GDB)
	
6	 Industrial Bank (TB)
	
7	 China Everbright Bank (CEB)
	
8	 HuaXiaBank(HXB)
	
9	 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB)
10	 China Minsheng Banking Corporation (CMBC)
Sources. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2003)
Note: Yantai House Savings Bank was transformed to the 1 1th joint-stock commercial banks,
namely Evergrowing Bank, in 2003.
72
Appendix 2.7
Panel Data Approach
Panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a cross-section of households,
countries, firms, etc. over several time periods (Baltagi, 1995). A panel data
regression differs from a cross-section or time-series regression in that it has a
double subscript on its variables, i.e.
y, = a + fl 'x1, + e	 i = 1, . . .,N; t = 1,... ,T
with i denoting households, individuals, firms, countries, etc., and t denoting time.
Therefore, the i subscript, denotes the cross-section dimension whereas t denotes
the time-series dimension. a is a scalar, /3 is K x 1 and x,, is the itth
observation on K independent variables.
Most of the panel data applications use a one-way error component model for the
disturbances, with
= + v
where u. denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and v denotes the
remainder disturbance.
Under the fixed effects approach, the u are assumed to be group specific fixed
parameters to be estimated, i.e., they are assumed to be constant over time. The
random effects approach takes 	 as a group specific disturbance, similar to v,
except that for each group, there is but a single draw that enters the regression
identically in each period (Greene, 2000).
As indicated by Hsiao (1985, 1986) and Baltagi (1995), there are several benefits
from using panel data, which include:
• Controlling for individual heterogeneity.
• Giving more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.
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• Being better able to study the dynamics of adjustment.
• Being better able to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable
in pure time-series or pure cross-sections data.
• Allowing us to construct and test more complicated behavioral models than
purely time-series or pure cross-sections data.
• Eliminating biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals, since
panel data are usually gathered on micro units.
However, the limitations of panel data include:
• Design and data collection problems.
• Distortions of measurement errors.
• Selectivity problems, such as self-selectivity, nonresponse, and attrition.
• Short time-series dimension.
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Appendix 2.8
Annual Growth Rate of China's Household Deposits (1979-2002)
Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2000-2003)
75
Chapter 3. X-efficiency in China's Banking Sector
3.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate X-efficiency in China's banking
sector from 1985 to 2002. A particular emphasis is placed on investigating how
gradual banking reform has influenced X-efficiency, as well as whether different
forms of bank ownership have affected X-efficiency. The rest of the chapter is
organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews previous studies, which focus on X-
efficiency in the banking sector. Section 3.3 describes the major methodology and
the data used. The stochastic cost frontier model is employed to estimate X-
efficiency, with three different assumptions (i.e., half-normal, exponential, and
truncated-normal) being applied to the disturbance distribution. In Section 3.4, a
two-stage regression model is estimated to identify the significant variables
influencing X-efficiency, and empirical results are presented. Section 3.5
concludes this chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Theory of X-efficiency
The concept of economic efficiency is normally viewed as consisting of two
separate components, technical and allocative. Technical efficiency refers to the
ability to avoid waste by maximizing outputs for a given set of inputs or
minimizing inputs for a given set of outputs. Allocative efficiency refers to the
ability to combine inputs and outputs in optimal proportions given prevailing
prices. Thus, economic efficiency refers to the ability to select the input and/or
output levels and mixes to optimize an economic goal, usually cost minimization
or profit maximization (Lovell, 1993).
Koopmans (1951) provided a formal definition of technical efficiency: a producer
is technically efficient if an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least
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one other output or an increase in at least one input, and if a reduction in any input
requires an increase in at least one other input or a reduction in at least one output.
In the literature, economic efficiency is substituted by a very popular term, X-
efficiency, which was introduced by Leibenstein (1966). For the first time, he
argued that production is bound to be inefficient as a result of one important type
of price and quantity distortion. This distortion has to do with the motivation,
information, and monitoring of managers, and, more generally, agency problems
within the firm. Since the (in)efficiency was initially undefined, he referred it as
X-(in)efficiency.
Farrell (1957) was the first to measure X-efficiency empirically. Usually,
technical efficiency is measured either as a ratio of observed to maximum
potential outputs obtainable from the given inputs, or as a ratio of minimum
potential to observed inputs required to produce the given outputs. X-efficiency is
obtained by comparing observed and optimum cost, profit, or any other economic
goal, subject to the appropriate constraints on quantities and prices. In this thesis,
cost minimization is chosen over profit maximization because it is the more
commonly specified and accepted X-efficiency concept in the literature.
In a simple case of two-inputs (xi, X2) and a single-output (Q), Figure 3.1
illustrates the meaning of X-efficiency. The efficiency isoquant is labelled YY',
which shows the minimum potential inputs required to produce the given output.
Relative to the actual input choice, which is labelled x', the technically efficient
input vector is labelled xB, which acts as a benchmark. Thus, the technical
efficiency of x 4' can be measured as xB I XA , where denotes the length
of the vector. This ratio tells how far xA is from the isoquant. The gradient of line
WW' gives (minus) the price ratio of the two factor inputs, assuming perfect
divisibility and that the prices are observed price ratio.
The technically and allocatively efficient input point is xE, given output and the
observed input price vector. Allocative efficiency at xA can be measured
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x1
w
as	 . This measure gives the increase in costs (inefficiencies) solely
due to the fact that x' picked a suboptimal input mix (factor input ratio). Then the
X-efficiency of can be measured as xC / H
	
, because the mix of inputs at
x4 is the same as that at xB by construction. Note that (1) the input mix of and
are the same, and that (2) the total costs of production at xC are the same as
those at xE (Greene, 1993).
Figure 3.1 The Efficiency Frontier with Two Factor inputs
w-	 x2
Source: Greene (1993, P.91)
Notes: x1 : input 1; x2 : input 2; xA: the actual input choice; xB: the technically efficient input vector;
xC: benchmark of xE; xE: the economic efficient input vector; W1V': the observed price ratio; VY':
efficiency isoquant, the minimum potential inputs needed to produce the given output.
3.2.2 Review of Methodologies
In the literature, there are two empirical ways to measure X-efficiency:
nonparametric methods and parametric methods 57. The most common
nonparametric techniques are data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal
hull analysis (FDH). DEA is a linear programming technique developed by
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). It was originally intended for use in the
public sector and not-for-profit institutions where typical economic behavioural
objectives, such as cost minimization or profit maximization, may not apply.
' See Lovell (1993), Greene (1993), Grosskopf (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997), and
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for comprehensive surveys.
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Since DEA could be used with just input and output data, most of the early DEA
studies focused on technical efficiency. In this radial form of DEA, efficient firms
are those for which no other firm or linear combination of firms has as much or
more of every output (given inputs) or as little or less of every input (given
outputs). The DEA frontier is formed as the piecewise linear combinations that
connect the set of these best-practice observations, yielding a convex production
possibilities set.
A potential problem of self-identifiers and near-self-identifiers may arise when
DEA is applied. Under the radial form of DEA, input mix (output mix) is held
constant, so firms with unusual input (output) mixes may be found to be self-
identifiers or near-self-identifiers. This potential problem can be minimized
through applying a cost-based DEA approach. In the cost-based DEA, input prices
are employed and, therefore, efficient firms are those which minimize the cost of
producing their observed outputs given the best-practice technique and input
prices. By applying the cost-based DEA, any input mix can be compared by
combining input prices and quantities and comparing total costs, rather than
having to compare firms in every input dimension as in the radial forms of DEA
(Bauer, Berger, Ferrier, and Humphrey, 1998).
Free disposal hull analysis (FDH) was introduced into the frontier literature by
Deprins, Simar, and Tulkens (1984), and is a special case of the DEA model
where the points on lines connecting the DEA vertices are not included in the
frontier. Instead, the FDH frontier is composed only of the DEA vertices and the
free disposal hull points interior to these vertices. Thus, the FDH frontier envelops
the data more tightly, and has a more restrictive notion of domination, than the
DEA frontier does. Since the FDH frontier is either congruent with or interior to
the DEA frontier, FDH will generate larger estimates of average efficiency than
DEA (Lovell, 1993).
As Berger (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Bauer et al. (1998) conclude,
the advantages of these nonparametric techniques are: (1) they permit efficiency
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to vary over time; (2) they do not require the explicit specification of a functional
form and so impose very little structure on the shape of the efficient frontier. The
key drawback of these nonparametric techniques is that they usually do not allow
for random error due to measurement problems associated with using inaccurate
accounting data, good or bad luck which temporarily raises or lowers inputs or
outputs, or specification error such as excluded inputs and outputs and imposing
the piecewise linear shape on the frontier. If there is any random error in a bank
that is not on the estimated frontier, it will be mistakenly included in that bank's
measured efficiency. This effect may be quite large. For example, if there is a
random error in a bank on the frontier, it will be mistakenly reflected in the
measured efficiency of all banks that are measured relative to that part of the
frontier.
The most common parametric X-efficiency estimation techniques are the
stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier approach (TFA), and the
distribution-free approach (DFA). The SFA originated with three papers published
nearly simultaneously by three teams: Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977),
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), and Battese and Corra (1977). This
approach has been applied to banking by Ferrier and Lovell (1990). The SFA
specifies a functional form for the cost relationship among inputs, outputs, and
other factors, and allows for random error. In the SFA, the X-inefficiency and
random error components of the composite error term are disentangled by making
explicit assumptions about their distributions.
The X-inefficiency term is assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, usually
the half-normal, while the random error term is assumed to follow a symmetric
distribution, usually the standard normal. The logic behind these assumptions is
that the X-inefficiencies cannot reduce costs, and so must be drawn from a
truncated distribution, whereas random error can both increase and decrease costs,
and so can be drawn from a symmetric distribution. Thus, the X-efficiency results
depend critically on the skewness of the data, i.e., any X-inefficiency components
that are more or less symmetrically distributed will tend to be measured as random
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error, and any random error components that are asymmetrically distributed will
tend to be measured as X-inefficiency. In addition, both the X-inefficiencies and
the errors are assumed to be orthogonal to all of the independent variables
specified in the estimating equation.
The distribution free approach (DFA) was introduced by Berger (1993). It also
specifies a functional form for the frontier, as does SFA, but DFA separates the X-
inefficiencies from the random error in a different way. It does not impose strong
assumptions regarding the specific distributions of the X-inefficiencies or random
errors. Instead, DFA assumes that there is a core X-efficiency or average X-
efficiency for each bank over time. The core X-inefficiency is assumed to be
stable over time, while random errors tend to average out to zero over time.
The reasonableness of these assumptions about the error term depends on the
length of period studied. If too short, the random errors might not average out, and
would be attributed to X-inefficiency. If too long, the bank's core X-efficiency
becomes less meaningful because of changes in management and other events, so
core X-efficiency might not be stable over the time period. Using 1984-1994 data
on US commercial banks and assuming a translog cost model, DeYoung (1997)
showed that a six-year time period could reasonably balance these concerns,
making DFA a panel estimation method (Berger and Mester, 1997). One
disadvantage is that DFA cannot capture X-efficiency changes within a bank over
time owing to replacement of managers or internal restructuring. If there were
changes in relative X-efficiency due to, for example, new management, the
approach would only pick up the average X-efficiency.
The thick frontier approach (TFA) was introduced by Berger and Humphrey
(1991). It, too, specifies a functional form. It does not impose distributional
assumptions on either X-inefficiency or random error, except to assume that X-
inefficiencies differ between the highest and lowest performance quartiles and that
random error exists within these quartiles. The approach has two disadvantages.
First, the measured X-efficiency is sensitive to the assumptions about which
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fluctuations are random and which represent X-efficiency differences.
Specifically, if X-inefficiencies follow a thin-tailed distribution and tend to be
small, while random errors follow a thick-tailed distribution and tend to be large,
then TFA may mistake one for the other. Second, generally, TFA gives an
estimate of X-efficiency differences between the highest and lowest quartile to
indicate the general level of overall X-efficiency, but does not provide exact point
estimates of X-efficiency for individual banks (Berger, 1993; Berger and
Humphrey, 1997; Bauer et al. 1998).
The advantage of the parametric methods is that they allow for random error, so
making measurement or specification errors less likely to be misidentified as
inefficiency. Moreover, the parametric methods will always rank the efficiencies
of the banks in the same order as their cost (profit) function residuals, independent
of the specific distributional assumptions imposed. That is, banks with lower costs
(higher profits) for a given set of independent variables will always be ranked as
more efficient, because the conditional mean or mode of the inefficiency term is
always increasing in the size of the residual. The disadvantage of the parametric
methods is that they have to impose more structure on the shape of the frontier by
specifying a particular functional form. If the functional form is misspecified,
measured efficiency may be confounded with the specification errors.
Estimating technical efficiency requires only input and output data, while
measuring X-efficiency also requires price data. As a result, most of the
nonparametric studies (especially those employing the radial DEA approach) have
focused on technical efficiency, although some have employed a non-radial cost-
based DEA to estimate X-efficiency58. In contrast, virtually all recent parametric
(SFA, TFA, and DFA) studies have examined X-efficiency. Among them, the
SFA is the most popular.
See Aly, Grabowski, Pasurka, and Rangan (1990), Resti (1997), Bauer et a!. (1998), Eisenbeis,
Ferrier, and Kwan (1999), Isik and Hassan (2002), McKillop, Glass, and Ferguson (2002),
Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002) for examples.
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The studies by Resti (1997), Bauer et al. (1998), Eisenbeis et al. (1999), and Isik
and Hassan (2002) compared estimates using both the nonparametric and
parametric approaches. The parametric approach was found to yield higher
efficiency values than the nonparametric approach in the three later studies, but
Resti (1997) found little difference between the techniques. This result is
consistent with the difference between the two methods, i.e., the nonparametric
approach does not allow for a random error owing to luck, data problems, or other
measurement errors, while the parametric approach does. The studies by Bauer,
Berger, and Humphrey (1993), Allen and Rai (1996), Berger and Mester (1997),
Bauer et al. (1998), Mertens and Urga (2001), and Clark and Siems (2002)
compared estimates using two or more of the parametric approaches, but the
results were mixed.
3.2.3 Review of Empirical Studies
Berger and Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 X-efficiency studies from 21
countries and various types of financial institutions. Most of the studies on
banking X-efficiency focus on the banks of developed economies (mostly US).
More recently some X-efficiency studies have been applied to the developing
economies (e.g. Isik and Hassan, 2002; Mertens and Urga, 2001; Hardy and Patti,
2001). Table 3.1 summarizes the results of studies from both the developing
countries and (a few) from the developed countries.
A large number of countries have, over the last two decades, undertaken extensive
reforms aimed at raising the X-efficiency of the banking sector. However, the
results of empirical studies on X-efficiency have been mixed. Altunbas, Gardener,
Molyneux, and Moore (2001c), Hasan and Marton (2003), and Girardone,
Molyneux, and Gardener (2004) reported that higher X-efficiency was found for
banks in the post liberalization environment.
By contrast, Hardy and Patti (2001) and Isik and Hassan (2002) indicated that the
X-efficiency of sample banks decreased significantly during periods of financial
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reform. In addition, Bauer et al. (1998), DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff (1998),
and Hao, Hunter, and Yang (2001) found that bank reform had little or no
significant effect on the X-efficiency of sample banks.
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), the outcome of bank reforms may
differ from what was anticipated because of differences in industry conditions
prior to reforms. For example, a desire to rapidly expand market share in Turkey,
or competition to pay higher deposit interest rates in the US and Pakistan, may
result in reduced X-efficiency after deregulation.
Of the studies that have investigated the relationship between X-efficiency and
ownership of banks, some have focused on comparing the differences between
state-owned banks and private banks. The empirical results are mixed. Isik and
Hassan (2002) reported that private banks were more X-efficient than state banks
in Turkey during the period 1988-1996. By contrast, Hardy and Patti (2001) found
state banks to be more X-efficient than private banks in Pakistan over the period
1981-1997, and for Croatia, Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) reported similar findings
for the period 1994-1995. Finally, Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux (2001b) found
little evidence to suggest that privately owned banks were more efficient than
their public sector counterparts in Germany between 1989 and 1996.
These inconclusive results are not surprising. The agency cost theory suggests that
agents might act in their own interest rather than in the principal's interest. This
principal-agent problem can occur in any bank where there is separation between
owners and managers. The source of the problem is asymmetric information, i.e.,
the manager knows more than the principals about the daily operation and
position of the bank (Heffeman, 2004). Thus, this problem is not limited to state
banks, but can also occur with managers of private banks.
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However, there are two possible explanations for the difference in efficiency
between state and private banks. One is the difference in bank objectives. While
private banks usually aim at cost minimization and profit maximization, state
banks might not necessarily minimize costs and pursue profits. State-owned banks
might pursue government-imposed objectives, such as lending to loss-making
state-owned enterprises to ensure that there are no sudden falls in unemployment.
The other is the difference in budget constraints. Private banks are subject to
relatively "hard" budget constraints, but state banks might be subject to "soft"
budget constraints since they might be required by the government to carry out
direct lending (Isik and Hassan, 2002). In short, state banks could be less effective
if they are subject to the social welfare objective and "soft" budget constraints.
No empirical study has estimated the differences in X-efficiency between the
state-owned and joint-stock banks in China. As indicated in Chapter 2, the state
banks are wholly owned and controlled by the state. The joint-stock banks are
effectively owned by the state: they are not private banks typical of the west.
However, the issues of social welfare objective and "soft" budget constraints are
more serious for the state banks, given that they are the mainstream of China's
banking sector and entirely controlled by the government. Taken together, it
would be expected that the X-efficiency of the joint-stock banks might be superior
to that of the state banks.
3.3 Methodology and Data
3.3.1 The Concept of X-efficiency as Applied to Banks
X-efficiency measures the extent to which a bank's costs approximate the costs of
the "best practice" or least cost bank, producing an identical output bundle under
the same conditions. The measure is derived from a cost function where the
dependent variable is total costs of each bank, and the independent variables
include the prices of inputs, the quantities of variable outputs, and a composite
error term. A general version of this cost function may be written as
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C=C(w,y1)+e,	 (3.1)
where
C = total costs
w = the input prices
= the output quantities
= u1 + v
= an X-inefficiency factor that may raise costs above the best-practice level
v = the random error that incorporates measurement error and chance that may
give banks high or low costs occasionally
The X-inefficiency factor u incorporates both technical inefficiencies from using
too much of the inputs to produce the same outputs, y, and allocative
inefficiencies from failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs, w,. The
standard assumption is that the X-inefficiency and random error terms can be
multiplicatively separated from the remainder of the cost function. After taking
logs of both sides of equation (3.1), the cost function can be depicted as
lnC=f(W,y1 )+e	 (3.2)
X-efficiency is defined as the ratio of the predicted minimum costs that would be
used if the bank were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample facing
the same exogenous variables (w, y) to the predicted actual costs, adjusted for
random error. According to Berger and Mester (1997), a bank-specific measure of
X-efficiency can be calculated as follows:
X-EFF' = ômuhl exp[f(w1,y1)]xexp(i2") 
=.!1	 (3.3)
C'	 exp[f(w,y1)]xexp(â1)
	
i2
where
êm = the predicted minimum costs as used by the best-practice bank;
C1 = the predicted actual costs;
= the minimum of the i2, across all banks in the sample;
u'i, the predicted actual cost inefficiency of a specific bank.
X-efficiency is the proportion of costs or resources that are used efficiently, so
that an X-EFF ratio of 0.80 would indicate that the bank is 20% less efficient in
terms of costs relative to the best-practice bank operating under the same
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conditions. X-efficiency theoretically falls in the interval (0,11, and equals one for
a best-practice bank within the observed data. The limitation of this definition is
that the estimated X-efficiency is only a relative measure against the best practice
bank within the sample, the best practice bank itself may not be efficient when
compared to banks outside the sample.
3.3.2 The X-efficiency Estimation Technique
To measure the X-efficiency of the Chinese banks, this thesis adopts the widely
used parametric technique - the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). Under the
SFA, bank-specific estimates of X-inefficiency, u, can be obtained by using the
distribution of the X-inefficiency term conditional on the estimate of the entire
composite error term, as proposed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt
(1982). The mean of this conditional distribution for the half-normal model is
shown as
o2 [ Ø(e1 21a)
	
	 e.21+E(uilsi)=22[(2)
where
2 = a /
a 2 = a, +
Ø(.) = the standard normal density function
= the cumulative standard normal density function
The half-normal assumption for the distribution of X-inefficiencies is relatively
inflexible and assumes that most banks are clustered near full X-efficiency.
Following Greene (1993), two alternatives have also been applied in this thesis.
For the model with exponentially distributed disturbance developed by Aigner,
Lovell, and Schmidt (1977),
	
E(u. Is.) = (e. +0a2)+ aØ[(e +Oa)/a]	 (3.5)V	 c1[(e, +Oo)/a]
(3.4)
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Stevenson (1980) has argued that the assumption of zero mean in (3.5) is an
unnecessary restriction. He introduced a truncated-normal model as opposed to a
half-normal model. For the model with truncated distributed disturbance, the one-
sided error term u 1 is taken to be the variable obtained by truncating at zero the
distribution of a variable with a possibly non-zero mean. The counterpart is
obtained by replacing e1 2 / o with
*	 g.I%	 u/t _L__
E(u, Is,) is an unbiased but inconsistent estimator of u., since, regardless of N,
the variance of the estimator remains non-zero. This model can be estimated using
maximum likelihood techniques.
3.3.3 The Model Specification
Consistent with most of the bank X-efficiency literature, this study adopts a
translog functional form rather than a more flexible form such as the Fourier-
flexible (FF) specification 59 . The choice was motivated by the fact that the FF
specification requires more degrees of freedom. This is a problem in this thesis
because the number of observations available is limited given the relatively small
number and short history of these banks. In addition, although formal statistical
tests indicate that the coefficients on the Fourier terms are jointly significant,
Berger and Mester (1997) argue that the improvement obtained through the use of
the FF specification is insignificant from an economic viewpoint. The average
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), DeYoung and Hasan
(1998), and Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux, and Moore (2001c), the translog functional form is
only a local approximation of the data, i.e., it provides a good fit for banking data that are close to
the sample means but may provide a poor fit for banking data located far from the mean scale and
product mix. The translog also forces the frontier average cost curve to have a symmetric U-shape
in logs. Compared to the translog functional form, the Fourier-flexible (FF) functional form is
more flexible and provides a global approximation of any cost function over the entire range of the
banking data, because it is the linear combination of the sine and cosine function, which are
mutually orthogonal over the [0, 2ic] interval and function space-spanning. Thus, in contrast to the
translog function form, which constrains a bank's true cost function to a translog form, the FF
functional form imposes no such constraint, allowing the data to reveal the true cost function
through a large value of fitted parameters, thereby avoiding misspecification error.
(3.6)
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improvement in goodness of fit is relatively small, meaning both functional forms
yield basically the same average level and dispersion of measured efficiency, and
both rank the individual banks in almost the same order.
Wheelock and Wilson (2001) also argue that the FF specification raises several
unresolved statistical problems, including whether to augment the underlying
translog function with trigonometric terms or orthogonal polynomials, and how
many terms should be included for estimation. Furthermore, Altunbas and
Chakravarty (2001a) indicate that the predictive ability of the FF form is worse
than the translog form. Finally, several studies use the stochastic frontier approach
for both the transiog and the Fourier specification of the cost function and reach
similar conclusions (Berger and Mester, 1997; Vander Vennet, 2002).
A classical pooled data regression model is applied in this study, since there is not
enough data for a panel data model. The translog cost function is specified as
follows; in conm-ion with the published work in this area, time and bank subscripts
are dropped for ease of exposition:
Cin	 a0 +	 /3,, 1n- '--- +	 8 ln(wm / w3)
z*w3	
p=1	 Z	 m1
(3.7)
2 p1 q=I	 Z	 Z	 2 m=I n=1
	
W3	 W3
42
+ypminln+u+v
p=1 m1	 Z	 W3
where
C = total cost
z = total assets
yt, =pth output = 1,2,3,4)
w 1 = mth input price (m = 1,2,3).
Following common practice, the standard symmetry restrictions apply to this
function (i.e., I3pq = j3qp ' mn = nm) In addition, all of the cost and input price
terms are normalized by the last input price, W3, which imposing linear
homogeneity restrictions on the model.
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Many studies normalize all of the cost and output quantities relative to the bank's
financial capital to control for scale biases in estimation (e.g., Berger and Mester,
1997; DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux, and Seth, 2000;
Merterns and Urga, 2001). Since the costs of the largest banks are much larger
than those of the smallest banks, large banks would have random errors with
much larger variances without the normalization. Furthermore, the X-inefficiency
term in cost functions is derived from the composite residuals, which might make
the variance of the X-efficiencies dependent on bank size without normalization.
Similarly, the normalization of the output quantities keep these variables from
being very skewed for the large banks, so that all the variables are of nearly the
same order of magnitude.
However, the capitalization and provisioning regulations in Chinese banks were
tightened considerably during the sample period. In particular, the state-owned
banks were severely undercapitalized in the earlier years, and, over time, were
required to meet capitalization standards in line with international norms. Thus,
normalizing by financial capital would conflate these institutional changes with
changes in bank behaviour, and overstate their costs in the early years. For this
reason, this thesis follows Hardy and Patti (2001) who normalized these variables
using total assets rather than total equity. All the cost and output quantities are
specified as ratios of the total assets, z, to control for scale biases in the estimation
of the X-efficiency in China's banking sector.
For firms that try to minimize costs, Shephard's lemma 6° specifies cost share
equations that can be jointly estimated with the total cost function to improve the
efficiency of certain coefficient estimates. However, as Berger (1993) and Berger
and Mester (1997) stated, inclusion of the share equations in an Iterative
° Shephard's Lemma was first introduced by Shephard, R.W. in 1953. The cost function C is
differentiable with respect to the components of the input price vector, w. Then the solution S to
the cost minimization problem is unique and
Sm =aC/aWm , m=1.....N;
i.e., the cost minimizing demand for the mth input is equal to the partial derivative of the cost
function with respect to the mth input price. This result is known as the derivative property of the
cost function or Shephard's Lemma, since Shephard (1953) was the first to obtain the result (New
Paigrave Dictionary of Economics, 1998, 4, p.692).
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Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation may improve the precision of
the estimates, but at a cost, i.e., it would impose the undesirable assumption of no
allocative inefficiencies. Forcing the shares to be consistent with the overall cost
equation (3.7) incorporates the arbitrary implicit assumption that all X-
inefficiencies are technical in nature (involving the general overuse of inputs),
rather than allocative (involving an incorrect input mix). That is, the cross-
equation restrictions incorporate the assumption that the input mix responds
correctly to changes in relative prices and output levels (Berger, 1993). Berger
(1993) also found that X-efficiency estimates that do not use cost share equations,
partially restricted share equations, and fully restricted share equations gave very
similar X-efficiency results. Following common practice, factor share equations
are not included in this model.
3.3.4 Data
As discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter focuses on the two major types of
commercial banks in China - 4 state-owned commercial banks and 10 joint-stock
commercial banks. The sample period was from 1985 to 2002, giving 187
observations in total. All of the data (except where mentioned specifically) used in
this study were obtained from various editions of the Almanac of China's Finance
and Banking issued by the China Finance Society 61 . Table 3.2 provides summary
statistics of all the variables used in the cost function in Eq. (3.7).
In the literature, there are two main approaches to measure the flow of services
provided by banks. Under the production approach, banks are treated as firms
which employ capital and labour to produce services for both deposit and loan
account holders. Outputs are measured by the number of deposit and loan
transactions processed over a given time period. Total costs include operating
expenses only. Output is treated as a flow, showing the given amount of output
produced per unit of time. However, such detailed transaction flow data are not
generally available, the numbers of deposit and loan account services are
61 All these data were translated from Chinese into English by the author.
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sometimes used instead. In this event, output is treated as a stock, i.e., a given
amount of output at one point in time.
Table 3.2 Variables Used to Estimate X-efficiency
Unit: million RMB
Variable	 Description	 Mean	 Standard Deviation
C	 Total costs	 6317	 11948.2
Yl	 Total deposits	 159056.8	 231466.1
Y2	 Total loans	 143498.4	 192872.1
Y3	 Total investments	 24637.9	 53000.4
Y4	 Non-interest income	 1324.2	 2668.2
WI	 Price of funds	 0.021	 0.020
W2	 Price of fixed assets 	 0.287	 0.2 14
W3	 Price of employees	 0.004	 0.002
Z	 Total assets	 254431.3	 327102.2
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-2003), China Statistical Yearbook
(2003).
Notes:
1. All financial variables measured in million's of constant 1985 RMB.
2. Total costs (C) refer to operating costs plus interest costs, including costs of funds, fixed
assets, and labour.
3. Total assets (z) is defined as all assets listed on the left-hand side of the balance sheet.
4. Total deposits (yj) include short-term deposits, short-term savings deposits, fiscal deposits,
long-term deposits, and long-term savings deposits.
5. Total loans (y2) include short-term loans, trade bills, bills discounted, medium and long-term
loans, and impaired loans, but excludes loan loss reserves.
6. Total investments (y3) include short-term investment, trading securities, securities held under
Repo agreement, and long-term investment, while excluding investment loss reserves.
7. Non-interest income (ye) include all the operating income excluding interest income.
8. The cost of funds (wj) is defined as the ratio of total interest expenses on borrowed funds to
total borrowed funds. Total interest expenses on borrowed funds include interest paid on total
deposits plus interest paid on interbank borrowing. Total borrowed funds include total
deposits, borrowing from central bank, deposits from banks, borrowing from banks,
borrowing from non-bank financial institutions, deposits against other credit facilities, bonds
issued, and long-term borrowing.
9. The cost of employees (w3) is defined as a ratio of total expenses on employees to the number
of employees. Since the total expenses on employees are unavailable, two categories of
average wage are applied here. One is the (annual) average wage for employees in state-
owned financial institutions. The other is the (annual) average wage for employees in other
types of financial institutions, which includes those in the shareholding financial institutions.
There are completed data on the number of employees for four state-owned and joint-stock
commercial banks. However, for six joint-stock commercial banks, data are incomplete.
Following Vennet, R.V. (2002), Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002), and Altunbas, et al. (2001),
this thesis assumes that the growth rate of employee numbers is the same as that of the total
assets for a given bank. This may cause biases in the results.
10. The cost of fixed assets (w2) is defined as the ratio of total expenses on the fixed assets to total
fixed assets. Total fixed assets is defined as the gross fixed assets less depreciation. Total
expenses on the fixed assets equal operating expenses minus expenses on employees.
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Under the intermediation approach, banks are treated as financial intermediaries
between borrowers and depositors rather than producers of loan and deposit
services. Outputs are measured by the value of loans and investments. Total costs
include operating costs plus interest costs. Output is also treated as a stock.
However, neither of these approaches completely captures the function performed
by banking institutions (Heffernan, 1996).
Following Humphrey (1992) and Berger (1993), the intermediation approach is
adopted in this study, with some modifications to capture the dual roles of banks
as (1) providing transaction services and (2) intermediating funds from depositors
to borrowers. As a result, bank deposits have been treated as inputs as well as
outputs at the same time. Bank deposits not only have input characteristics,
because they are paid for in part by interest payments and the funds raised provide
the bank with the raw material of investible funds, but they also have output
characteristics, since they are associated with a substantial amount of liquidity,
safekeeping, and payments services provided to depositors (Berger and
Humphrey, 1997).
Some recent studies augment outputs by adding off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities
(e.g., Jagtiani, Nathan, and Sick, 1995; Stiroh, 2000; Altunbas et al. 2000;
Altunbas et al. 2001c; Mertens and Urga, 2001; Vander Vennet, 2002). These
studies argue that bank output is seriously understated by focusing only on the
balance-sheet activities, since significant portions of the banking business have
moved beyond the traditional balance sheet. OBS activities, such as loan
origination, sales, servicing, securitization, standby letters of credit, and derivative
securities, are expanding rapidly. Non-interest income, which is generated as a
result of OBS fee services, is the most common proxy for OBS activity in
literature. This thesis includes non-interest income as one of the outputs, though
the extent to which Chinese banks are actively pursuing OBS business
(derivatives, securities) is probably low - this is true in the west - the large
commercial universal banks dominate the derivatives and securities markets.
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Several studies argue that differences in output quality should be controlled in
efficiency models. Generally, the balance-sheet data do not fully capture the
heterogeneity in bank output, but theoretically the comparison should be based on
the same output quality. For example, banks with relatively more problem loans
may incur higher labour expenses for extra monitoring and negotiating, and, in
addition, may also have to pay higher rates for funds. These differences may be
mismeasured as differences in X-inefficiency. The proxies used to measure the
bank-level differences in output quality include (1) the volume of non-performing
loans (Clark and Siems, 2002); (2) the provisions for loan losses (Drake and Hall,
2002); (3) the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (Altunbas et al. 2000);
(4) the risk-weighted assets (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996).
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997),
whether or not non-performing loans (NPLs) should be included as an explanatory
variable in efficiency models depends on the main explanation for the observed
negative relationship between measured efficiency and NPLs. NPLs would be
exogenous to the bank if they are generally caused by negative economic shocks
("bad luck"). Thus, they should be controlled for in efficiency models, otherwise
the measured X-efficiency may be artificially low due to the expenses associated
with dealing with these loans (e.g., extra monitoring, negotiating workout
arrangements, etc.). Alternatively, NPLs are likely to be endogenous to the bank,
either because management is inefficient in managing its portfolio ('bad
management') or because it is trying to reduce short-run expenses by cutting back
on loan origination and monitoring resources ('skimping'). Therefore, they should
not be controlled for in efficiency models.
Since it is hard to separate the exogeneity from the endogeneity of NPLs, Berger
and Mester (1997) attempted to solve this problem by using the ratio of NPLs to
total loans in the bank's state 62 . Using data on 6,000 US commercial banks over
the period 1990-1995, they reported that the X-efficiency of US banks was 0.868
62 Berger and DeYoung (1997) tested the bad luck, bad management, and skimping hypotheses
and found mixed evidence on the exogeneity of NPLs.
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(model only including state average NPL ratios), 0.866 (model only including
bank's own NPL ratio), 0.866 (model including both ratios), and 0.869 (model
excluding both ratios). They argued that the state average variable is almost
entirely exogenous to any individual bank, but it does allow them to control for
negative shocks that may affect the bank.
The key problem with this approach is to classify NPLs using methodology in
view of the ambiguity over what is exogenous or endogenous. For example, if
most banks' assets are concentrated in one sector (e.g. Asia) and that sector is
affected by an unexpected downturn, is this "bad luck" or poor management,
because past loan decisions by these banks have left them overly exposed in that
sector? Incorporating average NPL ratios in this case might cause the overestimate
of the X-efficiency of banks with higher levels of NPLs. Another problem is the
lack of appropriate Chinese data for such an exercise. For these reasons, no
attempt is made to classify NPLs.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 X-efficiency Estimates
The parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier regression, Eq. (3.7), are
presented in Table 3.3. The inefficiency residual u of this regression is used to
derive the X-efficiency estimates63.
63 Following convention practice, the individual parameter estimates are not interpreted because
the colinearity inherent in the translog specification makes these estimates difficult to interpret
(Hardy and Patti, 2001).
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Table 3.3 Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model
Indepen-	 Description	 Half-normal	 Exponential	 Truncated-normal
dent	 model	 model	 model
Variable	 Coefficients	 Coefficients	 Coefficients
[Standard errors] 	 [Standard	 [Standard errorsi
(p-values)	 errors]
	
(p-values)
___________ _____________________ __________________ (p-values) 	 ____________________
Constant	 2.025	 2.118	 2.208
	[0.721]	 [0.710]
	
[0.766]
	
_________ __________________ (0.005)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)
Lnyl	 Total deposits	 0.489	 0.550	 0.582
	
[0.5 16]
	
[0.507]
	
[0.520]
	__________ ____________________ (0.344)
	
(0.278)	 (0.263)
Lny2	 Total loans	 0.577	 0.649	 0.778
	
[0.601]	 [0.602]	 [0.613]
	
__________ ___________________ (0338)
	
(0.28 1)
	 (0.204)
Lny3	 Total investments	 0.149	 0.152	 0.163
	[0.072]	 [0.072]	 [0.074]
	
__________ ___________________ (0.037) 	 (0.034)	 (0.027)
Lny4	 Non-interest income	 0.109	 0.102	 0.103
	
[0.103]	 [0.101]
	
[0.103]
	
__________ ____________________ (0.291)	 (0.310)	 (0.318)
Lnwi	 Price of funds	 1.152	 1.170	 1.193
	[0.154]	 [0.150]
	
[0.154]
	
_________ _________________ (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
Lnw2	 Price of fixed assets
	 -0.447	 -0.465	 -0.493
	[0. 69]
	
[0.262]	 [0.267]
	
_________ __________________ (0.097)
	 (0.076)	 (0.064)
Lnyllnyl/ Total deposits	 -0.974	 -0.971	 -0.990
2	 * Total deposits/2	 [0.383]
	
[0.386]
	
[0.386]
	
_________ __________________ (0.011) 	 (0.012)	 (0.010)
Lnyllny2	 Total deposits	 0.270	 0.253	 0.309
* Total loans	 [0.341]
	
[0.339]
	
[0.348]
	
__________ ____________________ (0.428)	 (0.456)	 (0.375)
Lnyllny3	 Total deposits	 -0.012	 -0.011	 -0.007
* Total investments 	 [0.09 1]
	
[0.092]	 [0.098]
	
__________ ____________________ (0.899) 	 (0.906)	 (0.940)
Lnyllny4	 Total deposits	 -0.021	 -0.023	 -0.022
* Non-interest	 [0.044]	 [0.044]	 [0.045]
__________ income	 (0.630)	 (0.602)	 (0.625)
Lny2lny2/ Total loans	 0.918	 0.913	 0.932
2	 * Total loans/2	 [0.473]
	
[0.488]
	
[0.507]
	
_________ ___________________ (0.052)
	 (0.062)	 (0.066)
Lny2lny3	 Total loans	 0.032	 0.031	 0.034
* Total investments	 [0.093]	 [0.098]
	
[0.102]
	
__________ _____________________ (0.733)
	 (0.755)	 (0.738)
Lny2lny4	 Total loans
	 -0.035	 -0.030	 -0.030
* Non-interest	 [0.041]
	
[0.041]	 [0.042]
__________ income	 (0.389)	 (0.473)	 (0.471)
Lny3lny3/ Total investments	 0.010	 0.010	 0.010
2	 * Total investments/2 [0.006]
	
[0.007]	 [0.007]
	
____________ ________________________ (0.110) 	 (0.131)	 (0.121)
Lny3lny4	 Total investments	 -0.006	 -0.006	 -0.006
* Non-interest	 [0.008]
	
[0.007]
	
[0.007]
_________ income	 (0.416)	 (0.410)	 (0.393)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Lny4lny4/ Non-interest income 	 0.010	 0.010	 0.010
2	 * Non-interest	 [0.0051
	
[0.0051
	
[0.006]
_________ income/2
	 (0.064)	 (0.078)	 (0.08 1)
Lnwllnwl Price of funds	 0.131	 0.134	 0.136
* Price of funds/2	 [0.0281	 [0.028]	 [0.0291
_________ ___________________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
Lnwllnw2 Price of funds	 -0.087	 -0.092	 -0.094
* Price of fixed assets [0.044]	 [0.043]	 [0.045]
_________ ___________________ (0.047)
	 (0.032)	 (0.035)
Lnw2lnw2 Price of fixed assets	 0.082	 0.085	 0.088
* Price of fixed	 [0.073]	 [0.071]	 [0.0731
__________ assets/2	 (0.261)	 (0.231)	 (0.224)
Lnyllnwl	 Total deposits	 -0.099	 -0.092	 -0.096
* Price of funds	 [0.095]	 [0.095]	 [0.096]
__________ ___________________ (0.301)
	 (0.335)	 (0.3 19)
Lny2lnwl	 Total loans	 0.012	 0.015	 0.039
* Price of funds	 [0.107]
	
[0.107]	 [0.109]
__________ ____________________ (0.914)
	 (0.889)	 (0.718)
Lny3lnwl	 Total investments	 0.008	 0.008	 0.010
* Price of funds	 [0.023]	 [0.023]
	
[0.025]
_________ __________________ (0.738) 	 (0.7 17)	 (0.687)
Lny4lnwl	 Non-interest income	 0.02 1	 0.020	 0.020
* Price of funds	 [0.015]
	
[0.015]
	
[0.015]
__________ ___________________ (0.157)
	 (0.170)	 (0.168)
Lnyllnw2	 Total deposits	 -0.115	 -0.136	 -0.134
* Price of fixed assets [0.146]
	
[0.143]
	
[0.147]
__________ ____________________ (0.432) 	 (0.341)	 (0.363)
Lny2lnw2	 Total loans	 0.065	 0.051	 0.025
* Price of fixed assets [0.140]
	
[0.141]	 [0.143]
_________ __________________ (0.642) 	 (0.7 17)	 (0.863)
Lny3lnw2	 Total investments 	 -0.020	 -0.02 1	 -0.023
* Price of fixed assets [0.017]
	
[0.016]
	
[0.017]
__________ ____________________ (0.231)
	 (0.197)	 (0.182)
Lny4lnw2	 Non-interest income	 -0.025	 -0.023	 -0.023
* Price of fixed assets [0.024]	 [0.023]
	
[0.024]
__________ ___________________ (0.287)
	 (0.327)	 (0.347)
Varianceparameters for compound error 	 ________________ __________________
A,e,A 1 	 .399	 19.879	 0.978
[0.416]	 [8.856]
	
[1.075]
______________________________ (0.001) 	 (0.248)	 (0.363)
a, o,	 0.141	 0.094	 0.128
[0.021]	 [0.012]	 [0.131]
_____________________________ (0.000)
	
(0.000)	 (0.329)
p/au
	
	
0.069
[10.2 13]
________________________________ __________________ ________________ (0.995)
Adjusted R2
	0.98	 0.98	 0.98
Log-likelihood	 153.91	 153.81	 153.77
Iteration completed	 38	 39	 36
Notes: 1. Half-normal model estimates A, exponential model estimates 0, and truncated-normal
model estimates A again. 2. Half-normal model estimates a, exponential model estimates a, and
truncated-normal model estimates a again. 3. Results at 10% significant level are in bold. 4.
Standard errors are in brackets, and p values are in parentheses.
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The mean X-efficiencies for the sample banks from 1985 to 2002 are presented in
Table 3.4. Under the half-normal assumption, the grand mean efficiency score for
the 187 observations was 0.407 with a standard deviation of 0.191. The figure of
0.407 suggests that, given its particular output level, the average bank could
reduce its costs by approximately 60% by using its inputs more efficiently.
Moreover, the results show that banks in the first stage of reform have higher X-
efficiency than those in the second reform stage. The results also indicate that the
joint-stock banks are more X-efficient than the state banks.
Table 3.4 X-efficiency Estimates (1985-2002)
Period 1985-2002	 1985-1992	 1993-2002
Model H	 IE	 IT	 H	 IE	 IT	 H	 IE	 IT
Allsample banks	 _____________________________________________________________
Mean	 0.407	 0.516	 0.461	 0.435	 0.554	 0.487	 0.395	 0.501	 0.451
S.D.	 0.191	 0.191	 0.175	 0.172	 0.155	 0.157	 0.198	 0.202	 0.181
State-owned_commercial_banks
Mean	 0.352	 0.463	 0.413	 0.410	 0.532	 0.465	 0.305	 0.408	 0.370
S.D.	 0.157	 0.167	 0.148	 0.144	 0.134	 0.132	 0.153	 0.172	 0.148
Joint-stock commercial banks
Mean	 0.442	 0.549	 0.492	 0.473	 0.587	 0.5 19	 0.434	 0.541	 0.485
S.D.	 0.203	 0.198	 0.184	 0.204	 0.179	 0.186	 0.203	 0.202	 0.184
Note: H denotes the haltnormal model, E for the exponential model, and T for the truncated-
normal model.
Generally, the finding suggests much lower levels of X-efficiencies among
Chinese banks compared to the results reported in the literature, which mostly
range from 70% to 90% (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). However, this result is
consistent with the findings shown in Table 3.1, that is, X-efficiency estimates are
much lower for developing countries (64% on average) than developed countries
(84% on average). Differences in data, periods of estimation and banking
structure, together with the fact that this is a relative measure, preclude
comparisons with results found in studies of other countries. This measure
indicates only the distance between the individual bank's costs and the Cost
frontier determined by the performance of all banks in the sample. Hence, this X-
efficiency measure is taken relative to the peer group in question.
Under the exponential and truncated-normal assumption, the grand mean
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efficiency scores were 0.516 and 0.461, respectively. The overall results suggest
that the half-normal model gives the lowest X-efficiency score, while the
exponential model gives the highest X-efficiency score. Although different
assumptions produce different sample mean efficiencies, both Pearson's and
Spearman's correlation coefficients between pairs of efficiency estimates for all
sample observations are significant with high values (Table 3.5). This result
provides support for Ritter and Simar (1997), who advocate the use of a relatively
simple distribution, such as normal or exponential, rather than a more flexible
distribution, such as truncated normal64.
Table 3.5 Correlation between the X-efficiency Estimates
Pearson's correlation coefficients	 Spearman's	 rank correlation
_______________ (p-values)	 ________________ coefficients (p-values)
Distribution	 Half-normal	 Exponential	 Half-normal	 Exponential
assumption_________________ ________________ ________________ ________________
Exponential	 0.987	 0.999
______________ (0.000)	 _______________ (0.000)	 ______________
Truncated-	 0.998	 0.989	 0.998	 0.999
normal	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
Moreover, both Pearson's and Spearman's correlation coefficients are calculated
to examine the possible relationship between the simple financial ratios used as
indicators of X-efficiency and the X-efficiency estimates obtained by the above
SFA. Generally, two simple financial ratios, the ratio of total cost to total assets
(TC/TA), and the ratio of total cost to total income (TC/TI), are often used as
indicators of efficiency.
64 Pearson's correlation coefficient, which is usually identified with the letter r, is the measure of
correlation most often used. The formula for r is
r= _________ _________)2/?2(	 y)2
The disadvantage of it is that it can be susceptible to the influence of outliers in the data set. Also,
it assumes that a straight line relationship exists between the two variables. Spearman's rank
correlation, which is always shown with the symbol s, is less susceptible to the influence of
outliers and is better in detecting nonlinear relationships. As with many other nonparametric tests,
one can replace observed values with their ranks and calculate the value of s on the ranks. The
disadvantage of the Spearman correlation is that it is not as powerful as the Pearson correlation in
detecting significant correlations in situations where the parametric assumptions are satisfied (Berk
and Carey, 2000).
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As indicated in Table 3.6, the Spearman correlation between the X-efficiencies
and both of the raw data measures follow the expected pattern - X-efficiency
under any assumption is negatively correlated with the cost to asset ratio and the
cost to income ratio at the 1% significance level. The Pearson's correlation
coefficients are negative and not statistically significant. In general, the findings
suggest these X-efficiency measures are consistent.
Table 3.6 Correlation between the X-efficiency Estimates and Accounting
Measures of Efficiency
Pearson's correlation coefficients	 Spearman's	 rank correlation
________________ (p-values)	 _________________ coefficients (p-values)
X-efficiency	 TC/TA	 TC/TI	 TC/TA	 TC/TI
estimates__________________
Half-normal	 -0.065	 -0.084	 -0.125	 -0.130
model	 (0.378)	 (0.256)	 (0089)	 (0.075)
Exponential	 -0.061	 -0.067	 -0.128	 -0.136
model	 (0.410)	 (0.364)	 (0.082)	 (0.063)
Truncated-	 -0.071	 -0.090	 -0.136	 -0.139
normal model	 (0.336)	 (0.222)	 (0.063)	 (0.057)
Note: 'IC(lA: total cost cRvided by total assets. fUr II: total cost divided by total income.
3.4.2 Potential Correlates of X-efflciency
Following common practice (e.g. Hasan and Marton, 2003; Mertens and Urga,
2001; DeYoung et al. 1998; Berger and Mester, 1997), a two-stage regression was
performed to explore the relationship between the X-efficiency estimates and a set
of economic and financial variables. Among other issues, of specific interest was
seeing whether a different ownership structure and gradual reform strategy
influence the X-efficiency estimates in a significant way.
However, such a two-stage procedure has limitations. As Berger and Mester
(1997) point out, such analyses are suggestive but not necessarily conclusive,
because the dependent variable, X-efficiency, in the regression is an estimate and
the standard error of this estimate is not taken into account in the subsequent
regression or correlation analysis. The results should be interpreted as only
providing information on correlation rather than causality because the variables
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used in the estimation also suffer from an endogeneity problem and thus bias the
coefficient estimates.
The two-stage regression model is specified below:
X - EFF = a + /11
 OWN + /12 REFORM + fl PF / TA + IJ4 TL / TA	 38
+fl5Tl/TA+fl5NIIPR+E
where
OWN = an ownership dummy, 0 for state-owned and 1 for joint-stock;
REFORM = a reform dummy, 0 for banks in the first reform stage (1985-1992),
and 1 for banks in the second reform stage (1993-2002);
PF/TA = purchased funds (non-deposit funds) over total assets;
TI/TA = total loans over total assets;
TI/TA = total investment over total assets;
NI/PR = non-interest income over pre-tax profits;
The independent variables are selected based on previous studies and on available
data. OWN is included to capture the possible difference in efficiency between the
state-owned commercial banks and the joint-stock commercial banks. REFORM is
included to capture any effects of the 1993 second stage reform. PF/TA measures
the reliance on purchased funds: it could also be related to X-efficiency, because
the cost of purchased funds differs from that of core deposits over the business
cycle. TL/I'A, TI/TA, and NI/PR are included to measure the impacts of output mix
on X-efficiency.
Table 3.7 presents summary statistics for the variables employed in the two-stage
regression model. There are a total of 187 observations in this sample, of which
54 are from the first reform stage (28.9%), and 133 from the second reform stage
(71.1%). Among them, there are 115 joint-stock commercial banks (61.5%), and
72 state-owned commercial banks (38.5%). The average ratio of non-deposit
funds to total assets was 18.6%, the average ratio of total loans to total assets was
54%, the average ratio of total investment to total assets was 9.5%, and the
average ratio of non-interest income to pre-tax profit was 154%.
The results of the two-stage regression are presented in Table 3.8. As can be seen
from this table, the ownership dummy has a statistically significant impact on
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bank X-efficiency no matter which distribution assumption is applied. The
significantly positive coefficient sign indicates that the joint-stock commercial
banks were more X-efficient than the state-owned commercial banks. This finding
is backed up by the individual X-efficiency scores in Table 3.4.
Table 3.7 Variables Employed in the Two-stage Regression Model
Variable	 Description	 Mean	 Std. Dev.
X-EFF-H	 X-efficiency under half-normal distribution	 0.407	 0.191
X-EFF-E	 X-efficiency under exponential distribution	 0.5 16	 0.19 1
X-EFF-T	 X-efficiency under truncated-normal distribution	 0.461	 0.175
OWN	 Ownership dummy, 0 for state-owned and 1 for joint-stock 0.6 15 	 0.488
REFORM Reform dummy, 0 for the 1st stage and 1 for the 2"' stage	 0.7 11	 0.454
PF/TA	 purchased funds (non-deposit funds) over total assets 	 0.186	 0.098
TI/TA	 total loans over total assets 	 0.540	 0.126
Ti/TA	 total investment over total assets 	 0.095	 0.072
NI/PR	 non-interest income over pre-tax profits 	 I 1.544	 3.168
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-2003).
Note: X-efficiency scores are derived from previous regressions.
The coefficient for the reform dummy is significantly negative for all the models,
which suggests that the first stage of banking reform is correlated with higher
levels of X-efficiency than the second stage. The individual X-efficiency scores in
Table 3.4 also backs up this result. This finding might be explained by the large-
scale adoption of expensive fixed assets, such as computers and
telecommunications, during the second reform stage. For example, in 2000, the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the largest bank in China,
accomplished overall transaction automation, network-based information
processing with 32 computer centres, 10,016 ATMs, 58,646 POS terminals, 227
self-banks and 13 call centres (Jiang, 2001). Referring to all sample banks, the
average expenditures on fixed assets increased from RMBO.54 bn in the first
reform stage to RMB2.15 bn in the second stage, and the growth rate was about
301%.
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The fixed interest rate might be another contributor to this finding. The cost of
raising funds is the majority cost in China's banking sector, and its average ratio
to total costs was 87% between 1985 and 2002. However, the Chinese government
set the levels of interest rates for both deposits and loans. Hence, banks did not
have enough opportunities to control their costs. This issue became more critical
in the second reform stage, since banks spent much more money to improve their
equipment, and better-equipped banks would probably ask for lower deposit rates.
The significantly negative coefficient for PF/TA under all the models suggests that
a lower proportion of purchased funds (non-deposit funds) would increase X-
efficiency. A possible explanation is that this type of funding is more costly than
deposits. if correct, banks in China could improve their X-efficiency by increasing
their share of deposits.
The results of both Pearson's and Spearman's correlation coefficients generally
support the findings of the two-stage regression, except an insignificant
coefficient for the REFORM dummy under the Pearson's correlation test, and a
significantly negative coefficient for NI/PR under the Spearman's correlation test.
Taken together, they suggest that the findings of the two-stage regression are
suggestive of consistency.
3.5 Conclusions
Employing the stochastic frontier approach, this chapter investigated X-efficiency
in China's banking sector over the period 1985-2002. Three disturbance
distributions were applied: half-normal, exponential, and truncated-normal. The
results obtained under these assumptions were similar. The grand mean X-
efficiency in China's banking sector was found to be in the range of 40%-50%.
Put another way, on average, all the sample banks would have increased their X-
efficiency (through lower costs) by about 50%-60% had they been operating on
the X-efficiency frontier.
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A two-stage regression model was estimated to explore the potential correlates of
X-efficiency. The results indicate that the joint-stock commercial banks were
relatively more efficient than state-owned commercial banks. In addition, X-
efficiency was found to be more pronounced in the early stage of banking reform,
and banks with higher proportions of deposits were relatively more X-efficient.
Overall, the findings suggest that X-inefficiency is an important issue that should
receive more attention from Chinese researchers, bank regulators and managers.
Second, converting state-owned banks to joint-stock ownership should improve
their X-efficiency. Third, relying on purchased funds to finance the portfolio
apparently raises X-inefficiency. Finally, further reforms should focus on giving
bank managers more opportunities to control their costs, such as interest rate
liberalisation.
It is worth to note that the joint-stock banks are relatively more X-efficient than
the state banks. It may be that all of these domestic banks are far less X-efficient
than foreign banks. Though there is no evidence to suggest whether this is true or
not, it will be a critical issue especially after interest rates and entry (WTO) are
liberalised. However, the domestic banks will behave like real commercial banks
(as their foreign counterparts) if they are subject to the full force of competition
with no interference (or expectation of interference) from the state. That is, the
state only largely owns these domestic banks but does not interfere with
management in any way, so they are left to compete with foreign banks on a level
playing field.
The major limitation of this chapter is that the X-efficiency is only a relative
measure against the best practice bank within the sample. The best practice bank
itself may be really efficient or not in the real economic sense. The latter could
cause the mis-measurement of the real efficiency level of China's banking sector.
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Chapter 4. Economies of Scale and Scope
in China's Banking Sector
4.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to employ the stochastic frontier approach and
expansion path measures to estimate economies of scale and scope in China's
banking sector during the period 1985-2002. The traditional non-frontier approach
and standard measures are also applied for comparison and completeness.
Economies of scale and scope between banks with different ownership types
and/or in different reform stages are compared as well. This chapter unfolds as
follows: Section 4.2 reviews previous studies, including a brief introduction to the
theory of economies of scale and scope and a review of the relevant empirical
literature. Section 4.3 discusses the methodology and data used: the translog cost
functions under different approaches are introduced first; the various measures of
economies of scale and scope are then illustrated. The parameter estimates of the
translog cost functions are used to calculate the economies of scale and scope
using different measures. Section 4.4 describes the empirical results. Section 4.5
summarizes the chapter and presents the conclusions.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Theory of Economies of Scale and Scope
As indicated by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982), two types of production
economies may be achieved by any firm in any industry - economies of scale and
scope. Economies of scale arise if average production costs decline as output
rises. Conversely, diseconomies of scale exist if average production costs increase
with output65 . Economies of scope exist if two or more products can be jointly
65 Economies of scale is a long-run concept, applicable when all the factor inputs which contribute
to a firm's production process can be varied (Heffernan, 1996).
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produced with lower cost by one firm than is incurred in their independent
production. Conversely, if the cost of joint production is higher than that of
independent production, diseconomies of scope are present. Economies of scale
are associated with firm size, while economies of scope are related to the joint
production of two or more products.
Figure 4.1 shows a series of short-run average cost curves (SAd, SAC2, SAC3)
for three variously sized banks, each producing different levels of bank output.
From the series of short-run average cost curves, an implied long-run average cost
curve (LAC) can be traced out. A downward-sloping LAC indicates economies of
scale, since lower average costs are incurred when more output is produced. An
upward-sloping LAG reflects diseconomies of scale, because higher average costs
are incurred when more output is produced. This description is based on an
assumption that the appropriate LAG can be revealed by a cross-section of
different sized banks at a point in time, and, a measure of economies of scale can
be derived from it. Therefore, bank scale economies appear as the slope of an
average cost curve indicating how costs change with output (Humphrey, 1990).
Figure 4.1 Economies of Scale
Bank Output
Source: Humphrey (1990, p.38)
Notes: SAC:short-run average cost curve; LAC: long-run average cost curve.
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the economies of scope graphically for two products. The
horizontal plane measures the output of two products, y 1 and y2 . The vertical
plane measures the average combined cost of production. The curved surface
ZC,1 C,2 indicates the average cost of producing different combinations of y 1 and
v 2 • A vertical plane extended along the axis Oy1 at y2 = 0 traces the cost curve
ZC 1 , showing the product-specific average cost of different quantities of product
y 1 without producing y2 . Similarly, a vertical plane extended along the axis Oy2
traces the comparable curve ZC,, 2 for y2 . Points on the cost surface between
ZC 1 and ZC,2 show the combined cost of producing diverse combinations of y1
and y2.
Figure 4.2 Economies of Scope
tput Y2
Source: Scherer and Ross (1990, p.101)
Supposing a third vertical plane is constructed to intersect axes 0 y 1 and 0 y2 at
45-degree angles, it would cut the curved cost surface along line 	 tracing
out the implications of producing different linear output combinations of y1 and
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y2 . It's midpoint M pinpoints the average cost of producing half as much of
product y 1 as quantity 0 Q in combination with half as much of product y2 as
quantity 0 Q. When C, 1 C,2 is convex downward, as shown in Figure 4.2,
economies of scope exist, since it would be cheaper to produce y 1 and y2
together rather than separately. Conversely, if were concave downward,
diseconomies of scope exist, because it would be more expensive to produce y1
and y2 together than separately (Scherer and Ross, 1990).
As indicated by Clark (1988), there are two potential sources of economies of
scale and scope in banking. First, spreading fixed costs. If excess capacity exists,
fixed or quasi-fixed branch costs, labour costs, or computer and
telecommunications equipment costs may be spread over large levels of output
and/or joint usage of these fixed resources. For example, employees at small
banks are likely to be unspecialised. These unspecialised employees are then a
fixed input that can be shared in the production of a number of products, with the
potential to achieve economies of scope. As these small banks grow, they may be
able to hire more specialised employees. Theoretically, greater specialisation will
lead to reductions in per unit cost. Thus, in this example, increased size may result
in production economies through substituting economies of scale for economies of
scope.
In spite of the large set-up costs required, computer and telecommunications
equipment can process a large number of transactions at a small additional cost
per transaction. It is possible to reduce the per-unit cost of these banks if they
increase the number of transactions that can be conducted by this equipment.
Thus, economies of scale are realised. Moreover, if excess capacity of the
equipment exists, its cost may be spread over an expanded product mix, thus
realising economies of scope.
Information production is the second basis for both economies of scale and scope.
For example, information collected from servicing a customer's deposits and
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loans may be 'reused'. Reuse may help reduce the incremental costs of extending
additional services, since the cost of reusing information is usually less than the
independent cost of its production. Hence, economies of scale will occur if the
information is reused to produce more of the same type of service. Alternatively,
economies of scope will occur if the information is reused to offer another type of
service.
According to Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987), there are two more
sources for economies of scope: risk reduction and customer cost economies.
Theoretically, asset diversification and asset-liability maturity matching can
reduce portfolio and interest rate risks. To reduce risk in their revenue streams,
banks may be willing to incur extra operating and/or interest costs. In addition,
when bank services are situated jointly, customer-incurred banking costs may be
reduced due to transportation cost savings, ease of inter-account funds transfers,
etc. Even if bank-incurred costs are increased, banks may respond to this joint
demand to the extent that revenues are raised through higher fee income, larger
balances, or increased market share.
4.2.2 Economies of Scale and Scope under Different Approaches and
Measures
Generally, there are two types of approaches employed in the literature to estimate
the economies of scale and scope. The traditional non-frontier models estimate an
average practice cost function that relates bank cost to output levels and input
prices. A two-sided error term is included in the cost function to capture
measurement error or any unpredicted factor that affected a bank's costs over the
sample period. Thus, the non-frontier models are based on the assumption that
there is no X-inefficiency66
 and the banks are using the same management and
production technology (Mester, 1996).
66 X-efficiency can be characterized as the superior management of resources, and shows how
closely a firm approaches its highest operational capability. For details, please see Chapter 3.
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However, Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) claim that the concepts of
economies of scale and scope are strictly applicable only to the X-efficient
frontier. Thus, the traditional non-frontier models of costs overlooking X-
inefficiencies confound the scale and scope economy measures. Kumbhakar
(199 1, 1996) argues that, although neglecting technical inefficiency in a cost
function may not affect the consistency property of the parameter estimates,
except for the intercepts, exclusion of allocative inefficiency may result in
inconsistent parameter estimates. This dissimilarity is due to the fact that
allocative inefficiency is input price dependent whereas technical inefficiency is
not.
Recent studies have reported another way to examine the economies of scale and
scope of banks, which is abstracted from inefficiencies in production. The new
measures are based on the estimated cost frontiers and so indicate whether a bank
that is minimizing the cost of producing a particular output bundle could lower
costs proportionately by choosing another level of output or by changing its
output mix (Mester, 1996). The most common approach is the stochastic
(translog) cost frontier approach. It is therefore the preferred method in this
chapter.
Basically, there are two types of measures to calculate economies of scale and
scope: the standard measures and the expansion path measures. The major
standard measures determine if existing banks are competitive relative to banks
with exactly the same product mix or banks that are specialised completely. The
assumption of other standard measures is that banks should be able to increase one
of their products, holding others at a constant level.
However, the standard measures may be of little use in evaluating competitive
challenges between currently existing banks, because banks rarely, if ever, have
the same product mix, are specialised completely, or increase one output while
holding others constant. Berger et al. (1987) developed the expansion path
measures, which capture the impact of changing scale and product mix
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simultaneously. They are thus more general than the standard measures. For these
reasons, they are used as the preferred measures in this chapter. The different
approaches and measures will be explained in more detail in section 4.3. The
following selective literature review focuses on the banking studies that employed
various approaches and measures to estimate economies of scale and scope to
some extent. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the relative studies reviewed.
Most studies on economies of scale and scope use the traditional non-frontier
translog cost models with the standard measures. Usually, the results indicate
overall economies of scale for small banks and overall economies of scope for all
banks (Rezvanian and Mehdian, 2002; Mertens and Urga, 2001; etc.). Some
studies use the stochastic frontier approach and the standard measures, and find
mixed results. For example, Allen and Rai (1996) estimated economies of scale
and scope for 194 banks in fifteen countries from 1988 to 1992. The results show
that small banks in all countries exhibit significant economies of scale. In
addition, there is no significant evidence of either economies or diseconomies of
scope. Employing the same approach and similar measures, Mester (1996)
estimated economies of scale and scope for 214 US banks in the Third Federal
Reserve District for 1991-1992. The results indicate slight economies of scale and
scope neutrality for these banks.
To determine whether the X-inefficiencies embedded in the traditional non-
frontier approach significantly bias the measure of scale and scope economies, a
few studies compare the differences between the stochastic frontier approach and
the traditional non-frontier approach. The results are mixed. For example,
applying both stochastic frontier and traditional non-frontier approaches, together
with the standard measures, Mester (1993) investigated economies of scale and
scope for 1,015 US savings and loans (S&Ls) in 1991. The estimation of the
traditional non-frontier approach yields similar results to the stochastic frontier
approach. Nearly constant returns to scale and economies of scope have been
found for the entire sample of S&Ls.
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Using the thick frontier approach 67 and the traditional non-frontier approach,
Berger and Humphrey (1991) estimated both standard and expansion path (only
expansion path subadditivity) economies of scale and scope for all US banks in
1984. The results show overall scale economies for the smallest banks and slight
overall scale diseconomies for the largest banks. The large difference between the
results estimated by different approaches is that the thick frontier approach yields
scope diseconomies and the traditional approach yields scope economies
(especially for the largest banks). Hence, there is evidence that the traditional non-
frontier approach confounds the standard scope economy measures.
On the other hand, applying the traditional non-frontier approach, a few studies
compare the differences between the standard measures and the expansion path
measures. Different measures were always found to yield different results. Using
this method, Berger et al. (1987) investigated the economies of scale and scope for
US banks in 1983. The results of the standard measures show constant returns to
scale for all banks; modest scope economies are found for the smallest banks, and
severe scope diseconomies for the largest. The results of the expansion measures
suggest that all banks face constant returns to scale as well, but show
diseconomies of scope for small banks, and scope neutrality for others.
Employing the same method, Mitchell and Onvural (1996) estimated the
economies of scale and scope for US banks in 1986 and 1990. The results from
using the standard measures suggest that small banks enjoy increasing returns to
scale while large banks generally face constant returns to scale. There was no
evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scope. The results of the
expansion path measures showed constant returns to scale for all banks. Costs are
subadditive in both years only along the expansion path between the two smallest
size bank groups. Costs are also subadditive in 1986 along the expansion path
joining the two largest groups.
67 Thick frontier approach is a parametric method to detect X-inefficiency. Please see Chapter 3 for
details.
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Employing the traditional non-frontier model, together with both standard (only
for overall scale economies) and expansion path measures, Rime and Stiroh
(2003) estimated economies of scale and scope for 289 Swiss banks that operated
between 1996 and 1999. Both measures showed there are economies of scale for
the small and mid-size banks in 1996 and 1998, but, for banks in 1997 and 1999,
the standard measure indicates economies of scale while the expansion path
measure implies constant returns to scale. Both measures suggest there are no
economies of scale for the large banks in most cases. The results of the expansion
path measure also suggest that there is limited evidence of economies of scope for
the smaller banks in 1997, and scope neutrality for others.
4.3 Methodology and Data
4.3.1 Empirical Models
Banks are multi-product firms employing a vector of inputs to produce a vector of
outputs. Under duality theory, the multi-product cost function dual to the
production function can be defined as:
C =f(Y,W)
where
C: total cost,
Y: a vector of outputs,
W: a vector of input prices.
(4.1)
This study also uses a parametric approach with a translog specification, as
discussed in Chapter 3. A classical pooled data regression model is applied in this
study, given there is not enough data for a panel data model. In common with the
published work in this area, time and bank subscripts are dropped for ease of
exposition. The traditional non-frontier translog cost function takes the following
form:
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lnC=a0 +fllny +8m lfl Wm
p	 m	 2	 q	 (4.2)
+!8mn1nwm1nwn+ypm1flyplUWm+E
n	 pm
where
C : total cost,
y : pth output,
Wm : rnth input price,
e: a normally distributed random error tenTh
Both standard symmetry (fJpq = '3qp'	 nm) and linear homogeneity
restrictions (Sm = 1,	 8mn = 0,	 0) are imposed during estimation.
Under the stochastic cost frontier approach, the translog cost function takes the
following form:
lnC=a0 +fllny +8m 1nwm +•-flpq1nypinyq
m	 j q	 (4.3)
+ 8mn 1fl Wm lflWn + 7pm lnyp lflWm +U+V
where
U: an X-inefficiency factor,
v: the random error.
The above-mentioned standard symmetry restrictions continue to apply. To
impose linear homogeneity restrictions on the function, all of the cost and input
price terms are normalized by the last input price, W3. As discussed in Chapter 3,
Shephard's lemma is not applied for either approach, because it would impose the
undesirable assumption that there were no allocative inefficiencies (Berger, 1993).
4.3.2 Measures of Economies of Scale and Scope
Basically, there are three standard measures of economies of scale - overall scale
economies (SCALE), product-specific scale economies (PSSE, and within-sample
product-specific scale economies (WPSSE). Moreover, economies of scope can be
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assessed in four different ways under the standard measures - overall scope
economies (SCOPE), within-sample overall scope economies (WSCOPE),
product-specific scope economies (PSCO), and within-sample product-specific
scope economies (WPSCO). Finally, there are two expansion path measures for
economies of scale and scope - expansion path scale economies (EPSCE) and
expansion path subadditivity (EPSUB). Following Berger et al. (1987), Figure 4.3
is employed to illustrate the measures of economies of scale and scope
graphically. It shows an output plane with two sizes of banks A and B producing
two outputs in quantities yA = [yyfl and yB = [ y 18 yfl, respectively. Costs can
be thought of as lying along a manifold above this output plane.
Figure 4.3. Different Measures of Economies of Scale and Scope
Y2
E -B ("large")
A ("sma1P____
0	 F
Source: Berger et al. (1987, p.505)
The overall scale economies (SCALE), also called ray scale economies, was
developed by Baumol et al. in 1982. It is said to exist if an equi-proportionate
increase in all outputs leads to a less than equi-proportionate increase in cost.
SCALE is measured by the elasticity of cost with respect to output, taken along a
ray tY that holds output mix constant:
SCALE(Y)	 in C(tY)/ a intl t=i = a ln C(Y)/ a ln y,	 (4.4)
where
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C(Y) : a multiple-output cost function,
Y: avectorof outputs, 
=[y1...y]'.
t: a scale adjustment factor,
p : indexes of different products.
SCALE is the multi-product analogue of marginal cost [dC(tY) / dt] divided by
average cost [C(tY)/t} on a ray such as OB in Figure 4.3. SCALE < 1 implies
economies of scale since costs increase proportionally less than outputs increase,
while SCALE> 1 implies diseconomies of scale.
Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1982) argued that the overall economies of
scale could be divided into two types: the plant (branch)-ievel and the firm (bank)-
level68 . The plant-level economies of scale refers to cost savings generated by
only increasing the output of existing branches (not by adding new branches),
68 As indicated by Benston et al. (1982) and Berger et al. (1987), to calculate both plant- and firm-
level economies of scale, the cost function should be changed to
lnC=a0 +/3lny +8m inwm +i8pq1nypinyq
+ -	 Smn In Wm In w, +	 Ypm in in Wm
+PBIflB+PBB(lflB) + p8 lnBlny +
where B is the number of branch offices.
Assuming that output expands while holding the number of branch offices constant, the plant-level
of economies of scale are derived using the partial elasticity with respect to y. It is calculated as
follows:
SCALE1 (Y) = in C(tY, B) / a ln t =
	
ln C(Y, B) / a in
Alternatively, assuming that the number of branch offices varies with output, the firm-level
economies of scale are derived from the total elasticity. It is computed as follows:
SCALE2 (Y) = a in C[(tY, B(tY)] / d In t
= SCALE1(Y)+[alnC(Y,B)IalnBxa1nB(Y)/alny]
where	 In B(Y) / a ln	 is estimated by running an auxiliary regression of the form as
follows:
1nB=O0 +Oiny +E
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while the firm-level economies of scale refers to cost savings generated by both
output and branch expansions. Since the calculation of the two types of overall
economies of scale requires the information of the number of branch offices,
which is not available for China, so this measure is not used in this chapter.
SCALE does not allow for a change in output mix. Baumol et al. (1982) suggested
an additional measure to illustrate how costs change when the output of one
product changes with the quantities of all other products held constant. Product-
specific scale economies (PSSE) are present if an increase in production of a
specific product results in a decline in the average cost, holding the other outputs
constant. PSSE for the kth output can be obtained by examining the relation
between its incremental average cost and marginal cost:
PSSE(yk ) [IC(y k )/y k ]IMC(y k ) =[1C(yk)1C(Y)1I[nC(Y)]1Yk1 (4.5)
where
IC(yij: the incremental cost of producing Yk'
=[C(yl,...,yp)—C(yl,...,ykl,O,yk+1,...,yP)],
IC(yk)/yk : the average incremental cost of producing Yk'
MC(yk ) : the marginal cost with respect to the kth output69
If the marginal cost is less (more) than average incremental cost at a given level of
output, then the value of PSSE(Yk ) > 1 (PSSE(yk ) < 1) implies economies
(diseconomies) of scale in production of the kth output.
Empirically, in the framework of the translog cost function, the original version of
PSSE cannot be calculated because it requires the assumption of zero output for at
least one output. Previous studies usually suggest a revised version of PSSE,
which substitutes the zero level of output with ad hoc values (such as 0.01 or
0.00 1) to avoid the non-finite representation of the translog cost function.
However, Berger et al. (1987) argue that both the conventional and revised
version of PSSE still require evaluation of the cost function at Yk near zero,
69 The incremental cost of the kth product is defined as the difference in cost incurred by the firm
when producing the given level of product k, as opposed to producing a zero level, while the
quantities of all other products are held constant.
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which is generally far outside the sample over which the cost function is
estimated. Thus, both versions should be subject to substantial extrapolation error.
In addition, the results of the revised measure are highly dependent on the
closeness of the approximation. Thus, any findings of the revised PSSE could be
inappropriate, since it could be reversed by making the approximation to zero
output more precise.
To remedy the extrapolation error and the problem of inappropriateness, Mester
(1992) defined a new measure of product-specific economies of scale, which is
called the within-sample product-specific scale economies (WPSSE). The within-
sample degree of economies of scale specific to output k:
WPSSE(yk ) = [IC(yk )/ C]/[a in C(Y)/ ln Yk]	 (4.6)
where
IC(y) = [C(yl,...,yP)—C(yj,...Yk.l,y',yk+l...,yP)],
y' = the sample minimum of yk.
Thus, WPSSE(y k ) is just PSSE(y k ) with the sample minimum of Yk replacing
zero70 . Like PSSE(y k ), WPSSE(Y k ) > 1 (WPSSE(yk ) < 1) implies economies
(diseconomies) of scale in production of the kth output.
In principle, both PSSE and WPSSE for each product should be measured
independently from the other products in the product mix (Clark, 1988). In
practice, however, such a measurement is meaningless. Due to joint production, it
is usually impossible to change the output of one specific product while holding
the output of the other products constant. Berger et al. (1987) proposed an
alternative measure of economies of scale called expansion path scale economies
(EPSCE).
70 For some bank groups, the minimum levels of bank investments and non-interest income are
zero. Following Mester (1992), in this chapter the minimum values of these outputs are the same
as the conventional measures (0.001).
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EPSCE measures the proportional changes in costs as banks move along the
observed expansion path from a small to a large bank. EPSCE avoids the
unrealistic assumption of constant output mix assumed by SCALE, the
extrapolation error and the problem of inappropriateness implied by PSSE, and the
partial constant output mix assumed by both PSSE and WPSSE. The curve OAB in
Figure 4.3 can be thought of as the expansion path that banks follow in choosing
output bundle B, changing product mix as scale increases.
Hence, EPSCE is defined as the elasticity of incremental cost with respect to
incremental output along the observed expansion path from the small bank A to
the large bank B:
[C(Y B )_ C(YA)]IC(YB)	 (4.7)
where
y : the quantities of the pth output at bank A,
the quantities of the pth output at bank B,
C(Y A ) : total costs at bank A,
C(Y B ) : total costs at bank B.
The numerator is the percentage change in cost when each output changes in the
same proportion as it does between bundles A and B. The denominator is the
percentage difference in costs between banks A and B computed from the cost
function. EPSCE < 1 implies economies of scale since costs increase
proportionally less than outputs, while EPSCE> 1 implies diseconomies of scale.
Compared to the standard scale economy measures, EPSCE is more generalised,
which accounts for observed (or more flexible) changes in the output mix between
small and large banks. SCALE is a special case of EPSCE, where the smaller bank
is at the origin in Figure 4.3, i.e., SCALE(Y A ) = EPSCE(O , Y A ) . Both PSSE and
WPSSE are also special cases of EPSCE, where the smaller bank is either at point
E or F or near point E or F in Figure 4.3.
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Baumol et al. (1982) also developed overall scope economies (SCOPE). SCOPE
are presented for a given product mix, if the total costs from the joint production
of all products in the product mix are less than the sum of the costs of producing
each product independently. That is, SCOPE measures the cost saving from joint
versus specialised production. The set of all parallelograms that stretch from 0 to
B in Figure 4.3 represents the combinations of two output bundles with various
product mixes that sum to yB
Under the assumption of SCOPE, the output among banks should be divided into
two specialised banks - each produces only one of the two products,
corresponding to the largest parallelogram OEBF. SCOPE at B are the
proportional cost increases from dividing Y' into yE = (O,y) and yF = (y,O).
In a general case with p outputs, SCOPE at B are calculated as:
SCOPE(YB) [C(y 18 ,O,...,O) + ... + C(O,...,O, y) - C(y 1B ,..., y !)] / C(y ,...,
(4.8)
SCOPE> 0, SCOPE < 0, and SCOPE = 0 suggest the presence of overall scope
economies, scope diseconomies, and scope neutrality, respectively.
Another measure of economies of scope is product-specific scope economies
(PSCO). PSCO exists if the cost of jointly producing one particular output with
the existing output bundle is smaller than the sum of the cost of producing this
output and the rest of the output bundle separately. Commonly, PSCO can be
calculated as follows:
PSCO(yk ) = [C(y 1	 ,0, Yk+1 ,..., y,,) + C(0,...,0, Yk ,0,...0) - C(y 1 ,...,
IC(y1,...,y)
(4.9)
PSCO > 0, PSCO <0, and PSCO = 0 indicate the presence of product-specific
scope economies, scope diseconomies, and scope neutrality, respectively.
Previous studies have developed revised versions of these measures, which
substitute the zero level of output in estimating both the SCOPE and PSCO with
an arbitrary minimum value (such as 0.01 or 0.001), because the translog cost
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function is undefined for a zero output level. However, as indicated by Berger et
al. (1987), the problems of extrapolation and inappropriate measures still exist. To
avoid the extrapolation inherent in the measures of SCOPE and PSCO, Mester
(1992) suggested a new approach: substituting the minimum output within the
sample for the zero level of output. Therefore, the within-sample scope economies
(WSCOPE) is defined as follows:
WSCOPE(YB)[C(y	
—3y,y",y)
+C(y",y',y	 _3y)_C(y1B,y,y,y)]
/ C(y, y2B , y3B , y4B)
(4.10)
where
y : the minimum value of y in the sample71.
WSCOPE measures the percentage increase in cost of dividing the outputs into
relative specialised banks, but none more specialised than the most specialised
bank in the sample. WSCOPE> 0, WSCOPE < 0, and WSCOPE = 0 suggest the
presence of within-sample scope economies, scope diseconomies, and scope
neutrality, respectively. In addition, the within-sample product-specific economies
of scope (WPSCO) is developed and defined as:
WPSCO(yk)=[C(yI,...,yk_l,y,yk^l,...,yP)+C(y,...,yl,yk
—C(y1,...,y)I/C(y1,...,y)
(4.11)
where
y : the minimum level of output k within the sample.
Therefore, WPSCO(y k ) is just PSCO(y k ) with the sample minimum of y,
replacing 0. WPSCO is said to exist in the production of Yk when
In this chapter, ( y - 3y ) in Eq. (4.10) is substituted by (Y - y'), because, for the output
vector yj (deposits) and Y2 (loans), the value calculated by the former equation is negative, and
hence cannot be used in the translog function to obtain costs. This may overestimate the costs of
producing separately, or underestimate the costs of joint production. Hence, the results of
WSCOPE should be interpreted with regard to this possible bias.
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WPSCO(y k ) > 0, whereas WPSCO(y k ) < 0 indicates within-sample product-
specific diseconomies of scope.
Baumol et al. (1982) also indicate that a sufficient condition for a multiproduct
cost function to exhibit economies of scope is the cost complementarities between
products. The cost complementarities imply that the marginal cost of producing
any one product decreases with increases in the quantities of all other products.
This condition may be expressed as:
a 2c - C *	 a2lnC	 alnCalnC)0
q	 'q	 lny*alnyalny	 a1nYqV
However, as indicated by Berger et al. (1987), the test for cost complementarities
is a local test at the mean data point. It is impossible to have cost
complementarities at every data point in the case of translog cost functions. In
addition, banking studies specifying more than two products find some
complementarities and some non-complementarities, and give inconclusive
economies of scope findings. Finally, the implementation of cost complementarity
tests is sometimes inconsistent with economic theory.
In detail, theory requires non-negative marginal costs, which means that the latter
two terms in the above condition equation must be positive and the first term in
parentheses must be negative for cost complementarity or joint production to hold.
Mester (1987) reported instances of negative marginal costs and negative average
incremental costs. Kolari and Zardoohi (1987) reported positive estimates for the
first term in parentheses, yet found evidence of economies of scope. Therefore,
the cost complementarity estimates and tests reported by these authors may be of
questionable validity72. For this reason, this thesis makes no attempt to estimate
the cost complementarity.
Since banks in different size categories appear to "specialize" in different output
72 For details, please see Berger et al. (1987).
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compositions, as shown in Figure 4.3, a more likely division of output bundle yB
includes the representative bank at A along the expansion path OAB. D is a
hypothetical bank, and + yD = YB shown by parallelogram OABD.
Accordingly, Berger et al. (1987) developed another measure called expansion
path subadditivity (EPSUB), which gives the proportional cost increase from two-
bank instead of one-bank production of yB, using the smaller bank on the
expansion path:
EPSUB(Y B )[C(Y A )+C(Y))_C(Y B )1IC(Y B )	 (4.12)
EPSUB measures the predicted cost differences if an observed bank were
arbitrarily divided into two smaller banks that produced the same total output.
Following Berger et al. (1987) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996), EPSUB is
estimated along the expansion path from the mean output level of one size class to
the mean of the next size class. EPSUB < 0 implies that the two smaller banks
could produce the same output at a lower total cost and output bundle B is not
competitively viable. This is referred to as "superadditive" costs.
EPSUB > 0 implies that the larger bank incurs lower costs and the smaller banks
have an incentive to expand since joint production can occur at lower costs. This
is referred to as "subadditive" costs. As claimed by Berger et al. (1987), EPSUB is
also a generalized version of SCOPE. In detail, SCOPE is a special case of
EPSUB, where the smaller bank specializes at point E or F in Figure 4.3.
In the next section, both the traditional non-frontier and stochastic frontier
estimates of equations (4.2) and (4.3), together with the original data set, are used
to compute economies of scale and scope. These estimates are entered into
equations:
. (4.4) to calculate overall economies of scale, SCALE;
(4.6) to obtain within-sample product-specific economies of scale, WPSSE;
• (4.7) to compute expansion path economies of scale, EPSCE;
• (4.10) to obtain within-sample economies of scope, WSCOPE;
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• (4.11) to calculate within-sample product-specific economies of scope,
WPSCO;
(4.12) to obtain expansion path subadditivity, EPSUB.
4.3.3 Data
As discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter concentrates on the two major types of
commercial banks in China - four state-owned commercial banks and 10 joint-
stock commercial banks - over the period 1985-2002. The dataset consists of 187
observations. All of the data (except where mentioned specifically) used in this
study are obtained from various editions of the Almanac of China's Finance and
Banking issued by the China Finance Society.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the modified intermediation approach is adopted in this
study to measure bank outputs. Based on this approach, outputs include total
deposits (y 1 ), total loans (y2 ), total investments (y 3 ), and non-interest income
(y4 ), which is used to represent the off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities. Inputs
include borrowed funds (x1 ), fixed assets (x2), and employees (X3). The definition
of each variable is consistent with those in Chapter 3. Table 4.2 illustrates the
major changes in output mix of the 14 sample banks during the period 1985-2002.
Table 4.3 reports the information related to the different categories of assets in the
sample banks, together with the expansion paths for different categories of banks.
Many studies in the banking literature are concerned with the possible endogenous
nature of the independent variables (especially bank outputs). Molyneux,
Altunbas, and Gardener (1996) provided an excellent review of this issue. To
solve this problem, Benston et al. (1982) included an independent variable,
measuring average account size, to adjust the number of accounts for bank size.
However, Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) argued that the inclusion of account size
in the model does not necessarily resolve the endogeneity problem. Instead, it is
likely to create a multicollineanty situation, since the number and average size of
accounts are highly correlated.
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Kim (1985) suggested a theoretical solution to this problem, in which the joint
estimation of an equation system consisting of a translog cost function, a cost-
share equation and a revenue-share equation, along with the proper parameter
restrictions, was the solution for obtaining consistent estimates with endogenous
outputs. But Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) indicated that this procedure might not
be completely necessary. On the one hand, the endogeneity problem is no more or
less serious than cost estimations in other industries. On the other hand, this
approach takes into account only the supply side of the market, without covering
the demand side. Given these problems, no attempt is made to deal with this issue
in this study.
Table 4.3 Total Assets of Sample Banks (1985-2002)
Unit: million RMB
Categories	 Periods	 Mean	 Median Mm.	 Max.	 Asset Range in
_____________ ________ ________ ________ ________ _________ Expansion Path
Allsample	 1985-	 254431	 66317	 386	 1432002	 (386-66317)--
banks2002	 ________ ________ ________ _________ (66317-1432002)
All State-owned 1985-	 600243	 554222	 168843	 1432002	 (168843-554222)
Banks	 2002	 --
______________ _________ _________ _________ ________ __________ (554222-1432002)
All Joint-stock	 1987-	 37923	 20561	 386	 231964	 (386-20561)--
Banks2002	 ________ ________ ________ _________ (20561-231964)
State-owned	 1985-	 390217	 389397	 168843	 789022	 (168843-389397)
Banks (1)	 1992	 --
_______________ _________ _________ _________ _________ __________ (389397-789022)
State-owned	 1993-	 768264	 749361	 406523	 1432002	 (406523-749361)
Banks (2)	 2002	 --
______________ ________ ________ ________ ________ _________ (749361- 1432002)
Joint-stock	 1987-	 9755	 4336	 386	 85976	 (386-4336) --
Banks(1)	 2002	 ________ ________ ________ _________ (4336-85976)
Joint-stock	 1993-	 44586	 28233	 2621	 231964	 (2621-28233) --
Banks(2)	 2002	 ________ ________ ________ _________ (28233-23 1964)
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-2003)
Notes: 1. Total assets are adjusted for inflation using the CPI, with 1985 as the base year. 2. To
calculate the EPSCE and EPSUB, sample banks are divided into large banks and small banks by
the median value of total assets in the relevant categories. 3. The expansion path is from "group of
small banks" to "group of large banks".
4.4 Empirical Results
Before the traditional non-frontier (4.2) and the stochastic frontier (4.3) functions
are estimated, two revised functions have been estimated to see if the costs of the
sample banks would be changed under different ownership and regulatory
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environments. Two dummy variables, an ownership dummy (zero for state-owned
banks, and one for joint-stock banks) and a reform dummy (zero for the first
reform stage, and one for the second reform stage), are added to functions (4.2)
and (4.3) simultaneously.
The results of the revised non-frontier function show that the coefficient of the
ownership dummy is significantly negative (-0.303) at the 1% level, and the
coefficient of the reform dummy is 0.052, which is insignificant at the 10% level.
This suggests that, under the traditional non-frontier approach, it is important to
test for differences in economies of scale and scope between the state-owned
banks and the joint-stock banks, but not between the banks in different reform
stages.
The results of the revised stochastic frontier function show that the coefficient of
the ownership dummy is significantly negative (-0.334) at the 1% level, and the
coefficient of the reform dummy is significantly positive (0.086) at the 5% level.
This again indicates that it is important to test the differences in economies of
scale and scope between different ownership banks and banks in different reform
stages under the stochastic frontier approach.
The coefficients and p-values after estimating equations (4.2) and (4.3) are
reported in Table 4473 The result shows that, among 36 coefficients estimated by
the traditional non-frontier cost function, only nine coefficients are found to be
statistically significant at the 10% level.
Using the stochastic frontier model, just one of 28 coefficients is statistically
significant at the 10% level. The findings are hard to explain, because the second-
order terms of outputs and input price do not make much economic sense. The
adjusted R-square is, for both models, 0.99, indicating that 99% of the variation in
total cost is explained by variation in independent variables.
Given the coefficients estimated under the revised versions are similar to those under the
original functions, the calculation of economies of scale and scope is based on the coefficients
estimated by the original functions.
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Table 4.4. Parameter Estimates of the Translog Cost Functions
Variable	 Description	 Stochastic Frontier	 Traditional Non-frontier
Approach ________ Approach ___________
Coefficients p-values	 Coefficients p-values
______________ _________________ ___________ (S.E.) 	 ___________ (S.E.)
Constant	 0.966	 0.432	 1.546	 0.068
_______________ ___________________ _____________ (1.231)
	 ____________ (0.842)
LNYI	 Total deposits	 0.89 1	 0.377	 1.006	 0.054
_______________ ___________________ _____________ (1.008)
	 ____________ (0.519)
LNY2	 Total loans	 -0.111	 0.898	 -0.323	 0.5 11
______________ __________________ ____________ (0.836) ____________ (0.490)
LNY3	 Total investments	 0.053	 0.590	 0.069	 0.135
______________ __________________ ____________ (0.099) 	 ____________ (0.046)
LNY4	 Non-interest	 -0.012	 0.945	 0.011	 0.894
______________ income
	 ___________ (0.171) 	 ___________ (0.080)
LNYILNY1,2	 Total deposits *	 -0.092	 0.842	 -0.2 17	 0.406
______________ Total deposits/2 	 ____________ (0.463) 	 ____________ (0.260)
LNYJLNY2	 Total deposits *	 0.078	 0.841	 0.170	 0.489
______________ Total loans	 ____________ (0.3 87)	 ____________ (0.245)
LNYJLNY3	 Total deposits *	 -0.052	 0.506	 -0.012	 0.803
______________ Total investments	 ____________ (0.078)
	 ____________ (0.049)
LNYJLNY4	 Total deposits *	 0.080	 0.25 1	 0.073	 0.03 1
Non-interest	 (0.070)	 (0.034)
income____________	 ____________ ____________
LNY2LNY2I2	 Total loans * Total	 -0.021	 0.950	 -0.067	 0.780
______________ loans/2 	 ____________ (0.339)	 ____________ (0.240)
LNY2LNY3	 Total loans * Total	 0.041	 0.598	 0.001	 0.988
______________ investments
	 ____________ (0.078)
	 ____________ (0.048)
LNY2LNY4	 Total loans * Non- 	 -0.095	 0.148	 -0.091	 0.011
_______________ interest income 	 _____________ (0.066)
	 _____________ (0.035)
LNY3LNY3/2	 Total investments * 0.013
	
0.0 13	 0.010	 0.004
_______________ Total investments/2 _____________ (0.005)	 _____________ (0.003)
LNY3LNY4	 Total investments * 0.003
	 0.667	 0.005	 0.114
Non-interest	 (0.007)	 (0.003)
income
LNY4LNY4/2	 Non-interest	 0.001	 0.899	 0.001	 0.855
income * Non-	 (0.009)	 (0.004)
________________ interest income/2 	 _____________ __________ _____________ _____________
LNW1	 Price of funds	 0.247	 0.382	 0.284	 0.291
______________ __________________ ____________ (0.282) ____________ (0.268)
LNW2	 Price of fixed assets 0.491	 0.212	 0.462	 0.124
_______________ ___________________ _____________ (0.393)
	 _____________ (0.230)
LNW3	 Price of employees NA	 NA (NA) 0.253	 0.146
______________ __________________ ____________ _________ ____________ (0.173)
LN Wi LN Wi 12	 Price of funds *	 0.029	 0.433	 0.053	 0.175
______________ Price of funds/2	 ____________ (0.037) 	 ____________ (0.039)
LNW]LNW2	 Price of funds *	 0.076	 0.170	 0.048	 0.33 1
______________ Price of fixed assets ___________ (0.055)	 ___________ (0.049)
LNWJLNW3	 Price of funds *	 NA	 NA (NA) -0.101	 0.001
_______________ Price of employees _____________ __________ _____________ (0.025)
LNW2LNW2/2	 Price of fixed assets -0.088	 0.302	 -0.058	 0.376
* Price of fixed	 (0.085)	 (0.065)
_____________________ assets/2 	 _________________ _____________ _________________ _________________
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.4 (continued)
LNW2LNW3	 Price of fixed assets NA	 NA (NA) 0.010	 0.773
* price of	 (0.035)
______________ employees	 ____________ _________ ____________ ____________
LNW3LNW3/2	 Price of employees NA	 NA (NA) 0.091	 0.00 1
* Price of	 (0.035)
_______________ employees/2 	 _____________ __________ ____________ _____________
LNY1LNWJ	 Total deposits *	 -0.0 12	 0.909	 0.04 1	 0.6 14
______________ Price of funds 	 ___________ (0.104) 	 ___________ (0.080)
LNYILNW2	 Total deposits *	 -0.050	 0.746	 -0.086	 0.424
______________ Price of fixed assets ____________ (0.155) 	 ____________ (0.107)
LNY1LNW3	 Total deposits *	 NA	 NA (NA) 0.045	 0.567
______________ Price of employees ____________ _________ ____________ (0.079)
LNY2LNW1	 Total loans * Price	 0.036	 0.7 19	 -0.013	 0.865
_____________ of funds 	 ___________ (0.100) ___________ (0.078)
LNY2LNW2	 Total loans * Price	 0.006	 0.965	 0.035	 0.730
_____________ of fixed assets 	 ___________ (0.136) 	 ___________ (0.102)
LNY2LNW3	 Total loans * Price NA
	 NA (NA) -0.022	 0.773
______________ of employees 	 ____________ _________ ____________ (0.076)
LNY3LNW1	 Total investments * -0.011	 0.600	 -0.009	 0.401
______________ Price of funds	 ___________ (0.022)	 ___________ (0.102)
LNY3LNW2	 Total investments * 0.017
	 0.475	 0.015	 0.204
______________ Price of fixed assets ____________ (0.023)	 ____________ (0.120)
LNY3LNW3	 Total investments * NA	 NA (NA) -0.007	 0.406
______________ Price of employees ____________ _________ ____________ (0.008)
LNY4LNWI	 Non-interest	 0.018	 0.426	 0.015	 0.262
income * Price of	 (0.023)	 (0.0 13)
______________ funds 	 ____________ _________ ____________ ____________
LNY4LNW2	 Non-interest	 0.024	 0.456	 0.027	 0.092
income * Price of 	 (0.033)	 (0.016)
________________ fixed assets 	 _____________ __________ _____________ _____________
LNY4LNW3	 Non-interest	 NA	 NA (NA) -0.042	 0.037
income * Price of
	
(0.020)
______________ employees
	 ____________ _________ ____________ ____________
0.99	 0.99
Note: Bold typeface for values indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
Using these estimated coefficients and the original data set, different measures of
economies of scale and scope are calculated. The results are reported in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5(a) summarises the results using the stochastic frontier approach; and
Table 4.5(b) reports the results using the traditional non-frontier approach. In
addition, in the discussion that follows, significance will mean at the 10% level,
unless stated otherwise.
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4.4.1 Econometric Results: Stochastic Frontier Approach
As mentioned in section 4.2, the stochastic frontier approach and the expansion
path measures are the preferred methods in this chapter. Estimated expansion path
scale economies (EPSCE) indicate that, in general, the values are not significantly
different from one for all groups. This implies that most banks face constant
returns to scale taking account of changes in output composition as these banks
change their scales along their expansion path. It generally reveals no gains from
changing the scale of production for these banks.
Estimated expansion path subadditivity (EPSUB) generally indicates that costs are
subaddivitive along the expansion path, given that most values are significantly
more than zero. This finding suggests that most banks could save on costs by joint
production as they grow. It might also imply that most banks are able to meet
customers' joint demands or efficiently reduce risk through product
diversification.
For both expansion path measures, the one exception to the aforementioned
general results is that the state-owned banks in the first reform stage (column 4)
face decreasing returns to scale and scope neutrality, but that they enjoy constant
returns to scale and scope economies in the second reform stage (column 5). This
might suggest that the second stage of banking reform improved the cost structure
of the state banks by reducing their scale to an optimal level. However, the
forbiddance of universal banking might reduce their opportunity to save on costs
by joint production.
The results of the major standard measures (i.e., SCALE and WSCOPE) tell a
different story. They show that, on average, all the sample banks have significant
overall economies of scale and diseconomies of scope. This finding suggests that
these banks are operating on the falling part of their respective average cost (AC)
curves and could reduce costs by increasing outputs. In addition, having
specialised banks would lower costs.
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Comparing the results of state-owned banks in column (2) with joint-stock banks
in column (3), state banks exhibit diseconomies of scale, but economies of scope.
On the contrary, joint-stock banks have economies of scale, but diseconomies of
scope. This finding suggests that state-owned banks have greater potential to take
advantage of joint production, whereas joint-stock banks are likely to be faced
with the necessity of increasing scale to remain cost competitive. The result on
economies of scale is consistent with those reported in the majority of bank cost
structure studies, which report the existence of economies of scale usually at small
size banks.
The results in columns (4) and (5) indicate that state-owned banks in the first
reform stage face decreasing returns to scale, but in the second reform stage enjoy
increasing returns to scale. This finding partiy reflects the effects of the
streamlining of state banks in the second reform stage. It suggests that the second
stage of banking reform optimised the cost structure of state banks. In addition,
state banks enjoy economies of scope regardless of the reform stages. This finding
indicates that these state banks could always reduce costs by joint production.
For joint-stock banks, the results in columns (6) and (7) indicate that there are
significant economies of scale and diseconomies of scope during the second
reform stage, while both figures are insignificant for the first reform stage. Thus
there are cost savings to be had through scale expansion of joint-stock banks in
the second reform stage. The finding of diseconomies of scope in the second
reform stage might be explained by the fact that banks in the second stage bought
more computer and telecommunications equipment, which requires large set-up
costs. It would be too difficult for them to achieve a lower level of additional cost
per transaction, unless the volume of transactions rose substantially.
Comparing the results of the expansion path and standard measures, the findings
are similar to those of previous studies (i.e., Berger et al. 1987; Mitchell and
Onvural, 1996; Rime and Stiroh, 2003). That is, different measures of economies
of scale and scope generally result in inconsistent results. This might be due to the
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fact that the expansion path measures capture the impacts of changing scale and
product mix simultaneously but the standard measures do not. According to
Wheelock and Wilson (2001), the expansion path measures are composite
measures of standard economies of scale and scope. EPSCE is closer in spirit to a
measure of economies of scale than EPSUB because EPSCE measures the
incremental cost of incremental output along the expansion path between two
different-sized banks. EPSUB, on the other hand, compares the cost of production
at a given bank B with the cost of producing an identical level of output in two
separate banks with different output mixes. Therefore, the findings imply that the
standard measures are inadequate to determine the level of economies of scale and
scope for the sample banks in this study.
The results of within-sample product-specific economies of scale (WPSSE)
indicate that there are significant diseconomies of scale for deposits, loans, and
off-balance sheet (OBS) activities for all banks. A proportionate increase in any of
these three outputs (with the others held constant) will raise costs by a great
proportion. In contrast, the sign for y, bank investments is significantly positive,
suggesting costs will fall with a proportionate increase in investments, holding
constant deposits, loans, and OBS activities. The results of other bank groups are
similar to this one, except several values become insignificant.
The results of within-sample product-specific economies of scope (WPSCO)
indicate significantly negative values found with respect to deposits, loans, and
investments for all banks. This means that there is no cost advantage from the
joint production of these respective products. The coefficient on OBS activities is
significantly positive, suggesting costs fall if OBS activities are jointly produced
with the other three outputs. The joint-stock banks tell a similar story, but the
results of the groups of state-owned banks suggest that, in addition to joint
production of the OBS activities, there is cost advantage from the joint production
of loans and investments.
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However, the results of both within-sample product-specific economies of scale
(WPSSE) and scope (WPSCO) should be interpreted with caution because thy
include a usually impossible assumption that banks can change the output of one
specific product while holding the output of the other products constant. In this
paper, 3 of the 4 "outputs" come from both the assets and the liabilities sides of
the balance sheet. For example, bank loans (y2) and investments (y3) are from the
assets side, while bank deposits (yj) are from the liabilities side. From an
accounting standpoint, assets and liabilities must balance. Thus, it will cut the
balance sheet if increasing bank loans while holding bank deposits and
investments constant.
4.4.2 Econometric Results: Traditional Non-frontier Approach
Comparing the values estimated under the stochastic frontier and traditional non-
frontier approaches, the results present a similar picture. However, the differences
appear when one looks into the degrees of economies of scale and scope for each
bank group. If the first four rows of Table 4.5(a) with 4.5(b) are compared, the
degree of economies of scale and scope is generally larger under the traditional
non-frontier approach than those estimated by the stochastic frontier approach.
For example, the degree of overall scale economies (SCALE) for all banks under
the stochastic frontier approach is 2.7% (=O.973-1), whereas the same estimate
under the traditional non-frontier approach is 6.7% (=10.933-lI). Hence, the
traditional non-frontier approach overestimates the degree of overall scale
economies for all banks by 4% (=6.7%-2.7%).
The degrees of diseconomies of scale and scope are usually smaller under the
traditional non-frontier approach than those estimated by the stochastic frontier
approach. For example, the degree of within-sample scope diseconomies
(WSCOPE) for all banks under the stochastic frontier approach is 81% (=1-0.81 -
01), while the same estimate under the traditional non-frontier approach is 68%
(=-0.68-Oj). Thus, the traditional non-frontier approach underestimates the degree
of within-sample scope diseconomies for all banks by 13% (=81%-68%). In short,
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the results suggest that using the traditional non-frontier model would confound
the degrees of scale and scope economies with X-inefficiencies. This result is
consistent with the finding in Berger and Humphrey (1991).
4.5 Conclusions
Employing both the stochastic frontier approach and expansion path measures,
this is the first empirical study estimating economies of scale and scope in China's
banking sector during the period 1985-2002. The traditional non-frontier approach
and the standard measures of scale and scope economies are also applied for
comparison and completeness. In addition, the economies of scale and scope of
banks with different ownership types and/or in different reform stages are
compared as well.
Before calculating the measures of scale and scope economies, two revised
functions with an ownership dummy and a reform dummy were estimated. The
results generally show that it is meaningful to estimate the differences of
economies of scale and scope between the banks with different ownership and the
banks in different reform stages, especially under the stochastic frontier approach.
Several conclusions emerge from this study. First, the results of the preferred
measures, the expansion path measures, indicate that, in general, there were
constant returns to scale and significant economies of scope in China's banking
sector during the last two decades independent of their ownership and reform
stages. This finding suggests that these major banks in China were at their optimal
levels of scale; increasing or decreasing their outputs along the expansion path
would not affect their cost efficiency. However, they could reduce their costs by
diversifying their products along the expansion path. This implies that allowing
these banks to conduct universal banking operations could enhance their cost
competitiveness.
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Second, the state-owned banks in the first reform stage faced decreasing returns to
scale and scope neutrality, but, in the second reform stage, they enjoyed constant
returns to scale and scope economies. As explained in Chapter 2, organisational
and product restructuring was one of the major reforms taken by the state-owned
banks in the second reform stage. Thus, this finding suggests that the restructuring
improved the cost structure of the state-owned banks.
Third, the results of the standard measures present a different picture. They
indicate that, on average, there were significant overall scale economies and scope
diseconomies in China's banking sector during the last two decades. State-owned
commercial banks exhibited diseconomies of scale and economies of scope,
whereas joint-stock commercial banks had economies of scale and diseconomies
of scope. The findings suggest that banks could reduce costs by increasing outputs
while holding the output mix unchanged. In addition, having specialised banks
would lower costs. Joint-stock commercial banks have greater potential to take
advantage of expansion in scale, while state-owned commercial banks can
increase their cost competitiveness by joint production.
Fourth, the results of standard measures also indicate that state-owned commercial
banks in the first reform stage faced decreasing returns to scale, but in the second
reform stage enjoyed increasing returns to scale. They enjoyed economies of
scope regardless of the reform stages. This suggests that the second stage of
banking reform optimised the cost structure of state-owned commercial banks,
which is consistent with the results of the expansion path measures. For joint-
stock commercial banks, the results indicate that there were significant economies
of scale and diseconomies of scope during the second reform stage, while both
figures are insignificant for the first reform stage. The findings suggest that there
were cost savings through expansion of joint-stock commercial banks in the
second reform stage.
Fifth, the difference between the results of the two types of measures might be
explained by the composite characteristic of the expansion path measures. In
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addition, it might imply that the standard measures are inadequate to determine
the level of economies of scale and scope for the Chinese banks.
Sixth, the results indicate that there are significant economies of scale specific to
investments and significant economies of scope specific to the off-balance-sheet
activities. These findings suggest that banks could save costs by proportionately
increasing investments while holding other outputs at their current levels. In
addition, jointly producing the off-balance-sheet activities with other products is a
good way to reduce costs.
Finally, there is evidence that using the traditional non-frontier model overlooking
X-inefficiencies would confound most of the measures of economies of scale and
scope. This suggests that the stochastic frontier approach is superior to the
traditional non-frontier approach.
However, Berger et al. (1987) indicates that cost functions only capture the cost-
or supply-side benefits to banks from joint production, as in the first two resources
of economies of scope, but ignore the revenue- or demand-side benefits, as in the
last two resources. Therefore, the total economies from joint production may be
understated in the empirical estimates here and in other studies.
142
Chapter 5. Competition in China's Banking Sector
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the relationship between market structure and profitability
within China's banking sector over the period 1985-2002. Emphasis has been
placed on investigating the influences of the gradual reform strategy on
competitive structure. In addition, the issue of whether the four state-owned banks
enjoy a "quiet life" or not is also tested. The next section reviews the relevant
theory of competition, and previous attempts to test the market structure-
profitability relationship in banking. Section 5.3 discusses the methodology and
the data used. The random effects panel data model, which incorporates measures
of concentration, market share, X-efficiency, and scale efficiency directly to the
regression, is employed to test both market-power and efficient-structure
hypotheses. Following Goldberg and Rai (1996), measures of both types of
efficiencies are obtained using the stochastic cost frontier, which assumes the X-
inefficiency factors are distributed half-normally. These estimates can be derived
from Chapters 3 and 4 directly. The classic pooled data regression model is also
estimated as a robust check. Section 5.4 presents the results of the tests. Section
5.5 summarizes and presents the implications of the results for China's banking
sector in its new regulatory environment.
5.2 Literature Review
5.2.1 Theory of Competition
In economic analysis, there are two broad concepts of competition: one
emphasises the conduct of sellers and buyers, while the other focuses on market
structure. Adam Smith's comments dealing with both features dominated the
strain of economic thought during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 74. On
For reviews of the development of economic thought on the nature of competition, see Stigler
(1957) and McNulty (1967, 1968).
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the conduct side, Smith considered the essence of competition to be an
independent striving for the patronage of the different sellers in a market. The
short-run structural prerequisites for competitive conduct were left indefinite. On
the structure side, the absence of barriers to resource transfers was considered as
the essence of competition. Given that the resources were usually fairly fixed in
the short run, Smith and his followers concluded that the full benefit of
competitive market processes might be realised only in the long run (Scherer and
Ross, 1990).
A different, essentially structural concept of competition emerged during the
nineteenth century. The pioneers were Jevons (1871), Marshall (1890, 1919),
Edgeworth (1881), Clark (1899), and Knight (1921), who contributed to the
development of the current model of perfect competition and monopoly75 . In this
modem economic theory, a market is said to be purely competitive if it has a large
number of finns selling a homogeneous commodity, and the market share of each
individual firm is so small that no individual firm finds itself able to influence
appreciably the commodity's price by changing the quantity of output it sells. To
make competition in economic theory not only "pure" but also "perfect", several
additional structural conditions are added: free entry and exit, perfect information,
and no transaction costs76 (Scherer and Ross, 1990).
Violations of the major structure preconditions for pure competition lead to a rich
variety of (seller's) market structure types. Table 5.1 presents six major types of
market structure, using the two-way classification based on the number of sellers
and the nature of the product. The difference between homogeneity and
differentiation in this classification implies the degree of substitutability among
competing sellers' products. In contrast to the pure competition concept, the
monopoly concept assumes a market with only one seller with complete control
over price.
' See Hay and Morris (1991) for a review.
76 When firms can enter a market and then exit easily, the market is said to be contestable even if
the conditions for pure competition are not met (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982).
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However, most markets are neither purely competitive nor monopolistic but fall
somewhere in between. Chamberlin (1933) made a very important theoretical
advance by developing new theories of monopolistic competition and oligopoly77.
The concept of monopolistic competition is characterised by a large number of
sellers (and buyers), easy entry, and a differentiated product. The oligopoly theory
assumes a market structure where a relatively small number of sellers control the
market.
Table 5.1 Major Types of Market Structure
Number of sellers
_____________________ One 	 A few	 Many
Homogeneous	 Pure	 Homogeneous	 Pure
Products	 monopoly	 oligopoly	 competition
Differentiated	 Pure	 multiproduct Differentiated	 Monopolistic
Products	 monopoly	 oligopoly	 competition
Source: Scherer and Ross (1990, p.17)
Under the theory of monopolistic competition, although a large number of sellers
may supply a single market, each firm's product has some unique characteristics,
which allow the firm some discretion over price and the ability to pursue a policy
at least somewhat different from their competitors. Under the oligopoly theory,
firms realise that their actions are interdependent because of the fewness of firms
in the market. The nature of competition under oligopoly ranges from active price
competition to implicit or explicit forms of collusion78 (Goddard, Molyneux, and
Wilson, 2001).
Pure monopolists, oligopolists, and monopolistic competitors share a common
feature, that is, under given demand conditions, each can increase the quantity of
In fact, Chamberlin's (1933) work on oligopoly was very brief, and 'ended up totally
indeterminate'. However, he did succeed in drawing attention to it. The recent studies stemmed
from the attempts by Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883) systematically analyze behaviour under
oligopoly (Hay and Morris, 1991). In Cournot's model, each firm makes decisions about its own
output assuming that the output levels of others will remain constant. In Bertrand's model, there is
a similar pattern of behaviour with respect to price (Goddard et al. 2001).
78 Implicit collusion includes models of dominant firm. Explicit collusion may take the form of
cartel agreement. In the most extreme case it might allow the firms to operate at the point of joint
profit maximization. That is, the firms collectively produce and set prices as would a single
monopolist, which enable the industry profit to be maximized. The maximized profit is then
divided among the participants (Goddard et al. 2001).
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output it sells only by reducing its price. Therefore, all three types of market
structure possess some degree of power over price, which is called monopoly
power or market power (Scherer and Ross, 1990).
Chamberlin's monopolistic competition and oligopoly models provided the basis
on which economists, in particular Mason (1939, 1949) and Bain (1951), could
generate empirically testable hypotheses about the market structure-performance
relationship that are at the heart of recent industrial economics. Basically, there
are two approaches to study this relationship: the structure-conduct-performance
(SCP) and the Chicago School approaches. In general, the SCP approach
originally was primarily empirical in its orientation, whereas the Chicago School
approach focused on the use of price theory (Waidman and Jensen, 2001).
The Structure- Conduct-Performance Paradigm
To describe the relationship between market structure and the performance of
firms, Mason (1939, 1949) and Bain (1951) developed a basic paradigm, which is
called the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, and was elaborated by
numerous scholars. The assumption of the SCP paradigm is that there is a direct
relationship between market structure, market conduct, and market performance.
For example, a perfectly competitive market structure leads to efficient economic
performance with price equal to marginal cost, inefficient firms driven from the
market, and long-run economic profits equal to zero. In contrast, a monopolistic
market structure results in poor economic performance with price exceeding
marginal cost, inefficient firms surviving in the long run, and economic profits
greater than zero.
The SCP paradigm extends the structure-conduct-performance relationship to
oligopoly and monopolistic competition. This paradigm is illustrated in Figure
5.1. The solid arrows show the primary relationships in this paradigm: market
structure determines conduct, and conduct determines performance. The dashed
arrows depict the feedback effects of performance on conduct and structure, and
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of conduct on structure as well. Also, government policies have a direct influence
on structure, conduct, and performance, which are shown by the dotted arrows.
Figure 5.1 The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
Market Structure
Concentration
Market share
Product differentiation
Barriers to entry and exit
Vertical integration
Diversification
Public Policy
Conduct
Pricing behaviour
Product strategy and advertising
Research and innovation
Plant investment
Mergers
Legal tactics
Taxes and subsidies
International trade rules
Regulation
Price controls
Antitrust
Information provision
Performance
Profitability
Efficiency
Product quality
Technical Progress
Source: modification of Waldman and Jensen (2001, p.7); Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson (2001,
p.35)
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In detail, the structure of the relevant market affects the conduct of the firms in the
market. Market structure is characterised by the degree of concentration, the
market share, the degree of differentiation of products, the presence or absence of
barriers to either the entry of new firms or the exit of old firms, etc. The conduct
of sellers and buyers determines performance in particular markets or industries.
Conduct is featured through pricing policies and practices, product strategy and
advertising strategies, research and development commitments, investment in
production facilities, legal tactics (e.g. in enforcing patent rights), etc. Relevant
performance measures embody at least the following goals: profitability,
efficiency, product quality, and technical progress (Waldman and Jensen, 2001;
Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson, 2001). Proponents of the SCP paradigm view
most existing markets as imperfect in terms of their competitive structure, which
needs some form of regulation to check the abuse of market power.
Under this approach, the finding of a positive relationship between firm
profitability and the market structure elements is attributed to two major market-
power (MP) hypotheses: the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and
the relative-market-power (RMP) hypotheses. The traditional SCP hypothesis
proposes that banks are able to extract monopolistic rents in more concentrated
markets by their ability to offer lower deposit rates and charge higher loan rates
due to competitive imperfections in these markets. The RMP hypothesis asserts
that only firms with large market shares and well-differentiated products are able
to exercise market power in pricing these products and earn supernormal profits
(Shepherd, 1982). The difference between SCP and RMP is that the latter need
not occur in concentrated markets. Generally, the MP hypotheses suggest that
antitrust or regulatory action may be productive.
The Chicago School Approach
The Chicago School of Economics refers to a school of industrial organization
economists who prefer to use price theory models to make predictions about
Smirlock (1985) regards it as the product differentiation hypothesis.
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expected conduct and performance and to design empirical tests of their
theories80 . In its most general form, price theory is characterised by three
elements. The first element is demand conditions. These conditions depend on
whether the product is homogeneous or heterogeneous, and the conjectural
variation that firms adopt81 . The latter will partly reflect the number and size of
firms in the market. The second element is cost conditions. These conditions are
usually portrayed by the average cost curve of the firm, which may be downward-
sloping, horizontal, or upward-sloping, but which can be drawn as U-shaped to
cover all possibilities. The third element is the assumption of profit maximisation
(Hay and Morris, 1991).
Generally, Chicago School economists, represented by academics including
Stigler (1968) and Demsetz (1973, 1974), argue that government interference
tends to lead to less competition rather than more. They questioned many of the
main empirical findings concluded by followers of the SCP approach in the 1960s
and 1970s. One of the key debates is about the rationale of the observed positive
relationship between concentration and profits in many empirical studies. Chicago
School economists argued that concentration is not a random event but rather the
results of the superior efficiency of the leading firms. Firms possessing a
comparative advantage in production become large and obtain a high market
share. Consequently, the market becomes more concentrated, and such efficient
firms earn Ricardian rents (Demsetz, 1973).
Theoretically, in competitive markets, the least efficient firm in the market
determines the price: the marginal cost of the last unit (highest cost) supplied
equals the price. Firms with lower costs earn Ricardian rents. These rents are
returns on their superior factors of production instead of economic profits. The
market value of these superior factors would include these capitalized rents, and a
decision to use them rather than sell them requires an imputation of their
opportunity cost (market value). The firm's economic profits become zero in
80 For details, see Stigler (1968), Posner (1979), and Reder (1982).
81 The conjectural variation captures the beliefs of one firm about how all the other firms respond
to an increase in its output (Hay and Morris, 1991).
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doing so. Therefore, the apparent economic profits of the firm arise from the
scarcity and superiority of the factor of production, not from anything done by the
firm.
An efficient firm may possess market power only if the scale of production at
which the cost advantage is sustained is large enough that the firm can act as a
price maker. In addition, monopoly profits could be capitalized from the absolute
cost advantage to the market value of the superior factor of production - thereby
eliminating it - which would disguise the fact that the source of the firm's market
power is its control of that factor (Church and Ware, 2000). Therefore, proponents
of the Chicago school approach are instinctively suspicious of any suggestion that
government intervention may be at all helpful in enabling markets to reach
competitive outcomes. They suggest that the best option for governments is to
stand back and allow market forces to run their course (Posner, 1979).
Following the Chicago school approach, two major efficient-structure (ES)
hypotheses have been generated: the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure
(ESX) hypothesis and the scale-efficiency version of the efficient-structure (ESS)
hypothesis. Under the ESX hypothesis, banks with superior management and
production technologies operate at lower costs and subsequently achieve higher
profits82. The X-efficient banks are also assumed to gain large market shares,
which may lead to higher levels of market concentration. Thus, the positive
relationship between market structure and profitability is "spurious" rather than of
"direct origin" under the ESX hypothesis, because X-efficiency drives both profits
and market structure (Demsetz, 1973, 1974; Peltzman, 1977).
Under the ESS hypothesis, banks are assumed to have similar management and
production technology but operate at different levels of economies of scale83.
Banks operating at optimal economies of scale will have lower costs and the
82 Banks with superior skill in minimizing the costs of producing any given output bundle may
achieve the greater X-efficiency.
Banks producing at output levels closer to the minimum average cost point may achieve the
greater scale efficiency.
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resulting higher profits may also lead to a larger market share and/or higher levels
of market concentration. Thus, the positive relationship between market structure
and profitability is also "spurious" (Lambson, 1987).
In short, the efficient-structure hypotheses suggest that the market-power
hypotheses might not be supported even if the significantly positive relationship
between market structure and profitability exists. Instead, they hypothesise that
both market concentration and/or large market share are the results of banks with
superior efficiency. Thus, the efficient-structure hypotheses have a different policy
implication - antitrust or regulatory actions are likely to be counterproductive.
5.2.2 Review of Empirical Work
The empirical literature on the relationship between market structure and bank
performance goes back at least to the 1960's. Basically, three methods have been
developed to test the market-power and the efficient-structure hypotheses. Table
5.2 briefly summarises the relative studies reviewed.
First Method
The first method is broadly characterized by testing the traditional SCP hypothesis
by only regressing a measure of bank performance on a measure of market
concentration. There is no attempt to review these studies one by one. Instead, the
review is based on an excellent survey paper by Gilbert (1984), which reviewed
44 previous studies, from 1964 to 1982, that used this method to test the SCP
hypothesis, and summarised the influence of a change in market concentration on
bank performance measures. The results showed that, among 126 regressions used
to test the SCP hypothesis, only 60 produced a positive relationship; the other 66
regressions were negative84.
See Gilbert (1984) for details.
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Second Method
Given that mixed results had been found in previous banking studies testing the
SCP hypothesis, and also the development of the efficient-structure (ES)
hypothesis, the innovation of the second method is to add one more independent
variable, market share, to estimate the structure-performance relationship. Most
studies in this category take market share as a proxy of efficiency. They argue that
the efficiency is reflected in high market share, since the most efficient firms have
lower costs and will consequently gain market share. Thus, the results of a
significantly positive coefficient on market share and an insignificant coefficient
on concentration support the ES hypothesis.
For example, taking market share as a proxy for efficiency, Smirlock (1985)
modelled bank profitability as a function of market share, concentration, an
interaction term between market share and concentration, and several control
variables for over 2,700 unit state banks in the US between 1973 and 1978. The
results show that market share is positively related to profitability and that, once
this is controlled for, there is no relationship between concentration and
profitability. They argue that the finding supports the ES hypothesis.
Following Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988) employed a similar
method (excluding the interaction term) to test more than 6,300 unit banks located
in 30 states of the US in 1984. They argue that the results provide categorical
support for the ES hypothesis, and limited support for the traditional SCP
hypothesis. However, Lloyd-Williams and Molyneux (1994) and Molyneux and
Forbes (1995) used the same method to investigate the relationship in Spanish
banking and European banking, respectively. Employing the pooled and annual
data for the period 1986-1988 and 1986-1989, separately, both papers found
evidence in favour of the traditional SCP paradigm.
Shepherd (1986) suggested these conclusions could be problematic since larger
market shares might also reflect higher market power. In fact, firms may obtain
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market power from at least three elements of their market positions. One is the
firm's own market share, which embodies direct control over market transactions.
The second is concentration, because oligopoly collusion can give a diluted
degree of market control. Thus, concentration should consistently show a weaker
association with profitability than should market share. The third is entry barriers,
which also convey a degree of market power and improved profitability.
Whatever the origins of market dominance may be, once these elements exist,
they can raise prices and profits.
Thus, the market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses cannot be distinguished
by only adding market share as an independent variable. The model used by
Smirlock (1985) and its followers only indicates whether market share is more
important than concentration. The coefficient on market share is much more
significant than that on concentration, which means that it is the firm's own
market position that matters the most, rather than the firm being in a concentrated
market. These results, it is argued, provide a "spurious" support for the ES
hypothesis85.
Third Method
To take the effects of efficiency directly into account, more recent studies have
regressed the profitability on concentration, market share, X-efficiency, and scale-
efficiency variables to distinguish among these four major theories. For example,
Berger (1995) developed a series of tests to incorporate the direct measures of
both market structure and efficiency into the model. Four hypotheses were
specified, including the SCP, RMP, ESX, and ESS hypotheses. They were
represented by different variables, so that any or all of them may be found to be
consistent with the data. To measure both X-efficiency and scale efficiency, the
85 The support was "spurious" because they used a spurious proxy for efficiency, i.e., market
share. It is worth noting that this result cannot be said to support the RMP hypothesis, since RMP
could be supported only when both concentration and efficiency are properly controlled for. These
studies did not control for efficiency, so that market share may capture both market power and
efficiency effects.
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distribution-free method was employed 86 . Concentration and market share were
also regressed against the efficiency variables to test the necessary condition of
the ES hypotheses that efficiency affects market structure.
The tests were applied to thirty separate US banking datasets with between 1,300
and 2,000 observations each, covering a decade (the 1980s) and three different
competitive environments, unit banking, limited branching, and state-wide
branching states. The use of so many separate samples allows for a relatively
comprehensive treatment of the industry and for evaluation of the stability of the
results. The main results of Berger (1995) give limited support for two of the four
hypotheses: ESX and RMP. The data do not support the ESS and SCP hypotheses.
Despite this limited support for two of the hypotheses, none of the hypotheses
appear to explain bank profits. The efficiency and market power variables, with
low R2 value, explain relatively little of the variance of profitability, and the
coefficients of the profitability equations suggest that very large increases in
efficiency and market share would be needed to raise expected profits
significantly87.
Applying a similar method, Goldberg and Rai (1996) tested the four hypotheses
for banks across 11 European countries over the period 1988-199 1. Unlike Berger
(1995), who used deviations from the average cost frontier to represent measures
of inefficiency (under the distribution-free approach), this paper applied a
stochastic cost frontier to derive measures of X-inefficiency and scale
inefficiency. In addition to testing the necessary condition of the efficient-
structure hypotheses (like Berger, 1995), the efficiency variables were also
regressed against concentration and market share to test the 'necessary condition'
of the market-power hypotheses88, that is, larger market shares or concentrations
86 For details of the distribution-free method, please see Chapter 3.
Berger (1995) indicated that if a bank were simultaneously to increase its market share, X-
efficiency, and scale-efficiency by 10 percentage points, respectively, only about a 14 percent
(ROA) to 19 percent (ROE) increase in expected profitability.
88 In fact, Goldberg and Rai (1996) indicated that the regressions were used to test Hicks' (1935)
'quiet life' hypothesis (p.75l, 765). However, they treated them as the necessary condition of the
MP hypothesis in explaining the empirical results, and did not comment on the 'quiet life'
hypothesis (p.765).
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should result in greater X- and scale inefficiencies. Goldberg and Rai (1996) find
the results support the RMP hypothesis for all banks and the ESX hypothesis for
banks located in countries with a low concentration of banks. When both
'necessary conditions' are complied with, the results only support the ESX
hypothesis.
However, the 'necessary condition' for the market-power hypotheses developed in
this paper was inappropriate. The structural model in Berger (1995, p.408) shows
that there is no such requirement that larger market shares or concentrations
should lead to greater X- and scale inefficiencies under the market-power
hypotheses. Berger and Hannan (1997, p.1 1) indicate explicitly that this condition
is not a necessary part of the market-power paradigm: it is only offered as an
adjunct or supplement to this paradigm (p.22). Accordingly, the results of
Goldberg and Rai (1996) also support the RMP hypothesis when all banks are
considered.
Berger and Hannan (1997) computed direct measures of bank efficiency to
distinguish among alternative explanations of the structure-performance
relationship in US banking in 1985. As in Berger (1995), the major four
hypotheses were specified, and the necessary condition of the efficient-structure
hypotheses was also tested. In addition to the profit data, survey price data on
bank deposits and loan rates were also used to investigate the structure-price
relationship 89 . The results show more support for the SCP hypothesis than for the
RMP and efficient-structure hypotheses, although the results are not fully
consistent with any of these theories90.
Furthermore, Berger and Hannan (1997) tested the 'quiet life' (QL) hypothesis.
As Hicks (1935) observed, "The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life (Hicks,
89 Berger and Hannan (1997) argue that the common dependent variable, profitability, contains a
significant amount of noise that is not related to the variables of interest. Some of this noise comes
from the difficulties in using accounting data, and some from a number of other factors (e.g., loan
loss provisions), which are largely unrelated to either market power or cost efficiency.
90 The SCP hypothesis is only supported by the price data, but not the profit data. Also, since the
concentration variable has significant influence on the efficiency variable, which might cause a
multicollinearity problem, the above result could be biased.
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1935, p.8)". The hypothesis proposes that firms with greater market power may
take part of the gains from non-competitive pricing not as profits, but as a more
relaxed environment in which less effort is put into the rigours of maximising cost
efficiency. That is, banks with greater market power are inefficient because a
relaxed environment enables slack management.
Based on Berger and Hannan (1998) and Rhoades and Rutz (1982), the 'quiet life'
effects might include two aspects: one is X-inefficiencies caused by the absence
of incentive to put full effort into choosing the optimal scale and/or mix of inputs
to produce any given output bundle, for example, the expansion of staff or other
physical inputs beyond levels justified by cost minimization, extra expenses in
obtaining and maintaining market power, etc. The other is scale-inefficiencies
caused by not putting full effort into operating at the optimal scale level. For
example, only choosing "safer" portfolios to trade off some of their monopoly
profit for a reduction in risk. The results of Berger and Hannan (1997) provide
support for Hicks' quiet-life hypothesis, which implies that banks with market
power adhere less rigorously to X-efficiency maximization.
Maudos (1998) estimated the relationship between market structure and
performance within the Spanish banking sector. There were 353 observations over
the period 1990-93. Three different stochastic measures of X-efficiency were
used, whereas the measure of scale efficiency was not included. The necessary
condition of the ES hypotheses was tested. The results support both the ESX and
RMP hypotheses.
Using a similar approach to Berger (1995), Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson
(2001) investigated the structure-performance relationship of banks from 15
European countries covering the period 1989-1996. A Fourier-flexible stochastic
cost frontier was used to obtain the estimates of bank-specific efficiency and scale
economies. The results support the SCP, ESX, and ESS hypotheses. However, the
explanatory power of the model is weak, as adjusted R 2 equals 0.05. Thus, they
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agree with Berger's (1995) concerns about the capability of such models to
explain variations in bank profitability.
Mendes and Rebelo (2003) studied the structure-performance relationship in the
Portuguese banking industry during the nineties. The hypotheses of SCP, RMP,
and ESX were tested using a direct measure of X-efficiency (both cost and profit
efficiency). The results support both the SCP and the ESX hypotheses in the first
half of the nineties. However, after 1994, there is more evidence to support the
RMP and ESX hypotheses. The deregulation process has apparently helped to
increase the degree of competition within the Portuguese banking industry, and
banks with superior efficiency exhibit better performance, although there remains
some market power via product differentiation.91.
5.3 Methodology and Data
5.3.1 Methodology
According to Berger (1995) and Goldberg and Rai (1996), the following equation
is used to test which of the four hypotheses is valid:
= a0 + /31 CONC, + 132 MS,, + 133 XEFF 1 + /34SEFF11	
5
+f35AIP,+/36OWN1+f37rr1+e, 	 (
where
F = a measure of profitability, such as return on equity (ROE) or return on
assets (ROA), of bank i at time t;
CONC1 = a measure of market concentration, such as four-bank concentration
ratio (CR4) or Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HERE), of concentration at
time t;
MS 1 = market share (in terms of deposits) of bank i at time t;
XEFF, 1 = a measure of X-efficiency, reflecting the ability of banks to produce
a given bundle of output at minimum cost through superior management
and/or technology;
SEFFJ1 = a measure of scale-efficiency, reflecting the ability of banks to
produce at optimal output levels (economies of scale), given similar
91 However, the conclusion of supporting the ESX hypothesis is suspicious, since its necessary
condition is not tested.
158
production and management technology;
All', = average income per person at time t;
OWN1 = dummy variable for different ownership, equal to 0 if it is state-
owned, 1 for joint stock;
77', = time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 for years 1985 to 2002,
respectively.
e1 , = an error variable for each bank i at time t.
Under the efficient-structure hypotheses, causation is assumed to run from
efficiency to profits, and to market structure. Therefore, the expected signs of the
coefficients on XEFF and SEFF in the estimation of Equation (5.1) are as follows:
fl >- 0,/34 >— 0. More efficient banks should have higher profits, so the signs of
the coefficients on XEFF and SEFF should be significantly positive. Under the
market-power hypotheses, the appropriate market structure variable, CONG or MS
should have a significantly positive coefficient, that is, fl should be positive if
the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis holds, and /32 should be positive if
the relative-market-power hypothesis holds.
As indicated by Berger (1995), CONG and MS, although endogenous under the
ES hypotheses, may be included as irrelevant independent variables, since they
are correlated with profitability only because they reflect the influences of XEFF
and/or SEFF and the control variables, which are controlled for in Eq. (5.1)92.
Moreover, theoretically, such endogeneity only exists under free entry with fixed
costs. However, no free entry condition has existed in China's banking sector
during the last two decades (Xie and Jiao, 2002). Hence, such formal entry
barriers could help to overcome some of the problems in this study.
To explain the relationship between profitability and market structure spuriously,
not only profits but also the market structure variables must be positively related
to efficiency. Thus, a necessary condition for the efficient-structure hypotheses to
92 The prerequisite of this argument is that the model is block-recursive — that other factors
affecting market structure do not affect profitability. That is, the error terms in the recursive
structural model are mutually uncorrelated (Berger, 1995; Berger and Hannan, 1997).
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hold is that efficiency has positive effects on market structure. To ensure that the
necessary conditions hold, the following two equations are also tested:
CONC za+/31 XEFF, +J32SEFF, +fl3 MF +/34 0 WN1 +fl517 +e 1 (5.2)
MS 1 , =a+J31XEFF, +f32SEFF, +fl3 AiF ^/34 0WN1 +fl5Tr +e1 ,	 (5.3)
The expected signs of the coefficients on XEFF and SEFF should be significantly
positive in Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3). Therefore, the efficient-market hypotheses are
strictly valid if they can establish that more efficient banks are more profitable,
and more efficient banks have larger market shares and/or lead to a higher level of
market concentration.
As suggested by Berger and Hannan (1997), Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5) are used to test
Hicks' (1935) 'quiet-life' hypothesis. In addition, failure to account for the
possibility of 'reverse causation' may result in biased coefficients in testing the
necessary condition of the ES hypotheses, as in equations (5.2) and (5.3).
XEFF11 = a + /31 C0NC1 + /32MS 1 + ,83 A1P1 + /34 0WN1 + /35Tr1 +	 (5.4)
SEFFI = a + /J1 CONC, + /32 MS 1 + J33 M1 + 134 0 WN + fl517 +	 (5.5)
Under the 'quiet-life' hypothesis, the expected signs of the coefficients on CONC
and/or MS should be significantly negative in equations (5.4) and (5.5). It means
that banks with greater market power are less efficient due to a relaxed
environment which enabling slack management.
Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3) are quite different from Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5), since they have
the reversed causal ordering between efficiency and market structure. This
suggests that simultaneous equations biases would result from OLS estimation if
both sets of relations were true (Berger and Hannan, 1997).
All the equations are first estimated using the random effects panel data approach.
As indicated by Greene (2000), the fundamental advantage of a panel data set
over a cross section and/or a time-series is that it will allow the researcher far
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greater flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across individuals and/or
time periods.
The random effects model is preferred over the fixed effects model because the
fixed effects estimator requires within group variation in all variables for at least
some groups. However, the Chinese banking data have some time invariant
regressors, such as the ownership dummy. Thus, the fixed effects estimator cannot
be computed. Moreover, a fixed effects model would lead to a substantial loss of
degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 1995). The pooled OLS estimators are computed
later for comparison.
5.3.2 Data
Most of the data used in this study came from various editions of the Almanac of
China's Finance and Banking, which contains annual information on the balance
sheet and income statements of all banks operating in China. The number of
employees, the average wages of employees, and the average income per person
are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook (2003). Data are collected on the
four state-owned commercial banks and the ten joint-stock commercial banks. The
full sample covers the period from 1985 through 2002 with 187 observations. In
addition, the data are split to obtain the first stage reform sub-sample (1985-1992),
and the second stage reform sub-sample (1993-2002). A complete description of
the variables not explained in earlier chapters is provided below.
Two popular measures of profitability, ROA and ROE, are employed here. ROA is
defined as the ratio of pre-tax net income to total assets, and ROE is defined as the
ratio of pre-tax net income to total equity93 . In addition, two common measures of
concentration, the four-bank concentration ratio, CR4, and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HERF), are used.
Pre-tax net income is used to calculate ROA and ROE instead of after-tax net income because of
missing corporate tax figures. Total equity (net worth) of the four state-owned banks refers to the
paid-in capital, which corresponds closely to Tier 1 capital in the Basel Accord, plus retained
profits and other surpluses to paid-in capital. Thus, it is roughly comparable to the sum of Tier 1
and Tier 2 capital (Lardy, 1999).
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CR4 is defined as the ratio of the total deposits of the four largest banks to the
total deposits of all the banks in a given year. CR4 should be close to 0 for a
perfectly competitive market and 100 for a monopoly. However, CR4 also has
some limitations. First, it is not affected by changes in the market share outside of
the four largest banks, and therefore does not ensure consistent rankings of the
degree of competition within an industry. Second, it takes no direct account of the
number of firms in the industry. Two industries could both have ten-firm ratios of
60 per cent, but one could have 30 smaller firms and the other 300 smaller firms,
and they would not be distinguished. If industry performance is determined
mainly by the ten largest firms, this may not matter, but if the number of firms
included in the ratio does not correspond with the number that determines industry
performance, this would be a problem (Hay and Morris, 1991).
HERF is defined as the sum of squared market shares of deposits of the sample of
banks in a given year. HERF is slightly greater than 0 for a perfectly competitive
market and 100 for a monopoly94 . HERF takes into account both the number of
banks and the inequality of market shares. Generally, the more banks there are in
a market, the lower is the value of HERF, ceteris paribus. Moreover, HERF
increases as the market shares of a given number of banks become less equal
(Waidman and Jensen, 2001). However, HERF has been found to have one
drawback: because the HERF may be written as H = no- 2 +1/n where a 2 is the
variance of firms' market shares and n is the number of firms. It thus embodies a
particular weighting between the inequality of the firms' market shares and the
number of firms (Hay and Morris, 1991, p.250). Since any measure of
concentration is arbitrary to some extent, the two variables are included separately
in the regressions. In addition, the national market is used because there is no
local market share. Market share is defined as the ratio of an individual bank's
total deposits to the total deposits of all banks in a given year.
Some antitrust practitioners prefer to move the decimal point two places to the right, using
percentages of the market instead. Thus, HERF then equals 10,000 for a monopoly under this
practice (Waidman and Jensen, 2001).
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X-efficiency provides a measure of how effectively banks are employing their
inputs to produce a given bundle of outputs. The estimates for X-inefficiency
(XINEFF) are obtained directly from Chapter 3. Following Goldberg and Rai
(1996), this empirical test substitutes XINEFF for the X-efficiency variables
(XEFF), defined in Eqs. (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4). The estimate of XINEFF
represents an inefficiency measure for each bank in the sample. Accordingly, the
coefficients on XINEFF in the series of equations will have the opposite sign to
XEFF specified in the same sets of equations.
Scale efficiency indicates whether banks with similar management and production
technology are operating at optimal economies of scale. Overall scale economies
(SCALE) are said to exist if an equi-proportionate increase in all outputs leads to a
less than equi-proportionate increase in cost. The estimates of SCALE are obtained
directly from Chapter 495• Given that both SCALE> 1 and SCALE < 1 imply scale
inefficiencies 96, following Goldberg and Rai (1996), the method to estimate scale
inefficiency is described below:
SINEFF = SCALE —1 if SCALE> 1
SINEFF =1— SCALE if SCALE <1
A bank is at the scale efficiency point if its SCALE = 1, thus SINEFF = 0. As in
the case of XINEFF, the sign of the coefficient will be opposite to that estimated
in Eqs. (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), and (5.5). For example, the predicted relationship
between ROA (ROE) and SINEFF is negative, i.e., the further a bank is from
efficient scale, the lower the profitability.
Average income per person (AlP) is included to control for factors affecting the
supply of funds to banks. Its coefficient may have either sign in a non-competitive
market, because it may reflect either a greater or lesser elasticity of deposit
As mentioned in Chapter 4, overall scale economies requires an unrealistic assumption - does
not allow for a change in output mix. Hence, the results of this chapter should be interpreted with
regards to this possible biasedness.
96 SCALE> 1 means that banks are operating below optimal scale levels and have the ability to
lower costs by increasing output further. SCALE < 1 means that banks are operating over optimal
scale levels and are required to downsize in order to achieve optimal input combinations.
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supply. An ownership dummy variable (OWN) is included to capture the possible
difference in profitability between the state-owned banks and the joint-stock
banks. The time trend variable (TI) is included to investigate the possible
influences of the gradual reform strategy on bank ROA and ROE97. Table 5.3
presents summary data for all the variables used in the analysis.
Table 5.3 Variables Used to Estimate the Structure-Performance Relationship
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1986-2003); China Statistical Yearbook
(2003).
Notes: 1. All the figures are based on the mean value of the relative sample period. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. 2. All the original data are deflated by the CPI, with 1985 as the base
year.
5.4 Empirical Results
The empirical analysis focuses on estimating 5 equations, (5.1) to (5.5). The
results estimated by the random effects panel data approach are shown first. Table
5.4 presents the results of Eq. (5.1) using ROA and ROE as the dependent
variables, and CR4 as the measure of concentration. Table 5.5 reports the results
of the same estimation except the concentration measure is changed to HERF.
Table 5.6 presents the results of estimating Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3) employing CONC
and MS as the dependent variables, respectively. Table 5.7 provides the results of
estimating Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5) using CR4 as the measure of concentration, while
Table 5.8 gives the results of estimating the same equations but using HERF as
the measure of concentration.
The time trend variable could also pick up trends in omitted variables.
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Before analysing the empirical results, Chow's Breakpoint Test is undertaken to
test for data poolability. The result shows that there was a structural change in
1993 (test statistics is 3.069, and p value is 0.003). Therefore, the empirical
analysis focuses on the two sub-samples.
Table 5.4 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the CR4, MS, XINEFF,
SINEFF, and other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA	 Dependent variable = ROE
___________ All 	 1 Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 Vt Stage	 2id Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.099	 -0.075	 0.085	 1.809	 0.08 1	 1.634
[0.024]	 [0.063]	 [0.043]
	
[0.362]	 [0.837]
	
[0.655]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.234)	 (0.045)	 (0.000)	 (0.923)	 (0.013)
CR4	 -0.086	 0.051	 -0.065	 -1.760	 -0.311	 -1.522
[0.024]	 [0.050]	 [0.039]
	
[0.354]
	
[0.664]
	
[0.590]
_________ (0.000)
	 (0.3 13)	 (0.092)	 (0.000)	 (0.640)	 (0.010)
MS	 0.036	 0.049	 -0.014	 0.825	 0.620	 0.157
[0.011]	 [0.019]
	
[0.016]
	
[0.178]	 [0.192]	 [0.285]
__________ (0.002)
	 (0.0 10)	 (0.390)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.582)
XINEFF	 -0.027	 -0.019	 -0.029	 -0.241	 -0.024	 -0.326
[0.009]
	
[0.020]
	
[0.010]
	
[0.134]	 [0.256]
	
[0.156]
___________ (0.003)
	 (0.336)	 (0.004)	 (0.073)	 (0.924)	 (0.036)
SINEFF	 0.0 18	 0.031	 -0.003	 0.245	 0.092	 0.0963
[0.012]	 [0.015]
	
[0.022]	 [0.184]
	
[0.185]
	
[0.345]
___________ (0.145)	 (0.031)	 (0.878)	 (0.182)	 (0.617)	 (0.788)
AlP	 -0.028	 0.040	 -0.017	 -0.285	 0.401	 -0.180
[0.006]	 [0.032]
	
[0.017]
	
[0.093]
	
[0.421]	 [0.259]
__________ (0.000)
	
(0.212)	 (0.324)	 (0.002)	 (0.341)	 (0.486)
OWN	 0.016	 0.020	 0.006	 0.283	 0.164	 0.175
[0.003]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.004]	 [0.048]	 [0.055]	 [0.070]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.106)	 (0.000)	 (0.003)	 (0.012)
TT	 0.0001	 -0.0002	 -0.001	 -0.004	 -0.003	 -0.011
[0.0004]	 [0.0004]	 [0.00 1]
	
[0.006]	 [0.006]	 [0.0 17]
___________ (0.860) 	 (0.620)	 (0.574)	 (0.470)	 (0.535)	 (0.529)
LM-	 28.99	 33.24	 20.29	 26.83	 4.86	 43.15
statistic	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.028)	 (0.000)
kT_.__	 1	 *11	 11 L__1__	 L_	 .._.t. iSt	 L -------	 &L_ t_.....	 .t L_1__
S 1JWO. S. £ LII - all IJUIJI%O In LW.? OUIII[JI # S .flU5' - L/annItnIL.L4 ILL LIII.? LIIOLOLUbJLLJUflIt1fle
reform (1985-1992); 2d stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration
ratio, MS = market share, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average
income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned,
I for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002,
respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. To provide
correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown
form, White (1980) derived a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-
values are in parentheses. 4. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type. 5. LM
(Lagrange multiplier test) is devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the random
effects model based on the OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-
squared with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model
with a single constant term is appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is
appropriate.
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Table 5.5 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the HERF, MS, XINEFF,
SINEFF, and other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE _________
___________ All
	
JSI Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 ]S1 Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.054	 -0.027	 0.075	 0.871	 -0.146	 1.386
[0.011]	 [0.026]
	
[0.025]
	
[0.168]
	
[0.339]	 [0.376]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.297)	 (0.003)	 (0.000)	 (0.667)	 (0.000)
HERF	 -0.140	 0.03 1	 -0.204	 -2.874	 -0.338	 -4.781
[0.037]	 [0.049]	 [0.079]	 [0.541]	 [0.648]
	
[1.183]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.529)	 (0.010)	 (0.000)	 (0.602)	 (0.000)
MS	 0.036	 0.049	 -0.014	 0.833	 0.621	 0.179
[0.011]	 [0.019]	 [0.016]
	
[0.177]	 [0.1921	 [0.279]
__________ (0.002)
	 (0.010)	 (0.394)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.522)
XINEFF	 -0.029	 -0.018	 -0.029	 -0.282	 -0.039	 -0.337
[0.009]	 [0.020]
	
[0.010]	 [0.133]
	
[0.258]
	
[0.150]
___________ (0.001)	 (0.378)	 (0.003)	 (0.035)	 (0.880)	 (0.025)
SINEFF	 0.018	 0.031	 -0.003	 0.236	 -0.094	 0.112
[0.012]	 [0.015]
	
[0.022]	 [0.182]
	
[0.185]
	
[0.333]
__________ (0.153)	 (0.034)	 (0.900)	 (0.194)	 (0.611)	 (0.737)
AlP	 -0.023	 0.026	 -0.018	 -0.168	 0.438	 -0.219
[0.006]
	
[0.026]
	
[0.015]
	
[0.094]	 [0.348]
	
[0.229]
___________ (0.000)	 (0.333)	 (0.23 1)	 (0.074)	 (0.208)	 (0.338)
OWN	 0.016	 0.020	 0.006	 0.284	 0.164	 0.178
[0.003]
	
[0.006]	 [0.004]
	
[0.047]
	
[0.055]
	
[0.069]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.105)	 (0.000)	 (0.003)	 (0.010)
IT	 -0.0003	 -0.0001	 -0.001	 -0.013	 -0.004	 -0.018
[0.0005]
	
[0.0004]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.015]
___________ (0.446)
	 (0.732)	 (0.364)	 (0.058)	 (0.475)	 (0.247)
LM-	 29.53	 32.62	 21.93	 27.28	 4.82	 49.51
statistic	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.028)	 (0.000)
XT___ 1	 All	 .11 k_1_..	 .L ----- - l_	 iSt	 L__l__ ___._i	 L_	 _..
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reform (1985-1992); 2nd stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, FIERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, MS = market share, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average
income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned,
1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002,
respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. To provide
correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown
form, White (1980) derived a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-
values are in parentheses. 4. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type. 5. LM
(Lagrange multiplier test) is devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the random
effects model based on the OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-
squared with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model
with a single constant term is appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is
appropriate.
166
4-
C
C
'4
-C
	
,—'	 —.'	 C
'CC 00rc(r)	 \'OCC
cn C 00 m 'C -4 00 Lt 'C 'zt m - N C — C — If CQ Q C C C 00 C N t C C C N N q
—
C#	 C C — — N 'C C "1- C — 00 C C C C\ - C "
r T 0 T 0 I
'0 C O If) — 'C C N © C '-4 N (4) QN 'C c N 'C cn ' c N ri N C C C C C ('1
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___O\ C O\ C C — — Q C C — — — In c
' C C m C — C N C\ 00 C C C C C N CC C C C N C C C\ © C C C C 00 © C C C C
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ — CL
-4	 CC
	
—'	 . -' —	 ' __s	
—'00 C C C N N 00 '1- 'C C C m tn — N 00 C4.N C ' In N C N C tn C C C N C C n cn CC C C C 't C C 00 C C C C C\ C C '1 C
2	 9 2B
C,)
C)
'f C N N cn N 'C N ' '-4 N C \ '— C NC C C — N ' N C\ -1 C C C N C C InN C C C C 'C C ' C C C C 'C © C C C .
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
C)
,	 .	 1	 r.	 .. r	 ., r	 ,—, .	 ..	 CCC C C cn — 'r 00 'C C C ' cfl 'C N C C -
- N C N .- N C 'I N tn m C C C o C CCC "C cn CC CCC C COCC
U)
-4
	
r	 ,- ,	 r r	 . r ('1 r, r	 ,,U	 N C - C\ It) N N O 00 '-t C C Cfl "	 .4 It)	 If)
'C N C — "1- N C N 00 00 In C C C C C 00 rn CC
f) ' C C C C 00 C C N 'l C C C C O\ C C 'zt C ,)
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
C,)
CC
CC
C)
—
'C C 'C c') 'CCV - Cfl C\ 00 4 cfl N -1 C N —
C)	 C C N N '' cn N C — In C C N © C C c'NqQQN. CrnCC00CC'CCC C
-	 d E2 EE-9 2B9 2B EB
r.. t;Z
I ..L C -	 —><	 F-	 ,Dii	 cCI- C)
-CC).-.
-	 C) U)	 C.)
C)	 CC	 Cd)
CCC/)
0	 -ci-
Cd) CC C Cd)	 C) '=
-	
-' C) v , .
	 ;
= -ci C)
C	 .CC E
	
C)
CC
II	
-
C.?')	 CC	 E
CC
)<	 U)__c&) C)
C C
CC 00 C) E-li-	 •'•CC Q— C0_	 >- 	 I-Cd) -	 cC - -'.CC'ci
C) CC
—
 C) CC
4	 Cd)
CC
CC	 CC
.; '
L
.
CC
II	
CC
Cd)	 I4
c.'1
Lii	
CC 4-
9 CC o4 C0	
CC
II	 .
U)0N	 Cd) CCC)C O	 CC
C)	 C) .	 C
o	
IP) 0 ,j'
	
C,)
00 CC	 0 Cd)
C) O\	 C)
OCC U)4-OU)C)
L)
.	
E
II CLLC	 Cd) C)
CC	 C)CC'
,j. 4- Cd) 0 •- CC
II	 Q	 -
0 CC I
C 0 . ; c .
C)	 C)Cd)
CCQC,)C)
II .	 CC	 - •- C
0 •' C) CC
C) o -
C)0
cC CC
C CC CC 0 4- - C)
C0
CC CC.,.. 0 r
.	 .
—	
.	 CC0
)< CC C) "
CC	 I4, Cd)
I4	 -	 C
	
-'U 0CC	
C)
C)
CCC.)	 . OC)
Oci
N
'C
-4
Table 5.7 Regression results of XINEFF and SINEFF on the CR4, MS, and
other control variables
Dependent variable = XJNEFF	 Dependent variable = SINEFF
___________ All	 l Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 Ft Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.043	 0.265	 -0.105	 -0.205	 0.291	 -0.103
[0.199]
	
[0.503]
	
[0.396]	 [0.145]
	
[0.670]	 [0.181]
__________ (0.828)
	 (0.598)	 (0.792)	 (0.158)	 (0.664)	 (0.570)
CR4	 0.043	 -0.070	 0.369	 0.144	 -0.153	 0.034
[0.195]
	
[0.400]
	
[0.356]	 [0.142]	 [0.533]
	
[0.163]
__________ (0.826)
	 (0.860)	 (0.301)	 (0.3 10)	 (0.774)	 (0.835)
MS	 0.045	 0.024	 -0.120	 0.130	 0.085	 0.041
[0.090]	 [0.044]	 [0.163]
	
[0.088]	 [0.145]	 [0.068]
__________ (0.616)
	 (0.591)	 (0.463)	 (0.143)	 (0.557)	 (0.548)
AlP	 -0.048	 -0.228	 -0.143	 0.279	 -0.081	 0.119
[0.042]
	
[0.252]	 [0.153]	 [0.03 1]	 [0.336]
	
[0.070]
___________ (0.257)	 (0.365)	 (0.352)	 (0.000)	 (0.808)	 (0.090)
OWN	 -0.014	 0.004	 -0.056	 0.052	 -0.005	 0.052
[0.023]
	
[0.013]
	
[0.028]
	
[0.018]	 [0.042]	 [0.016]
___________ (0.540)
	 (0.787)	 (0.043)	 (0.005)	 (0.895)	 (0.001)
TI'	 0.005	 0.000 1	 0.0 13	 -0.014	 -0.009	 -0.003
[0.003]
	
[0.003]	 [0.010]	 [0.002]	 [0.004]	 [0.005]
__________ (0.087)
	
(0.971)	 (0.195)	 (0.000)	 (0.025)	 (0.540)
LM-	 14.69	 0.24	 30.38	 44.06	 55.35	 9.00
statistic	 (0.000)	 (0.627)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.003)
kT.	 I	 All	 _ll k_l_	 .L_	 ..._l_ 1SL	 L__l	 L_ £L__	 __ _r L__l_fl_
A 1.JLi.#. i. flu - Un IJUIIflO ILL I_LL•_# •SUlll1JI#,	 flU'_# - LJULLflO #flLL3L#L ALL LII'..! Lii L OLU5'..# UI lJULLft1hL
reform (1985-1992); 2' stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
INT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration ratio, MS = market share, XINEFF = X-
inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an
ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time
trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the
coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980)
derived a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses.
4. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is
devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the random effects model based on the
OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model with a single constant term is
appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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Table 5.8 Regression results of XINEFF and SINEFF on the HERF, MS, and
other control variables
Dependent variable = XINEFF
	 Dependent variable = SINEFF
___________ All 	 Jst Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.136	 0.308	 0.188	 -0.111	 0.125	 -0.086
[0.092]
	
[0.197]	 [0.236]
	
[0.067]
	
[0.265]
	
[0.107]
__________ (0.136)
	 (0.118)	 (0.424)	 (0.099)	 (0.637)	 (0.423)
HERF	 -0.173	 -0.277	 0.364	 0.179	 -0.05 1	 0.068
[0.300]
	
[0.385]
	
[0.747]
	
[0.220]	 [0.5 17]
	
[0.341]
__________ (0.564) 	 (0.472)	 (0.626)	 (0.416)	 (0.921)	 (0.843)
MS	 -0.049	 0.024	 -0.119	 0.130	 0.085	 0.041
[0.091]	 [0.044]	 [0.163]
	
[0.087]
	
[0.145]
	
[0.068]
__________ (0.590)
	 (0.589)	 (0.466)	 (0.141)	 (0.560)	 (0.548)
AlP	 -0.041	 -0.287	 -0.206	 0.271	 -0.024	 0.116
[0.044]
	
[0.205]	 [0.140]
	
[0.032]	 [0.275]
	
[0.064]
__________ (0.360) 	 (0.162)	 (0.141)	 (0.000)	 (0.929)	 (0.068)
OWN	 -0.014	 0.004	 -0.056	 0.052	 -0.006	 0.050
[0.023]	 [0.013]
	
[0.028]
	
[0.018]
	
[0.042]
	
[0.016]
___________ (0.559)
	
(0.783)	 (0.043)	 (0.005)	 (0.894)	 (0.001)
TI'	 0.003	 -0.0002	 0.017	 -0.01	 -0.010	 -0.003
[0.004]	 [0.0031
	
[0.009]
	
[0.003]
	
[0.004]	 [0.004]
__________ (0.364)	 (0.956)	 (0.07 1)	 (0.000)	 (0.023)	 (0.543)
LM-	 15.19	 0.21	 30.05	 43.87	 55.24	 8.98
statistic	 (0.000)	 (0.646)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.003)
1	 All - .11 L....l.... :.... .1.-.	 iSt	 l..._l_._	 5... .c:__... ......_...
;eform (1985-1992); 2 stage=banks e;isted in the second stage of banking ;eform (1992OO2
INT = intercept, HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman index, MS = market share, XINEFF = X-
inefficiency, SINEFF scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an
ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TI = a time
trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the
coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980)
derived a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses.
4. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is
devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the random effects model based on the
OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model with a single constant term is
appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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For banks in the first reform stage, when ROA is the dependent variable and CR4
is the measure of concentration, the results in Table 5.4 show that the coefficient
of MS is positive and significant, supporting the relative-market-power (RMP)
hypothesis. The results in Table 5.7 and 5.8 indicate that the big four banks in
China did not enjoy a 'quiet life' during this period, since neither of the structure
variables (CONG and MS) has significant influence on the efficiency variables
(XINEFF and SINEFF).
In addition, the coefficients on the ownership dummy variable show that the joint-
stock banks have greater profits, but a smaller market share and lower scale
efficiency. The coefficients on the time trend variables suggest that there is no
significant change in performance, but banks became more scale efficient over
time. The coefficients on the average income per person variables indicate that the
higher the income per person, the lower the concentration levels. The results
hardly change when employing HERF as the measure of concentration instead of
CR4, and/or replacing ROA with ROE as the dependent variable.
Turning to the banks that existed during the second stage of banking reform, with
ROA as the dependent variable and CR4 as the measure of concentration, the
results (in Table 5.4) support the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure
(ESX) hypothesis. However, it is shown to be invalid after its necessary condition
is tested. Table 5.6 shows that when MS is the dependent variable (as in Eq. (5.3)),
the coefficient of XINEFF is insignificant, which invalidates the ESX hypothesis.
Furthermore, the results in Table 5.7 and 5.8 also indicate that the big four banks
in China did not enjoy a 'quiet life' during the second reform stage, because
neither of the structural variables (CONC and MS) had a significant effect on the
efficiency variables (XINEFF and SINEFF). Finally, the coefficients on OWN
show that the joint-stock banks have a lower market share and less scale
efficiency, but have higher X-efficiency and enjoy higher ROE. Similar results are
obtained if ROE is taken as the dependent variable and/or HERF is the
concentration measure.
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On the other hand, as indicated by Goldberg and Rai (1996), Eq. (5.1) might be
subject to multicollinearity problems if there are significant relationships between
the market structure and efficiency variables. In addition, given that both
concentration and market share measures are based on the ratio of bank's deposits
to total deposits in a given year, there might be multicollinearity arising from
them. Consequently, correlation coefficients are calculated to examine the
possible relationship between different concentration, market share, and efficiency
measures. As indicated in Table 5.9, the correlation coefficients range from —0.14
to 0.30. These values are not high enough for concerns of multicollinearity.
Table 5.9 Correlation between the Major Independent Variables
CR4	 HERF	 MS	 SJNEFF
MS	 0.29	 0.30
SINEFF	 -0.09	 -0.05	 -0.09
XINEFF	 -0.12	 -0.14	 0.10	 -0.02
Notes: CR4 = tour-bank concentration ratio, HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman index, MS = market
share, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency.
Nevertheless, following the suggestion of Goldberg and Rai (1996), a test of
robustness was undertaken. Eq. (5.1) was tested in four components in order to
remove the effects of possible multicollinearity98 . The test also applied the
random effects panel data approach and was constructed as follows:
l =a+/31 XEFF1 +JJ2 SEFF1 , +fl AI1 +1340 WN 1 +/3517 +e,	 (5.la)
= a + /31 C0NC1 + /32MS, + 13 AIP + J34 0WN1 + /35 T1 + e. 1	(5.lb)
P,. =a+/31 C0NC +/32 XEFF, +/33 SEFF,, +fl4 AIk +/30 WN1 ^fl6 TT +e1,
(5.lc)
=a^ /31 MS11 +/32 XEFF +133 SEFF, +/34 AlP +/35 0WN1 +136 T1 +e1,
(5. id)
The results of Eqs. (5.la) and (5.lb) are presented in Tables 5.10 - 5.12, while the
results of Eqs. (5.lc) and (5.ld) are reported in Tables 5.13 - 5.15. For all three
98 To drop variables suspected of causing the problem from the regression is the most frequently
used method to deal with multicollinearity (Greene, 2000, p.258).
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samples, the results of Eqs. (5.la), (5.lb), (5.lc), and (5.ld) are similar to those of
Eq. (5.1) no matter which measure is used for profitability or concentration.
When taking all the results estimated by the random effects panel data approach
together, there is conclusive evidence of the relevant market-power hypothesis for
the banks in the first reform stage. On the other hand, the X-efficiency version of
the efficient-structure hypothesis is only supported by the initial test for the
second reform stage sample, but is invalidated by the test of its necessary
condition (see Table 5.6). This result is largely consistent with the available
literature on the topic (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1997).
This finding suggests that the larger banks were able to exercise market power by
providing differentiated products during the first reform stage. Neither
concentration nor efficiency significantly influenced the level of profitability at
that time. The result is consistent with the fact that the big four banks were
actually the state-owned specialized banks, and were subsidized by the
government to make loans to designated sectors/firms up to 1993. The second
stage banking reform removed these subsidies and tried to transform state banks
into commercial banks. During this stage, the effects associated with relative
market power faded away, and banks with higher X-efficiency earned profits. This
implies that the gradual reform strategy did improve the sector's competitive
structure. However, the improvement is not enough for these more efficient banks
to gain larger market share.
Given that the joint-stock banks are more X-efficient but scale inefficient than the
state-owned banks, the policy implication therefore is to provide more
opportunities for the joint-stock banks. However, any policy suggestion must be
made with caution. None of these theories are completely consistent with the
observed relationship between profits, market structure, and efficiency for banks
in the second reform stage, further research is needed along these lines.
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Furthermore, there is no evidence for the 'quiet life' hypothesis in either stage.
This implies that large banks in China (mainly referring to the big four banks) did
not enjoy a 'quiet life' by sacrificing their monopoly profits with cost inefficiency.
This finding is not surprising, and might be explained by the fact that there was
very limited opportunity for larger banks to obtain monopoly profits even in the
highly concentrated market, since the interest rates of deposits and loans were
controlled by the government. This restriction almost isolated the link between a
higher concentration market/larger market share and higher profits, and hence
lower cost efficiency, since there were fewer market-power benefits (i.e.,
subnormal profits) that they could enjoy by less rigorous adherence to cost
minimization.
However, as noted in Chapter 2, the process of interest rate liberalization has been
initiated in China, which is likely to enable such a link. Thus, 'quiet life' effects
will be a crucial question for future research on banking regulation. The policy
implication is that the liberalization of the interest rates should be accompanied by
reforms which improve the competitive structure, otherwise 'quiet life' effects
may emerge, and the market-power effects may be significant, if banks operate in
a highly concentrated market with no restriction on interest rate. Alternatively,
inefficiency may be hard to reduce, if banks operate in a competitive market with
strong restrictions on interest rates.
To compare the results of other studies which used the classic regression model
with a pooled data set, the pooled OLS estimators for all the equations are
presented in Appendix 5.1. In addition to supporting the RMP hypothesis for
banks in the first reform stage, the pooled results also support the ESX hypothesis
for banks in the second reform stage. This finding is consistent with other studies
(Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Maudos, 1998). However, almost all of the Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) tests indicate that the random effects panel data model is superior
over the classic regression model for these data. This finding suggests that
applying the classic model to the pooled data set could yield misleading results.
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Table 5.10 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the XINEFF, SINEFF, and
other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE _________
___________ All	 ]Sl Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 ft Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.021	 -0.001	 0.012	 0.219	 -0.148	 0.028
[0.003]
	
[0.011]	 [0.009]
	
[0.039]
	
[0.141]	 [0.144]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.962)	 (0.186)	 (0.000)	 (0.296)	 (0.844)
XINEFF	 -0.026	 -0.012	 -0.029	 -0.235	 0.059	 -0.369
[0.010]
	
[0.020]
	
[0.010]
	
[0.150]
	
[0.252]	 [0.158]
_________ (0.006)
	 (0.549)	 (0.003)	 (0.119)	 (0.814)	 (0.020)
SINEFF	 0.020	 0.033	 -0.005	 0.293	 0.159	 0.113
[0.013]
	
[0.015]
	
[0.022]	 [0.203]
	
[0.188]
	
[0.353]
__________ (0.124)
	 (0.027)	 (0.836)	 (0.150)	 (0.398)	 (0.748)
AlP	 -0.028	 0.015	 -0.0002	 -0.275	 0.515	 0.205
[0.007]
	
[0.021]
	
[0.014]	 [0.105]
	
[0.268]
	
[0.217]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.496)	 (0.99 1)	 (0.008)	 (0.054)	 (0.344)
OWN	 0.008	 0.009	 0.010	 0.104	 0.024	 0.140
[0.002]	 [0.004]	 [0.002]	 [0.027]
	
[0.052]	 [0.033]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.042)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.652)	 (0.000)
Ti'	 0.001	 -0.0002	 -0.001	 0.011	 -0.003	 -0.029
[0.0003]	 [0.0004]
	
[0.001]	 [0.006]	 [0.005]	 [0.016]
__________ (0.029)
	 (0.68 1)	 (0.160)	 (0.068)	 (0.569)	 (0.067)
LM-	 37.93	 76.04	 23.31	 21.94	 92.89	 45.21
statistic	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
I Al	 _ll l____l__	 £L_ _____l_	 iSt	 I - I	 _2 L___I___
I IUIA.,.S. A. LXII - Ull WUflflO III IIfl.# QUIhfljJ1., A 	 0LU51... - IJULIflO AIOI.¼.¼I III LIII... IAIOL.ILU5I.. U t IJUIIflA115
reform (1985-1992); 2nd stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TNT = intercept, XINEFF X-inefficiency,
SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy
variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals
to 0 to 17 as, from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence
of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980) derived a heteroscedasticity consistent
covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. Coefficients in 10% significance
level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980),
and used to test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals. Under the null
hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is
that the classical regression model with a single constant term is appropriate. The alternative
hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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Table 5.11 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the CR4, MS, and other
control variables
Dependent variable ROA _________ Dependent variable = ROE _________
___________ All 	 1st Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 JSI Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.095	 -0.069	 0.088	 1.744	 0.103	 1.653
[0.025]
	
[0.065]
	
[0.044]	 [0.363]	 [0.8 19]
	
[0.659]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.287)	 (0.043)	 (0.000)	 (0.900)	 (0.012)
CR4	 -0.084	 0.046	 -0.075	 -1.732	 -0.321	 -1.636
[0.025]	 [0.052]	 [0.039]
	
[0.356]
	
[0.6511	 [0.592]
__________ (0.001)	 (0.371)	 (0.056)	 (0.000)	 (0.622)	 (0.006)
MS	 0.037	 0.051	 -0.010	 0.853	 0.617	 0.205
[0.012]	 [0.019]
	
[0.017]
	
[0.180]
	
[0.193]	 [0.293]
__________ (0.002)	 (0.008)	 (0.566)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.485)
AlP	 -0.022	 0.040	 -0.013	 -0.205	 0.395	 -0.122
[0.005]	 [0.033]	 [0.017]
	
[0.077]	 [0.410]
	
[0.255]
__________ (0.000)
	
(0.221)	 (0.447)	 (0.008)	 (0.336)	 (0.634)
OWN	 0.017	 0.020	 0.008	 0.301	 0.162	 0.199
[0.003]
	
[0.006]	 [0.004]	 [0.048]
	
[0.056]	 [0.069]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.001)	 (0.038)	 (0.000)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)
Ti'	 -0.0003	 -0.0005	 -0.001	 -0.009	 -0.004	 -0.015
[0.0004]
	
[0.0004]
	
[0.001]	 [0.006]
	
[0.005]
	
[0.017]
__________ (0.415)	 (0.224)	 (0.378)	 (0.107)	 (0.407)	 (0.364)
LM statistic 27.69	 26.40	 22.95	 39.37	 17.29	 57.97
___________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
kT___ I	 All	 .11 L___l__	 L_ ____.l_. iSt	 i__i	 __ t_ £n_	 .r i__i__
I VJIt.#O. A. £ Xli - Ulfi iJUllfl3 III IllS? 3UflhlJlS? I	 OIUt.# - UUllflOS?It.tOL#SL ill U1 # LiLOI.OLU5#JflIJUIlfllht
reform (1985-1992); 2 stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration
ratio, MS = market share, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy
variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals
to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence
of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980) derived a heteroscedasticity consistent
covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. Coefficients in 10% significance
level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980),
and used to test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals. Under the null
hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is
that the classical regression model with a single constant term is appropriate. The alternative
hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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Table 5.12 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the HERF, MS, and other
control variables
Dependent variable = ROA _________ Dependent variable = ROE _________
___________ All
	 jst Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 JSI Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.048	 -0.028	 0.070	 0.805	 -0.143	 1.312
[0.012]	 [0.026]	 [0.026]	 [0.168]
	
[0.324]	 [0.378]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.279)	 (0.007)	 (0.000)	 (0.659)	 (0.001)
HERF	 -0.132	 0.035	 -0.214	 -2.780	 -0.327	 -4.893
[0.078]	 [0.050]
	
[0.081]	 [0.5461
	
[0.632]	 [1.194]
__________ (0.001)	 (0.488)	 (0.008)	 (0.000)	 (0.605)	 (0.000)
MS	 0.036	 0.051	 -0.0 10	 0.855	 0.617	 0.223
[0.012]
	
[0.019]
	
[0.017]
	
[0.180]
	
[0.193]
	
[0.288]
__________ (0.002)
	 (0.008)	 (0.571)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.438)
AlP	 -0.017	 0.029	 -0.013	 -0.093	 0.443	 -0.136
[0.006]
	
[0.027]
	
[0.015]	 [0.080]	 [0.336]	 [0.223]
__________ (0.003)	 (0.277)	 (0.410)	 (0.249)	 (0.187)	 (0.543)
OWN	 0.017	 0.020	 0.008	 0.301	 0.161	 0.202
[0.003]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.004]
	
[0.048]	 [0.056]	 [0.068]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.00 1)	 (0.037)	 (0.000)	 (0.004)	 (0.003)
IT	 -0.00 1	 -0.0004	 -0.00 1	 -0.017	 -0.005	 -0.024
[0.0005]
	
[0.0004]	 [0.001]
	
[0.007]	 [0.005]
	
[0.015]
__________ (0.130)	 (0.295)	 (0.170)	 (0.009)	 (0.350)	 (0.116)
Liv! statistic 27.54
	
26.10	 24.70	 40.87	 17.29	 65.72
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
Xt___ I	 Al,	 _ll l___l__ __ --------_.i_	 1St _.__	 k__I ------___l ¶_ L_ £_	 _C L___l____
A IUL#Q. i. nil - UI. UULIIt.S ilk I.LL% OUlhlJl¼fl £	 0LU5¼ - IJUILItO l.#ISlOtU Ilk k1l'_# £IIJLQlUb#tlLkJUllfl.lIle
reform (1985-1992); 2x stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TNT = intercept, HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, MS = market share, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy
variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT a time trend variable, equals
to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence
of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980) derived a heteroscedasticity consistent
covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. Coefficients in 10% significance
level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980),
and used to test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals. Under the null
hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is
that the classical regression model with a single constant term is appropriate. The alternative
hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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Table 5.13 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the CR4, XINEFF,
SINEFF, and other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE __________
____________ All	 1 Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.107	 -0.069	 0.083	 1.978	 0.124	 1.665
[0.025]	 [0.065]	 [0.042]	 [0.385]
	
[0.830]
	
[0.6551
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.293)	 (0.051)	 (0.000)	 (0.881)	 (0.011)
CR4	 -0.085	 0.055	 -0.065	 -1.738	 -0.219	 -1.517
[0.025]	 [0.052]	 [0.038]
	
[0.379]
	
[0.658]
	
[0.593]
__________ (0.001)	 (0.289)	 (0.088)	 (0.000)	 (0.739)	 (0.011)
XINEFF	 -0.026	 -0.012	 -0.028	 -0.218	 0.060	 -0.333
[0.009]
	
[0.020]
	
[0.010]	 [0.143]	 [0.255]
	
[0.156]
__________ (0,006) 	 (0.549)	 (0.005)	 (0.127)	 (0.816)	 (0.033)
SINEFF	 0.023	 0.034	 -0.005	 0.360	 0.157	 0.104
[0.013]
	
[0.015]
	
[0.022]	 [0.194]	 [0.191]
	
[0.345]
___________ (0.066) 	 (0.024)	 (0.823)	 (0.063)	 (0.412)	 (0.764)
AlP	 -0.028	 0.041	 -0.017	 -0.286	 0.410	 -0.180
[0.0061
	
[0.033]
	
[0.017]
	
[0.099]
	
[0.4 16]
	
[0.260]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.2 12)	 (0.326)	 (0.004)	 (0.325)	 (0.488)
OWN	 0.008	 0.009	 0.010	 0.100	 0.023	 0.141
[0.002]	 [0.004]	 [0.002]	 [0.026]
	
[0.053]
	
[0.034]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.042)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.659)	 (0.000)
TT	 0.0001	 -0.0002	 -0.001	 -0.005	 -0.003	 -0.011
[0.0004]	 [0.00041
	
[0.001]	 [0.007]	 [0.005]
	
[0.0171
___________ (0.906)
	
(0.621)	 (0.572)	 (0.446)	 (0.593)	 (0.528)
LM statistic 42.15	 77.01	 23.60	 28.72	 93.15	 48.15
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
T.-..,_.1
reform (1985- 1992); 2nd stage= banks e;isted inthe se;ond stage of banking ;eforrn (1992OO2
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TNT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration
ratio, XINIEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person.
OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT
= a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the
coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980)
derived a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses.
4. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is
devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the random effects model based on the
OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model with a single constant term is
appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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Table 5.14 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the HERF, XJNEFF,
SINEFF, and other control variables
iutes: i. i-Mi = all oans in we sample; i stage = O4flKS exisieu in we iirst stage 01 oaning
reform (1985-1992); 2"' stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TNT = intercept, HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP average income per person.
OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT
= a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the
coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980)
derived a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses.
4. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is
devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the random effects model based on the
OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model with a single constant term is
appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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Table 5.15 Regression results of ROA and ROE on the MS, XINEFF, SINEFF,
and other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable ROE _________
___________ All 	 1r Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.013	 -0.012	 0.016	 0.037	 -0.305	 -0.003
[0.004]	 [0.012]
	
[0.010]
	
[0.057]
	
[0.145]
	
[0.158]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.284)	 (0.117)	 (0.521)	 (0.035)	 (0.984)
MS	 0.035	 0.050	 -0.015	 0.785	 0.617	 0.134
[0.012]	 [0.019]
	
[0.016]	 [0.184]	 [0.191]	 [0.288]
__________ (0.003)
	 (0.008)	 (0.372)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.641)
XINEFF	 -0.027	 -0.019	 -0.030	 -0.253	 -0.023	 -0.364
[0.009]	 [0.020]	 [0.010]
	
[0.143]	 [0.253]	 [0.158]
___________ (0.003) 	 (0.332)	 (0.002)	 (0.077)	 (0.928)	 (0.022)
SINEFF	 0.015	 0.031	 -0.003	 0.180	 0.097	 0.103
[0.013]	 [0.014]	 [0.022]
	
[0.195]
	
[0.183]
	
[0.352]
___________ (0.243) 	 (0.034)	 (0.893)	 (0.357)	 (0.596)	 (0.769)
AlP	 -0.028	 0.015	 -0.0001	 -0.272	 0.550	 0.206
[0.006]
	
[0.021]	 [0.014]	 [0.099]
	
[0.269]
	
[0.216]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.458)	 (0.993)	 (0.006)	 (0.041)	 (0.340)
OWN	 0.016	 0.020	 0.006	 0.277	 0.164	 0.169
[0.003]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.004]	 [0.049]
	
[0.055]
	
[0.07 1]
_________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.117)	 (0.000)	 (0.003)	 (0.017)
TI'	 0.001	 -0.0002	 -0.001	 0.012	 -0.004	 -0.029
[0.0004]	 [0.0004]
	
[0.001]	 [0.006]
	
[0.005]
	
[0.016]
__________ (0.020)	 (0.677)	 (0.164)	 (0.042)	 (0.505)	 (0.065)
LMstatistic 25.77
	 32.53	 19.92	 19.64	 4.86	 40.13
__________ (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
kT_.._.. 1	 Al,	 -.11 k__l_	 _. I__. .__._I_.	 1St	 ___	 k__I ------'__.._i t_ I__ £t__ _...___
reform (1985- 1992); 2 :tage= banks e;isted inthe se:ond
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, MS = market share, XINEFF =
X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an
ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time
trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. To provide correct estimates of the
coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, White (1980)
derived a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 3. p-values are in parentheses.
4. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type. 5. LM (Lagrange multiplier test) is
devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980), and used to test for the random effects model based on the
OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom. The null hypothesis is that the classical regression model with a single constant term is
appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the panel data model is appropriate.
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5.5 Conclusions
This chapter conducts the first empirical study of the relationship between market
structure and profitability within China's banking sector. Emphasis has been
placed on investigating the effects of a gradual reform strategy on competitive
structure. In addition, the issue of whether the big four banks enjoy the "quiet life"
is also tested.
Following Berger (1995) and Goldberg and Rai (1996), four hypotheses are
specified, including the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, the relative-
market-power hypothesis, the X-efficiency version of efficient-structure
hypothesis, and the scale-efficiency version of efficient-structure hypothesis. The
first two are related to the market power paradigm; the latter two to the efficient-
structure paradigm. These hypotheses were tested by regressing profits against
measures of concentration, market share, X-efficiency, and scale efficiency.
Concentration and market share were regressed against the efficiency variables to
test for the presence of the necessary conditions of the efficiency-structure
hypotheses.
In addition, following Berger and Hannan (1997), X-efficiency and scale
efficiency were regressed against concentration and market share. This is used to
test for reverse causality in estimating the necessary condition mentioned above,
and to test for 'quiet life' effects, i.e., whether banks with market-power sacrifice
some profits by less rigorous adherence to cost minimization. For example, X-
inefficiencies caused by the absence of incentive to put full effort into minimizing
the costs of producing any given output bundle, and scale-inefficiencies caused by
not putting full effort into operating at the optimal scale level.
The random effects panel data model was chosen as the preferred approach, and
the classic regression model is estimated for comparison. The empirical results of
the preferred model suggest that:
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(1) Although using the standard OLS regression model yielded similar findings
compared to other bank studies, the random effects panel data model is more
appropriate for this study according to the results of the Lagrange Multiplier
test.
(2) The relative-market-power hypothesis is valid for banks in the first reform
stage. For banks in the second reform stage, the X-efficiency version of the
efficient-structure hypothesis is supported by the initial test but invalidated by
the further test of necessary condition.
(3) The results of the ownership dummy show that the joint-stock banks have a
small market share and lower scale efficiency, but are more X-efficient, and
earn more profits.
(4) No significantly negative relationship between concentration and efficiency
was found for the four state-owned banks.
(5) The results are insensitive to different measures of profitability and
concentration.
Overall, the findings indicate that the gradual reform strategy did improve the
competitive structure of China's banking sector. For example, the subsidies to the
state-owned banks were removed, and the more efficient banks gained higher
profits. However, the improvement was not sufficient, because the more efficient
banks could not gain a larger market share. Given that the joint-stock banks are
more efficient than the state-owned banks in this sample, the policy implication is
to provide more opportunities for the joint-stock banks (e.g. encouraging the
expansion of these banks), which would, in turn improve competitive structure.
There was no evidence to suggest the big four banks enjoyed a 'quiet life' over the
period, possibly due to the strict controls on interest rates. As "prices", interest
rates provide the potential link between higher concentration level, higher
monopolistic profits, and lower efficiency. The strict controls on interest rates
could isolate such a link. However, the 'quiet life' scenario could become a
problem, if in future banks operate in a highly concentrated market with no
restriction on interest rates. For the same reason, the market-power effects on
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bank profitability could become more significant. Thus, while interest rate
liberalization could help to improve bank efficiency, policy makers must be wary
of negative effects from too much market power, quiet life, etc. In other words,
the deregulation of the interest rates should be accompanied by reforms which
improve competitive structure.
Finally, further research is needed along these lines, since none of the theories are
completely consistent with the observed relationships between profits, market
structure, and efficiency for banks in the second reform stage. On the other hand,
given that the acceleration of the interest rate liberalization and the full
implementation of the WTO commitments in the coming years will greatly change
the operational environment of the banks in China, the structure-performance
issues will remain highly topical research questions in future years.
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Appendix 5.1
Pooled OLS Estimates
Table 1. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the CR4, MS, XINEFF,
SINEFF, and other control variables
__________ Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE __________
____________ All
	 1' Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 1 Stage	 2'' Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.103	 -0.078	 0.092	 1.898	 0.213	 1.833
[0.029]
	
[0.137]	 [0.049]
	
[0.373]	 [1.205]
	
[0.678]
__________ (0.001)
	 (0.57 1)	 (0.061)	 (0.000)	 (0.861)	 (0.008)
CR4	 -0.087	 0.050	 -0.070	 -1.762	 -0.439	 -1.595
[0.029]
	
[0.113]	 [0.043]
	
[0.360]	 [0.992]	 [0.600]
__________ (0.003)
	 (0.660)	 (0.112)	 (0.000)	 (0.660)	 (0.009)
MS	 0.027	 0.048	 -0.017	 0.484	 0.760	 -0.164
[0.007]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.009]	 [0.091]
	
[0.054]	 [0.114]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.073)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.154)
X1NEFF	 -0.025	 -0.028	 -0.030	 -0.374	 -0.153	 -0.463
[0.010]	 [0.035]
	
[0.010]
	
[0.144]	 [0.349]
	
[0.150]
__________ (0.012)	 (0.432)	 (0.003)	 (0.010)	 (0.663)	 (0.003)
SINEFF	 0.022	 0.028	 -0.0004	 0.238	 -0.309	 0.181
[0.013]	 [0.016]
	
[0.023]
	
[0.196]
	
[0.198]
	
[0.344]
__________ (0.087)
	 (0.087)	 (0.985)	 (0.228)	 (0.125)	 (0.599)
AlP	 -0.029	 0.048	 -0.019	 -0.266	 0.440	 -0.253
[0.006]
	
[0.055]
	
[0.089]
	
[0.109]
	
[0.569]	 [0.282]
___________ (0.000)
	 (0.388)	 (0.300)	 (0.016)	 (0.443)	 (0.370)
OWN	 0.014	 0.018	 0.006	 0.204	 0.176	 0.099
[0.002]	 [0.002]
	
[0.003]	 [0.020]
	
[0.023]
	
[0.035]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.055)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.005)
IT	 0.000 1	 -0.000 1	 -0.0004	 -0.005	 -0.008	 -0.006
[0.0004]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]
	
[0.008]	 [0.018]
___________ (0.777)	 (0.834)	 (0.697)	 (0.431)	 (0.318)	 (0.736)
0.51	 0.38	 0.61	 0.41	 0.52	 0.50
F-statistic	 28.44	 5.62	 29.91	 19.28	 9.07	 19.97
__________ (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
I All	 - ..11 Ll_..	 L_	 .l.. iSt	 .-	 L....l._	 _...
reform (1985- 1992); 2 :tage=banks e;isted inthe second stage of banking reform (1992OO2
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TNT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration
ratio, MS = market share, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average
income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned,
1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002,
respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are
in parentheses. 4. The F-statistic is from a test of the hypothesis that of the slope coefficients
(excluding the intercept) in the regression jointly equal to zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance
level are in bold type.
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Table 2. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the HERF, MS, XINEFF,
SJNEFF, and other con frol variables
_________ Dependent variable = ROA _________ Dependent variable = ROE _________
___________ All	 jSt Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 jSl Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.057	 -0.019	 0.079	 0.960	 -0.084	 1.535
[0.0141
	
[0.048]
	
[0.030]
	
[0.188]	 [0.435]	 [0.447]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.699)	 (0.010)	 (0.000)	 (0.847)	 (0.001)
HERF	 -0.142	 0.006	 .0.210	 .2.872	 -0.522	 -4.869
[0.046]
	
[0.101]
	
[0.096]	 [0.589]
	
[0.890]	 [1.436]
__________ (0.002)
	 (0.951)	 (0.031)	 (0.000)	 (0.560)	 (0.001)
MS	 0.026	 0.048	 -0.017	 0.481	 0.761	 -0.163
[0.007]
	
[0.006]	 [0.009]	 [0.094]	 [0.053]	 [0.105]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.062)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.123)
XJNEFF	 .0.026	 -0.028	 .0.031	 -0.408	 -0.169	 .0.473
[0.010]	 [0.037]	 [0.010]	 [0.144]	 [0.357]
	
[0.155]
__________ (0.008)
	 (0.447)	 (0.003)	 (0.005)	 (0.638)	 (0.003)
SINEFF	 0.021	 0.028	 -0.001	 0.226	 -0.310	 0.181
[0.012]	 [0.016]	 [0.023]
	
[0.198]
	
[0.198]
	
[0.354]
__________ (0.089)
	 (0.086)	 (0.985)	 (0.254)	 (0.124)	 (0.611)
AlP	 .0.023	 0.026	 -0.020	 -0.148	 0.474	 -0.277
[0.006]
	
[0.042]
	
[0.017]
	
[0.106]
	
[0.473]
	
[0.257]
___________ (0.000)	 (0.540)	 (0.233)	 (0.163)	 (0.321)	 (0.283)
OWN	 0.014	 0.018	 0.006	 0.203	 0.176	 0.098
[0.002]
	
[0.002]	 [0.003]
	
[0.020]
	
[0.023]
	
[0.031]
__________ (0.000)
	
(0.000)	 (0.045)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.002)
Ti'	 -0.0003	 -9.87E-05	 -0.001	 -0.014	 -0.009	 -0.014
[0.0004]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]
	
[0.007]
	
[0.008]
	
[0.017]
___________ (0.499)
	
(0.890)	 (0.448)	 (0.056)	 (0.263)	 (0.402)
0.51	 0.38	 0.61	 0.42	 0.52	 0.52
F-statistic	 28.83	 5.55	 31.05	 19.88	 9.11	 21.83
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
XT._..	 I	 I1	 .II L....1_..	 L.	 ........I_. iSt	 ..	 - I.. -------...J	 .	 L_	 .	 ...0 L1_._..
reform (i985- 1992); 2nd stage = banks e;isted in the second	 ;
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, iNT = intercept, HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, MS market share, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average
income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned,
1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002,
respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are
in parentheses. 4. The F-statistic is from a test of the hypothesis that of the slope coefficients
(excluding the intercept) in the regression jointly equal to zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance
level are in bold type.
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Table 4. Regression results of XINEFF and SINEFF on the CR4, MS, and
other control variables
Dependent variable = XINEFF	 Dependent variable SINEFF
____________ All	 jst Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 JSI Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.028	 0.272	 -0.077	 -0.186	 0.290	 -0.090
[0.215]
	
[0.523]
	
[0.461]
	
[0.143]
	
[0.670]
	
[0.238]
__________ (0.897)
	 (0.605)	 (0.867)	 (0.196)	 (0.667)	 (0.705)
CR4	 0.091	 -0.074	 0.380	 0.132	 -0.161	 0.025
[0.211]	 [0.4161
	
[0.429]	 [0.146]	 [0.532]
	
[0.212]
___________ (0.666)
	 (0.860)	 (0.378)	 (0.366)	 (0.764)	 (0.907)
MS	 -0.095	 0.022	 -0.290	 0.08 1	 0.048	 0.055
[0.152]	 [0.046]
	
[0.308]
	
[0.071]	 [0.052]
	
[0.056]
___________ (0.521)
	 (0.630)	 (0.339)	 (0.249)	 (0.362)	 (0.325)
AlP	 -0.045	 -0.234	 -O.143	 0.285	 -0.046	 0.105
[0.040]
	
[0.263]
	
[0.164]	 [0.044]	 [0.353]
	
[0.088]
___________ (0.263)
	 (0.379)	 (0.388)	 (0.000)	 (0.898)	 (0.232)
OWN	 -0.042	 0.003	 -0.092	 0.037	 -0.018	 0.052
[0.014]
	
[0.015]
	
[0.025]	 [0.010]
	
[0.018]
	
[0.013]
__________ (0.002)
	 (0.827)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.307)	 (0.000)
TT	 0.005	 0.0001	 0.013	 -0.014	 -0.010	 -0.002
[0.003]
	
[0.003]
	
[0.011]	 [0.003]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.006]
__________ (0.073)
	 (0.958)	 (0.223)	 (0.000)	 (0.105)	 (0.779)
0.07	 0.04	 0.12	 0.29	 0.25	 0.60
F-statistic	 3.60	 1.39	 4.45	 16.42	 4.50	 40.38
__________ (0.004)	 (0.246)	 (0.001)	 (0.000)	 (0.002)	 (0.000)
T.-.._....	 1	 All	 ..11 l......l... :....	 L.. ......_.1. ist	 ..__.. - L....l...	 J	 ...	 L..	 ......
reform (i985-l992);2:tage=bankse;istedinthesecond stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
INT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration ratio, MS = market share, XINEFF = X-
inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an
ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TI = a time
trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The
F-statistic is from a test of the hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in
the regression jointly equal to zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Table 5. Regression results of XINEFF and SINEFF on the HERF, MS, and
other control variables
Dependent variable = XINEFF 	 Dependent variable = SINEFF
___________ All
	 Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 Ft Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.150	 0.310	 0.232	 -0.093	 0.134	 -0.068
[0.092]	 [0.206]	 [0.268]
	
[0.076]
	
[0.300]	 [0.132]
__________ (0.106)
	 (0.139)	 (0.387)	 (0.223)	 (0.656)	 (0.609)
HERF	 -0.100	 -0.276	 0.349	 0.139	 -0.093	 -0.015
[0.302]	 [0.397]
	
[0.908]
	
[0.272]	 [0.623]
	
[0.415]
__________ (0.740)	 (0.489)	 (0.701)	 (0.611)	 (0.881)	 (0.972)
MS	 -0.095	 0.022	 -0.289	 0.08 1	 0.047	 0.055
[0.152]
	
[0.045]
	
[0.208]	 [0.076]
	
[0.052]
	
[0.056]
___________ (0.533)
	
(0.628)	 (0.189)	 (0.274)	 (0.361)	 (0.323)
AlP	 -0.040	 -0.291	 -0.210	 0.280	 0.001	 0.100
[0.040]
	
[0.220]	 [0.146]	 [0.048]
	
[0.299]	 [0.074]
__________ (0.320)
	 (0.191)	 (0.154)	 (0.000)	 (0.998)	 (0.179)
OWN	 -0.044	 0.003	 -0.092	 0.037	 -0.018	 0.052
[0.014]	 [0.015]
	
[0.025]
	
[0.010]
	
[0.018]	 [0.013]
__________ (0.002)	 (0.823)	 (0.000)	 (0.001)	 (0.307)	 (0.000)
Ti'	 0.004	 -0.0001	 0.017	 -0.014	 -0.010	 -0.001
[0.003]	 [0.003]
	
[0.010]
	
[0.004]	 [0.006]
	
[0.005]
___________ (0.294)
	 (0.969)	 (0.090)	 (0.00 1)	 (0.098)	 (0.782)
0.06	 0.04	 0.11	 0.29	 0.25	 0.60
F statistic	 3.58	 1.49	 4.29	 16.31	 4.49	 40.37
___________ (0.004)
	 (0.210)	 (0.001)	 (0.000)	 (0.002)	 (0.000)
XT -....-.. 1	 All - ..l1 L.....I....	 ... .1... ............l.-. iSt	 ... - k,....1.-,	 :.	 .i.	 .c:...,.	 c L.....i_:...
reform (1985- 1992); 2 ;tage=banks e;isted in the second Stage of bankeform(1992OO2
TNT = intercept, HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman index, MS = market share, XINEFF = X-
inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an
ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time
trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The
F-statistic is from a test of the hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in
the regression jointly equal to zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Table 6. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the XINEFF, SINEFF, and
other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE __________
____________ All	 1St Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 jSt Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.022	 -.008	 0.0 12	 0.237	 -0.209	 0.063
[0.002]	 [0.022]	 [0.009]
	
[0.035]
	
[0.313]
	
[0.144]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.726)	 (0.167)	 (0.000)	 (0.506)	 (0.662)
X/NEFF	 -0.030	 -0.013	 -0.028	 -0.465	 0.100	 -0.457
[0.009]
	
[0.042]	 [0.009]
	
[0.140]	 [0.530]
	
[0.140]
___________ (0.002)
	 (0.761)	 (0.003)	 (0.001)	 (0.852)	 (0.001)
SINEFF	 0.025	 0.037	 -0.005	 0.297	 -0.160	 0.137
[0.014]	 [0.020]	 [0.023]
	
[0.225]
	
[0.268]
	
[0.340]
__________ (0.085)
	
(0.070)	 (0.827)	 (0.189)	 (0.554)	 (0.688)
AlP	 -0.030	 0.027	 -0.0004	 -0.281	 0.706	 0.164
[0.007]	 [0.044]	 [0.014]	 [0.118]
	
[0.619]	 [0.226]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.542)	 (0.975)	 (0.018)	 (0.260)	 (0.469)
OWN	 0.008	 0.007	 0.010	 0.096	 -0.002	 0.136
[0.001]
	
[0.002]	 [0.001]
	
[0.014]	 [0.025]
	
[0.018]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.002)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.944)	 (0.000)
Ti'	 0.001	 -6.O1E-05	 -0.001	 0.012	 -0.008	 -0.026
[0.000]
	
[0.001]	 [0.001]
	
[0.007]
	
[0.013]	 [0.017]
__________ (0.018)
	 (0.946)	 (0.190)	 (0.093)	 (0.531)	 (0.121)
0.45	 0.11	 0.60	 0.29	 0.05	 0.49
F statistics	 31.41	 2.28	 40.00	 16.31	 0.56	 25.96
__________ (0.000)	 (0.06 1)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.732)	 (0.000)
WT.__	 I	 Al.	 _1l L__l	 _l_ iSt _	 L__l__ __ __.I	 .L_
S !JL'.. n. nil - UI! IJUflI!fl lii LLI OUIhIjJfl.fl A OUUb% - LlUnsnoS_nIn/a Ill l.Ifl.. nIIOUU5.#JLUUIlitIL
reform (1985-1992); 2"' stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TNT = intercept, XINEFF = X-inefficiency,
SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy
variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals
to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The F-statistic is from a test of the
hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in the regression jointly equal to
zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Table 7. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the CR4, MS, and other
control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE __________
___________ All 	 JS( Stage	 21M1 Stage	 All	 JS( Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.099	 -0.078	 0.095	 1.844	 0.082	 1.852
[0.029]
	
[0.1401
	
[0.0491
	
[0381]	 [1.217]
	
[0.677]
___________ (0.0001)
	 (0.580)	 (0.055)	 (0.000)	 (0.947)	 (0.007)
CR4	 -0.087	 0.048	 -0.081	 -1.765	 -0.378	 -1.766
[0.029]	 0.1161
	
[0.044]	 [0.371]
	
[0.973]
	
[0.604]
___________ (0.003)	 (0.681)	 (0.065)	 (0.000)	 (0.699)	 (0.004)
MS	 0.031	 0.049	 -0.008	 0.539	 0.742	 -0.020
[0.007]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.010]	 [0.093]
	
[0.0571
	
[0.097]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.383)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.841)
AlP	 -0.022	 0.054	 -0.015	 -0.182	 0.490	 -0.168
[0.005]
	
[0.058]	 [0.018]	 [0.081]	 [0.625]	 [0.273]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.360)	 (0.403)	 (0.026)	 (0.437)	 (0.539)
OWN	 0.016	 0.017	 0.008	 0.229	 0.181	 0.151
[0.002]
	
[0.002]
	
[0.002]	 [0.019]
	
[0.023]	 [0.023]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
Ti'	 -0.0003	 -0.0004	 -0.001	 -0.011	 -0.005	 -0.013
[0.0004]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.008]
	
[0.018]
___________ (0.409) 	 (0.526)	 (0.457)	 (0.055)	 (0.504)	 (0.486)
0.49	 0.36	 0.58	 0.39	 0.51	 0.47
F statistic	 36.25	 7.05	 37.17	 24.44	 11.99	 24.84
___________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
I All - .l1 L,...l....	 .L.. ...l_.. iSt	 ...	 k.,..l...	 ... •L.. 4_....	 ._.._
reform (i985- 1992); 2 stage=banks e;isted in the second stag; of banking reform (1992OO2
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration
ratio, MS = market share, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy
variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals
to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The F-statistic is from a test of the
hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in the regression jointly equal to
zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Table 8. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the HERF, MS, and other
control variables
Dependent variable ROA _________ Dependent variable = ROE	 -
___________ All
	
]SI Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 )St Stage	 2's" Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.051	 -0.024	 0.072	 0.877	 -0.178	 1.413
[0.013]
	
[0.044]	 [0.032]	 [0.186]
	
[0.461]	 [0.468]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.534)	 (0.026)	 (0.000)	 (0.701)	 (0.003)
HERF	 -0.136	 0.011	 -0.221	 -2.800	 -0.446	 -5.031
[0.046]
	
[0.097]	 [0.101]	 [0.603]
	
[0.873]	 [1.528]
__________ (0.003)
	 (0.906)	 (0.03 1)	 (0.000)	 (0.612)	 (0.001)
MS	 0.031	 0.049	 -0.008	 0.538	 0.742	 -0.017
[0.007]	 [0.006]	 [0.009]
	
[0.096]	 [0.056]
	
[0.092]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.377)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.858)
AlP	 -0.017	 0.034	 -0.014	 -0.068	 0.523	 -0.160
[0.005]	 [0.042]	 [0.0 17]	 [0.080]
	
[0.524]	 [0.252]
___________ (0.002)
	
(0.423)	 (0.407)	 (0.394)	 (0.323)	 (0.527)
OWN	 0.016	 0.017	 0.008	 0.229	 0.181	 0.151
[0.002]	 [0.002]
	
[0.0021
	
[0.0 19]	 [0.023]	 [0.02 1]
__________ (P.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
TT	 -0.001	 -0.0004	 -0.001	 -0.019	 -0.006	 -0.022
[0.000]
	
[0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]
	
[0.008]
	
[0.016]
___________ (0.132)
	 (0.590)	 (0.198)	 (0.004)	 (0.438)	 (0.176)
0.49	 0.36	 0.59	 0.39	 0.51	 0.50
F statistic	 36.50	 6.98	 38.36	 24.82	 12.03	 26.96
___________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
r __	 I	 All	 _11 t___l__ ----------- _i_ 	 iSt	 l_l__ ___.__l	 .i__ r...	 c L__l__
A l%.JL..#.. i. CAlL - Ull t.JULLflO tLl LLL% Ottlhl}JLA#, S	 Iii ALL# LLICALU#*JLIJUISLS.ALI
reform (1985-1992); 2"' stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, MS = market share, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an ownership dummy
variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time trend variable, equals
to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The F-statistic is from a test of the
hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in the regression jointly equal to
zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Table 9. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the CR4, XINEFF, SINEFF,
and other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE __________
___________ All 	 ]St Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 ]St Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.110	 -0.074	 0.090	 2.017	 0.283	 1.806
[0.030]	 [0.159]
	
[0.048]
	
[0.384]	 [1.832]	 [0.672]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.644)	 (0.067)	 (0.000)	 (0.878)	 (0.008)
CR4	 -0.087	 0.053	 -0.072	 -1.759	 -0.396	 -1.613
[0.029]	 [0.127]
	
[0.043]	 [0.378]
	
[1.416]	 [0.596]
__________ (0.003)
	 (0.678)	 (0.100)	 (0.000)	 (0.781)	 (0.008)
XJNEFF	 -0.029	 -0.012	 -0.027	 -0.448	 0.095	 -0.430
[0.010]	 [0.043]
	
[0.010]
	
[0.144]	 [0.535]	 [0.143]
__________ (0.003)
	 (0.776)	 (0.006)	 (0.002)	 (0.860)	 (0.003)
SINEFF	 0.028	 0.037	 -0.005	 0.347	 -0.162	 0.135
[0.014]
	
[0.020]
	
[0.023]	 [0.222]	 [0.270]
	
[0.335]
__________ (0.053)
	 (0.074)	 (0.819)	 (0.112)	 (0.550)	 (0.686)
AlP	 -0.030	 0.053	 -0.019	 -0.285	 0.513	 -0.248
[0.001]	 [0.074]
	
[0.019]
	
[0.117]
	
[0.984]	 [0.281]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.478)	 (0.3 12)	 (0.015)	 (0.605)	 (0.379)
OWN	 0.008	 0.007	 0.010	 0.094	 -0.002	 0.136
[0.001]
	
[0.002]
	
[0.001]	 [0.014]	 [0.025]	 [0.017]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.002)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.94 1)	 (0.000)
TI'	 0.0002	 -0.0001	 -0.0005	 -0.005	 -0.008	 -0.006
[0.0004]
	
[0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.008]	 [0.013]	 [0.018]
__________ (0.733)
	 (0.9 10)	 (0.684)	 (0.546)	 (0.555)	 (0.727)
0.48	 0.09	 0.60	 0.35	 0.06	 0.50
F-statistic	 29.24	 1.92	 34.27	 17.81	 0.47	 23.24
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.099)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.828)	 (0.000)
1
reform (i985- 1992); 2' st;ge=banks e;isted in the second stage of banking refor; (1992OO2
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, CR4 = four-bank concentration
ratio, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person.
OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT
= a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The
F-statistic is from a test of the hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in
the regression jointly equal to zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Table 10. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the HERF, XJNEFF,
SINEFF, and other con frol variables
Dependent variable = ROA _________ Dependent variable = ROE _________
____________ All 	 Jst Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 jst Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
INT	 0.063	 -0.013	 0.075	 1.085	 -0,004	 1.496
[0.0141	 [0.061]	 [0.030]
	
[0.195]	 [0.7691
	
[0.446]
__________ (0.000)	 (0.829)	 (0.015)	 (0.000)	 (0.996)	 (0.001)
HERF	 -0.143	 0.011	 -0.213	 -2.884	 -0.445	 -4.895
[0.018]
	
[0.117]
	
[0.096]
	
[0.651]	 [1.381]
	
[1.436]
__________ (0.004)
	
(0.925)	 (0.029)	 (0.000)	 (0.749)	 (0.001)
XINEFF	 -0.030	 -0.013	 -0.027	 -0.481	 0.082	 -0.441
[0.010]	 [0.0441
	
[0.010]
	
[0.144]	 [0.543]	 [0.149]
__________ (0.002)
	 (0.778)	 (0.007)	 (0.001)	 (0.880)	 (0.004)
SINEFF	 0.027	 0.037	 -0.005	 0.335	 -0.163	 0.135
[0.0 14]	 [0.020]
	
[0.023]	 [0.222]	 [0.270]
	
[0.346]
__________ (0.054)	 (0.073)	 (0.820)	 (0.133)	 (0.549)	 (0.697)
AlP	 -0.024	 0.03 1	 -0.020	 -0.166	 0.553	 -0.269
[0.007]
	
[0.059]
	
[0.017]
	
[0.118]
	
[0.832]	 [0.257]
__________ (0.000)
	
(0.602)	 (0.258)	 (0.160)	 (0.5 10)	 (0.297)
OWN	 0.008	 0.007	 0.010	 0.094	 -0.002	 0.136
[0.001]
	
[0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.014]
	
[0.025]
	
[0.016]
__________ (0.000)
	 (0.002)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.945)	 (0.000)
TT	 -0.0003	 -5.05E-05	 -0.001	 -0.014	 -0.008	 -0.014
[0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]	 [0.009]	 [0.013]
	
[0.017]
___________ (0.597)
	 (0.956)	 (0.431)	 (0.121)	 (0.510)	 (0.390)
0.48	 0.09	 0.61	 0.36	 0.06	 0.53
F-statistic	 29.69	 1.87	 35.56	 18.46	 0.47	 25.41
__________ (0.000)	 (0.107)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.825)	 (0.000)
T,._	 ,	 _11 1._1_.	 L	 _..i. iSt	 L._1..	 L	 .	 _1__
reform (1985- 1992); 2 stage=banks e;isied inthe second banking ;eforrn (1992O02
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, TNT = intercept, I-IERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, XINEFF = X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person.
OWN = an ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT
= a time trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The
F-statistic is from a test of the hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in
the regression jointly equal to zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Table 11. Regression results of ROA and ROE on the MS, XINEFF, SINEFF,
and other control variables
Dependent variable = ROA __________ Dependent variable = ROE _________
____________ All	 ]St Stage	 2nd Stage	 All	 JSf Stage	 2nd Stage
N	 187	 54	 133	 187	 54	 133
JNT	 0.015	 -0.016	 0.017	 0.115	 -0.334	 0.113
[0.003]
	
[0.016]
	
[0.009]	 [0.039]
	
[0.194]	 [0.147]
___________ (0.000)
	 (0.343)	 (0.055)	 (0.003)	 (0.092)	 (0.443)
MS	 O.027	 0.048	 -0.018	 0.483	 0.760	 -0.177
[0.007]
	
[0.006]
	
[0.009]	 [0.085]
	
[0.056]
	
[0.111]
__________ (0.000)
	
(0.000)	 (0.058)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.111)
XJNEFF	 -0.026	 -0.029	 -0.031	 -0.392	 -0.148	 -0.492
[0.009]
	
[0.035]	 [0.010]	 [0.140]	 [0.347]
	
[0.147]
___________ (0.007)
	 (0.417)	 (0.001)	 (0.006)	 (0.672)	 (0.001)
SINEFF	 0.019	 0.028	 0.0002	 0.188	 -0.306	 0.186
[0.013]
	
[0.015]	 [0.024]
	
[0.200]	 [0.199]	 [0.352]
___________ (0.142)
	 (0.082)	 (0.993)	 (0.348)	 (0.130)	 (0.597)
AlP	 -0.029	 0.024	 -0.002	 -0.262	 0.654	 0.154
[0.007]
	
[0.034]	 [0.013]
	
[0.111]	 [0.406]
	
[0.225]
___________ (0.000)	 (0.484)	 (0.911)	 (0.019)	 (0.113)	 (0.496)
OWN	 0.014	 0.018	 0.005	 0.206	 0.176	 0.096
[0.002]	 [0.002]	 [0.003]	 [0.020]	 [0.022]
	
[0.035]
___________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.062)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.007)
Ti'	 0.001	 -0.0001	 -0.001	 0.011	 -0.009	 -0.026
[0.000]	 [0.001]	 [0.001]
	
[0.007]	 [0.008]
	
[0.017]
___________ (0.017)	 (0.879)	 (0.199)	 (0.088)	 (0.292)	 (0.127)
0.48	 0.39	 0.60	 0.33	 0.53	 0.49
F-statistic	 29.69	 6.61	 34.01	 16.46	 10.73	 21.73
___________ (0.000)
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)
All _I -----------	 1-----------ut _.	 I----------------------2t_	 ------------l_. --
.LIUU..fl. i. nii - all uainno III Liii.. aannlpLhl#, S	 3La5¼# - lJannr... i.,AIaLLA.1 lit Liii.. Allot .)LU5i.# WI Llallrllhlb
reform (1985-1992); 2 stage = banks existed in the second stage of banking reform (1993-2002),
ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity, INT = intercept, MS = market share, XINEFF =
X-inefficiency, SINEFF = scale inefficiency, AlP = average income per person. OWN = an
ownership dummy variable, equals to 0 if it's wholly state-owned, 1 for joint-stock. TT = a time
trend variable, equals to 0 to 17 as from years 1985 to 2002, respectively. 2. White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in brackets. 3. p-values are in parentheses. 4. The
F-statistic is from a test of the hypothesis that of the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) iii
the regression jointly equal to zero. 5. Coefficients in 10% significance level are in bold type.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
6.1 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis was to investigate X-efficiency, cost economies and
structure-performance relationship issues in China's banking sector. It began with
a review of the evolution of the banking sector over the past half-century, and
included reviews of the related theoretical and empirical studies of efficiency and
competition. However, using a data set on the major state and joint-stock banks
for the period 1985-2002, the thesis concentrated on:
Obtaining measures of X-efficiency, with a view to assessing how the
gradual reform strategy influenced X-efficiency and whether there were any
differences in X-efficiency between the state and joint-stock banks.
• Testing for economies of scale and scope of the sample of Chinese banks
and looking for differences in the cost economies between banks with
different ownership types and/or at different reform stages.
Assessing how competitive the market is by testing whether there is
empirical support for the market-power or efficient-structure hypotheses.
Chapter 2 reviewed the evolution of China's banking sector from 1949 to 2003,
providing the background for more detailed empirical analyses in subsequent
chapters. The banking sector underwent significant changes after the Chinese
government introduced a series of reforms, commencing in 1979. Employing a
gradual approach, the first stage of banking reform (1979-1992) transformed the
banking system from a monopoly into a two-tier banking system to strengthen its
role in the mobilisation and allocation of financial resources. However, this sector
was highly regulated, and was dominated by state-owned specialised banks.
Banks had little incentive and scant means to behave efficiently.
The second stage of banking reform (1993-present) was initiated with the
objective of developing an effective, competitive and stable banking sector. To
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achieve this aim, a package of financial reforms, involving a mix of deregulation
and new regulations, was adopted. For example, entry barriers were lowered, the
state-owned banks were commercialised, the credit ceiling was removed, an inter-
bank market was created, the interest rates were marginally liberalised, and
commercial and investment banking business were separated. Technological
progress has also boosted competition by eliminating geographical barriers and
facilitating product innovations.
In response to these changes, banks adopted strategies aiming at improving
efficiency to expand output and increase the range of services offered. The
streamlining of the state-owned banks, the expansion of the joint-stock banks, the
diversification of portfolios, increased off-balance-sheet activities, and, more
recently, a plan to turn some state banks into joint-stock, can be interpreted as
responses of this kind. A major motivation has been to realize potential scale and
scope economies, and to reduce inefficiencies. Given the above factors, and
noting that China's WTO accession may lead to an increasingly integrated
banking market, it is important to investigate the progress of China's banking
system with respect to efficiency and competition.
The second stage of reform was profound, but the high proportion of non-
performing loans has posed a substantial challenge to the sector during this stage.
Although the Chinese banks have made certain progress in improving the quality
of their loans, their average ratio of non-performing loans is still very high,
suggesting that improving asset quality should still be the major task for these
banks.
While the state banks are wholly owned by the state, the joint-stock banks are also
effectively owned by the state via local governments and state-owned enterprises.
They are not private banks typical of the west. However, the issues of social
welfare objectives and "soft" budget constraints are more applicable to the state
banks, given that they are the mainstream of China's banking sector, and directly
controlled by the government.
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To provide suggestions for future lines of enquiry and research, Chapter 2 also
included a preliminary analysis of the factors influencing bank performance in
China over the last two decades. The results show that both the ownership dummy
and time trend variables were statistically significant, confirming the need to look
into the differences between various reform stages and ownership types. The
exercise also showed that standard measures of bank efficiency influence
performance even in China, where government controls are so extensive. Future
research might focus on new influential variables as these are lifted.
Chapter 3 investigated X-efficiency within the banking system from 1985 to 2002.
The results show that the grand mean X-efficiency was in the range of 40%-50%.
Joint-stock commercial banks were found to be relatively more X-efficient than
the state-owned commercial banks. X-efficiency was found to be more
pronounced in the early stage of banking reform. Banks with higher proportions
of core deposits were relatively more X-efficient.
Chapter 4 evaluated economies of scale and scope in the banking sector. The
results indicate that there are constant returns to scale and significant economies
of scope in most of the banks, independent of ownership structure and the stage of
banking reform.
Chapter 5 looked at aspects of competition by investigating the structure-
performance relationship within the Chinese banking market. The results suggest
that the relative-market-power hypothesis appeared to be supported during the
first reform stage, but the second reform stage confirmed the X-efficiency version
of the efficient-structure hypothesis, although this was invalidated by a further
test. Joint-stock banks were found to have a small market share and lower scale
efficiency, but to be more X-efficient and earn greater profits. No significant
negative relationship between concentration and efficiency was found for the four
big state-owned banks.
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The findings from various chapters are consistent with each other, and suggest
that: (1) X-efficiency is a critical issue that should receive more attention from
researchers, bank regulators and managers. (2) Converting state-owned banks to
joint-stock ownership should improve their X-efficiency. In addition, the domestic
banks will behave like their foreign counterparts if they are subject to the full
force of competition with no interference (or expectation of interference) from the
state. (3) Interest rate liberalisation would provide bank managers with more
opportunities to boost their X-efficiency. (4) Relying on purchased funds rather
than core deposits to finance the portfolio would probably lead to X-inefficiency.
(5) Allowing banks to engage in universal banking operations is likely to improve
their cost structures. (6) The gradual reform strategy did improve the competitive
structure of China's banking sector to some extent. However, policy should be
directed at enabling the more efficient banks to gain larger market shares. Given
that the joint-stock banks were more efficient than the state-owned banks in this
sample, the policy implication is to encourage the expansion of the joint-stock
banks to further improve the competitive structure. (7) The big four banks did not
enjoy a 'quiet life' during the sample periods. However, the 'quiet life' scenario
could become a problem if, in future, banks operate in a highly concentrated
market with no restriction on interest rates. For the same reason, the banks could
end up with more market-power, which would probably validate the market-
power hypothesis. Thus, while interest rate deregulation should improve bank
efficiency, policy makers must be wary of potential negative effects from too
much market power, 'quiet life' effects, and other anti-competitive behaviour. In
other words, interest rate liberalization should be accompanied by reforms which
improve competitive structure, such as the deregulation of market entry.
In terms of methodology, several conclusions have been reached from this study.
First, applying different distribution assumptions to the disturbance term of the
stochastic frontier model yielded similar results, which supports the use of
relatively simple distribution. Second, the stochastic frontier approach and the
expansion path measures were found to be superior to the traditional non-frontier
approach and the standard measures in estimating economies of scale and scope
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for the Chinese banks. Finally, although using the standard regression model
yielded similar results to other bank studies, the random effects panel data model
was found to be more appropriate for this study, according to the Lagrange
multiplier test.
6.2 Limitations of this Thesis
As with other studies on bank efficiency and competition, this thesis has some
drawbacks. The first issue concerns the limited number of observations, because
of the relatively small number and short history of these banks. Thus, some
advanced techniques, such as the panel data approach and the Fourier-flexible
functional form, cannot be applied to estimate X-efficiency and economies of
scale and scope.
In terms of the methodology, as indicated by Berger and Humphrey (1997), one
problem with frontier analysis is that rankings of banks by their measured X-
efficiencies can differ, although the central tendency of average X-efficiency
values for banks is generally similar across frontier techniques. Since rankings
will vary depending on the frontier technique used, the common practice of the
two-stage regression may lead to misleading results. To make these ex post
regressions informative, X-efficiency estimates should be obtained from more
than just one class of frontier technique. However, this thesis used just one
parametric technique, the stochastic frontier approach, to estimate X-efficiency.
More frontier techniques are needed to cross-check the results.
Another issue is that X-efficiency is only a relative measure against the best
practice bank within the sample. The best practice bank itself may or may not be
really efficient in the real economic sense. The latter could cause the mis-
measurement of the real efficiency level of China's banking sector.
Finally, as indicated by Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987), the cost
function only captures the cost- or supply-side benefits to banks from joint
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production, as in the first two resources of economies of scope (i.e., spreading
fixed costs and information production). However, it ignores the revenue- or
demand-side benefits, as in the last two resources (i.e., risk reduction and
customer cost economies). Therefore, the total economies from joint production
may be understated in the empirical estimates here and in other studies.
6.3 Avenues for Future Research
Several suggestions for future research may be derived from this thesis. First, a
larger data set should produce more reliable results by enabling more advanced
techniques to address the efficiency and competition issues. Second, the
nonparametric approach, such as data envelopement analysis, should be applied to
cross-check the X-efficiency in the banking sector.
Third, while the efficiency analysis of this thesis concentrated on the cost side of
banks' operations, banks in China have already recently put their energies into
trying to boost returns to shareholders by focusing on both costs and revenues.
Thus, further work is needed to estimate the profit efficiency, which also takes the
revenue sides of banks' operations into account.
Finally, while this thesis has made a contribution to estimating the structure-
performance relationship within China's banking sector, none of the theories are
completely consistent with the observed relationships among profits, market
structure and efficiency for banks in the second reform stage. Further research is
needed along these lines.
The acceleration of the interest rate liberalization and the full implementation of
the WTO commitments in the coming years will change the operational
environment of the banks in China greatly, suggesting that the structure-
performance relationship should be a more critical topic in future research.
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The continuing efforts of researchers will hopefully find answers to these
questions and shed more light on the factors that influence efficiency and
competition in the banking sector.
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